台灣金融服務業董事酬勞及持股比例對組織財務績效之影響

Abstract

本論文主要目的，除在探討台灣金融服務業董事酬勞之發放及董事持股比例的提高，是否有助於提升企業的經營績效外，也將驗證董事持股比例在酬勞對組織績效之影響的干擾效果是否存在。 本論文研究對象是43家台灣上市、上櫃金融服務業廠商。本研究以這些廠商2002至2006年當年度平均董事酬勞與前一年度財務績效進行相關分析，得出每一家廠商的相關係數作為本研究董事酬勞誘因機制之自變數。經由迴歸分析得到以下結論： 1.董事酬勞誘因機制對組織績效有正向影響。 2.董事持股比例對組織績效既無直接影響，也未顯著干擾誘因機制對組織績效的影響。 另外，本研究結果發現，外部董事比率對組織財務績效有顯著負向影響，係由於金融服務業管理階層易尋求外部董事為其政策背書，並未實際發揮獨立董事應有之功能。因此，未來應加強落實相關規定，以有效提高公司治理之成效。

This thesis examines two research issues. First is whether increasing the compensation and ownership stake of directors of financial services firms in Taiwan helps a firm's operating performance. The second is whether the impact of director compensation on operating performance is affected by the size of their ownership stake. The research presented in this thesis focuses on 43 financial services firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the GreTai Securities Market. The data used in this thesis compares current-year compensation versus previous-year operating performance for each year in the period 2002-2006 to obtain coefficients for each financial services firm. These are then used as independent variables for study of the compensation incentive mechanism. The empirical results show that 1. The compensation incentive mechanism is positively associated with operating performance. 2. Impact of the ownership stake on operating performance is not direct and does not significantly affect the impact of the compensation incentive mechanism on operating performance. In addition, this thesis finds that the proportion of independent directors has a significant negative association with operating performance. The directors of financial services firms tend to find external directors who will support their policies, therefore external directors fail to function as independent directors. Therefore, financial services firms should strengthen their internal rules to improve corporate governance.