上市櫃公司董監持股比例偏低經營權受威脅時其因應對策分析─以矽品公司防禦措施為例

Abstract

本論文主要在探討上市櫃公司董監事持股比例偏低，於面臨敵意併購威脅時所採因應對策及分析，以2015年至2016年，台灣併購市場最受到關注的案例─日月光併購矽品案為例，由美國比較法的角度出發，討論在我國現行法制下可行的防禦措施，就矽品所採的防禦措施及其適法性進行深入分析，並試圖找尋矽品是否可能有其他防禦措施，並比較三個不同階段鞏固經營權措施之案例，提出結論與建議。

Hostile M&A （Mergers and Acquisitions） often takes place when company directors & supervisors of the board are not significant shareholders. The 2015~2016 ASE-SPIL M&A case was one of the most outstanding cases in Taiwan. This thesis explores & apply in-depth analysis with viable & applicable defensive measures on the ASE-SPIL case in comparative law (United States/ Taiwan) perspectives. Alternative studies were also made to find if other feasible counter measurements were available. Comparisons & Recommendations to protect company control are also given based on scenarios in three different company cases.