以現金流量、資本支出與研究發展費用、股利，或經濟附加價值作為經理人績效衡量指標對於公司投資效率之影響

Abstract

本研究以1993至2015年美國S&P500的公司為研究對象，探討當高階經理人的薪酬計畫中包含營業活動現金流量、資本支出或研究發展費用、股利，或經濟附加價值等績效衡量指標時，對於自由現金流量與過度投資的關聯性是否有加重或減緩的效果。實證結果顯示當自由現金流量為正時，企業採用營業活動現金流量為高階經理人薪酬計畫中的績效衡量指標時，確實會減緩過度投資的行為發生。而當選擇納入經濟附加價值為薪酬制度中的績效衡量指標時，則反而會加重過度投資的情況。至於以資本支出或研究發展費用，或是股利作為績效衡量指標則為不顯著結果。

This study investigates whether using operating cash flows, capital expenditure/ R&D, dividends, or economic value added (EVA) as performance measure in CEO’s compensation plan affects firm-level over-investment of free cash flow. Focusing on S&P 500 firms from 1993 to 2015, this paper demonstrates that firms using operating cash flows as performance measures in CEO’s compensation plan are less likely to over investment their free cash flows. However, using EVA as CEO performance measures boosts over-investment. However, I find no evidence showing that using capital expenditure/ R&D, or dividends as performance measures affect firms’ over-investment.