「以凍代刪」預算審議之研究-以2004年至2012年時期為中心

Abstract

近年來立法院一到審議總預算之場景，因政黨對立情況嚴重及預期心理因素影響下，立法院對於預算之減額刪除上，似乎擁有無限制的強大權力。立法院於預算審議時，履見「經同意後始准動支」已公布之法定預算之決議，即一般所稱「預算之凍結」。即立法委員在委員會審查預算時，以凍結預算方式要脅行政部門，其目的在於立法權藉預算之「解凍」替代「刪減」，得以介入預算之執行，並干預行政權之行使。 本研究之重點在於，分析94至101年度預算案在陳水扁與馬英九不同政府時期，我國中央政府預算從預算案到立法院三讀通過的法定預算，其預算刪減數、預算凍結率、中央政府年度預算刪減之幅度及凍結預算數及比較兩政府各執政年度刪減率與凍結率之實證研究等解釋審查預算遭凍結、刪減之情形，最後比較在不同政府時期是否具有顯著差異。 本研究之結論為，扁政府時期預算刪減確實高於馬政府時期、扁政府時期預算凍結確實高於馬政府時期、扁政府時期審查預算以大幅刪減歲入預算替代大幅刪減歲出預算以及比較兩個政府時期，預算凍結率均高於預算刪減率。

In recent years, the Legislative Yuan of REpublic of China has had a great power for budget deletion at budgetary process because of political party of rivalry and some mental factors. There is usually” paid after approval” happened at budgetary process in Legislative Yuan. It means that when legislators can threaten Administration Department by Budget Block. The purpose of Budget Block is to replace deletion and then access to intervene budget execution. Besides, it is to meddle in executive power of administrative authority. This research is focused on the analysis of the budget cases between Chen Shui-Bian and Ma Ying-jeou from 2005 to 2012. There are amount of budget deletion, the rate of budge block, the range of annual budget deletion for central government and comparison between two periods of parties in power. Finally, the variation is apparent or not in different parties duration. The conclusion of this research is that Chen Shui-Bian administration is actually with a higher budget deletion rate and budget block than Ma Ying-jeouadministration. Chen Shui-Bian administrationreduced annual input budget wider than annual output budget. Moreover, the rate of budget block is higher than rate of budget deletion.