語意、詮釋與理由─以語意學之刺為中心的討論

Abstract

本文的研究主題是美國法哲學家德沃金所提出的語意學之刺論證(Semantic Sting Argument)。藉由語意學之刺，德沃金指出法實證主義是一個不成功的法理論。有別於一般直接對於語意學之刺論證進行評價，並試圖鑑別這個論證是否能夠駁斥法實證主義，亦或是法實證主義可以成功回應語意學之刺攻擊的討論模式，本文將採取有別於過往文獻的論證形態，嘗試評價德沃金所提出的語意學之刺是否會反而造成對其理論，也就是詮釋性法理學的打擊。 本文對這個問題採取肯定的見解，並透過評估語意學之刺如何影響德沃金論證的健全程度，顯示語意如何影響個人對於規範判斷中給予理由的過程，以及語意又是如何不可否定地影響了詮釋活動的實踐。本文的討論不只著眼於傳統法哲學的研究方式、論證與相關文獻，更將觸及與行動理由相關的經驗研究，透過評估這些經驗研究在規範建構上的意義與貢獻，我們可以重新理解主體如何面對規範，並在以規範為基礎進行判斷時，又是如何因為受到語意侷限，而弔詭地使其完成真正的判斷與實踐。

The thesis is devoted to evaluate Dworkin’s Semantic Sting Argument, which is designed to criticize the theories of legal positivism. Based on semantic sting, Dworkin claims that legal positivism in general is not a successful theory of law. Depart from the common literature concentrating on whether Dworkin has successfully debunked legal positivism by semantic sting, or on the contrary, legal positivists survive the attack, I would like to take a different approach to cope with the question. I will evaluate from another perspective whether Dworkin’s own theory, the interpretive jurisprudence, will also fail itself through the criticism of semantic sting, and invalidate the project of interpretive jurisprudence. The answer towards the above-mentioned question in this thesis is positive. To show how semantic sting also influence the validity of interpretive jurisprudence, the thesis will demonstrate how semantics actually play an important role in the process of reason-giving in normative judgments, and semantics also influences the practice of interpretation. The thesis will not simply draw upon the traditional methods, arguments, and literature on the issue, it will also refer to empirical researches related the topic. The thesis will evaluate through the empirical researches how norms are constructed, and how humans confront norms. All in all, the thesis intends to point out how paradoxically human beings will be limited by semantics, yet can only accomplished normative judgments and practices through the limitation of semantics.