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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳妙芬 | |
| dc.contributor.author | I-Chun Chang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 張逸群 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T01:02:31Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2014-10-03 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2014-09-29 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Alexy, R. (2002). A theory of constitutional rights. (J. Rivers, Trans.) New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/18384 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文的研究主題是美國法哲學家德沃金所提出的語意學之刺論證(Semantic Sting Argument)。藉由語意學之刺，德沃金指出法實證主義是一個不成功的法理論。有別於一般直接對於語意學之刺論證進行評價，並試圖鑑別這個論證是否能夠駁斥法實證主義，亦或是法實證主義可以成功回應語意學之刺攻擊的討論模式，本文將採取有別於過往文獻的論證形態，嘗試評價德沃金所提出的語意學之刺是否會反而造成對其理論，也就是詮釋性法理學的打擊。
本文對這個問題採取肯定的見解，並透過評估語意學之刺如何影響德沃金論證的健全程度，顯示語意如何影響個人對於規範判斷中給予理由的過程，以及語意又是如何不可否定地影響了詮釋活動的實踐。本文的討論不只著眼於傳統法哲學的研究方式、論證與相關文獻，更將觸及與行動理由相關的經驗研究，透過評估這些經驗研究在規範建構上的意義與貢獻，我們可以重新理解主體如何面對規範，並在以規範為基礎進行判斷時，又是如何因為受到語意侷限，而弔詭地使其完成真正的判斷與實踐。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The thesis is devoted to evaluate Dworkin’s Semantic Sting Argument, which is designed to criticize the theories of legal positivism. Based on semantic sting, Dworkin claims that legal positivism in general is not a successful theory of law. Depart from the common literature concentrating on whether Dworkin has successfully debunked legal positivism by semantic sting, or on the contrary, legal positivists survive the attack, I would like to take a different approach to cope with the question. I will evaluate from another perspective whether Dworkin’s own theory, the interpretive jurisprudence, will also fail itself through the criticism of semantic sting, and invalidate the project of interpretive jurisprudence.
The answer towards the above-mentioned question in this thesis is positive. To show how semantic sting also influence the validity of interpretive jurisprudence, the thesis will demonstrate how semantics actually play an important role in the process of reason-giving in normative judgments, and semantics also influences the practice of interpretation. The thesis will not simply draw upon the traditional methods, arguments, and literature on the issue, it will also refer to empirical researches related the topic. The thesis will evaluate through the empirical researches how norms are constructed, and how humans confront norms. All in all, the thesis intends to point out how paradoxically human beings will be limited by semantics, yet can only accomplished normative judgments and practices through the limitation of semantics. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T01:02:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-R01a21004-1.pdf: 3022528 bytes, checksum: 900a9972a8bc98e5a798bf5415301d55 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 導論 1
一、問題意識 1 二、章節綱要 4 三、研究旨趣與進路 7 第二章 語意學之刺：結構、特徵與其問題 9 一、前言 9 二、語意學之刺：理論與其問題 10 1.先決問題：為何是「語意」？ 10 2. 語意學法理論(Semantic Theories of Law) 16 a.理論 16 b.案例 19 3. 語意學理論的錯誤何在？ 22 a. 錯誤之一：分類謬誤 22 b. 錯誤之二：缺乏詮釋 24 4.建構性詮釋：一個勝過語意學法理論的替代方案 25 5.小結：型構語意學之刺論證(the semantic sting argument) 26 三、語意學之刺論證的結構：分析與評價 28 1.語意學法理論在方法上的問題 28 2.概念觀作為語意學法理論的盲點 29 a.慣例主義 30 b.法實用主義 31 c.缺乏對法律概念觀的評價所造成的不均衡謬誤 31 3.建構性詮釋中的整全法：一個優越的替代方案 32 4.小結：關鍵的客觀性 35 四、語意學之刺論證與其自我駁斥(self-refuting)的性質 39 1.定義的問題 40 2.詮釋的定義：德沃金的可能出路 46 a.嚴格的定義 46 b.嚴格定義的問題 47 3.對定義的進一步分析：Ramsey-Lewis方法 54 a.分析 55 b.討論 58 4.小結 62 第三章 語意學之刺的困難與其根源：語意、詮釋與理解 64 一、前言：懷疑論的陰影 64 二、懷疑論的不滿與不滿的懷疑論 65 1.駁斥懷疑論的論證 65 2.駁斥懷疑論所產生的問題 69 a.分類的問題 69 b.客觀性的真正要求 74 3.問題的根源：對語意的反對 76 4.語意、「詮釋」與理解：另外一種面對懷疑論的方式 81 5.懷疑論爭議中的後設倫理學的地位 84 a.後設倫理學作為一個假問題(pseudo-question) 84 b.禮儀論證:一個德沃金哲學的反例 86 c.開放問題：論證的開始或結束？ 91 6.小結：德沃金、詮釋性法理學與法律哲學的未來 93 三、語意學之刺的對象：正解或誤解？ 96 1.問題的形態與範圍 96 2..法律社群的態度 96 2.Hercules法官：社群態度的化身 99 a.Hercules的任務 99 b.Hercules的自我矛盾：以實踐上的落差為核心 101 3.整全性的內涵、分類與價值 102 4.德沃金詮釋論證的重構 104 5.對IPA結構的考察：世界上存在幾位Hercules法官？ 107 6.在專名與通稱之間：關於「Hercules法官」的概念本質之爭 109 第四章、裁判、法官與規範性的問題：關於理由的考察 112 一、從裁判呈現的論證到法官所為的裁判 112 1.問題的型態 112 2.法官的本質問題 114 3.法官、理性與建構性詮釋 115 a.法官作為裁判中的理性行動者 115 b.法官所犯謬誤的意義 117 4.Hercules法官的認知能力 120 a.Herucles法官的可錯特質 120 b.對照組：Hermes法官的論證 121 5.類比論證(Analogy Argument)與法律概念 123 6.文本主義：一個個案分析 125 7.Hercules的致命問題 129 二、再訪裁判本旨 130 1由裁判論證中的概念觀到法官推論中的概念觀 130 2.由法官裁判到法律本旨 134 a.凱爾森的洞見 134 b.法律爭議的「最差解答」：一個為Paris法官為主角的思想實驗 135 c.Hercules與Paris兩位法官的比較：Sorensen案的分析 138 i.案例爭點與裁判方式 138 ii.裁判分歧的根源 141 3.道德瑪莉論證(the Moral Mary Argument) 142 a.瑪莉的故事 142 b.瑪莉的問題：道德判斷與情緒 146 i.情緒作為必要條件 146 ii.Paris與瑪莉的異同比較 147 三、「應該」(ought to)的本質：行動理由(reason for action)的提出 148 1. 理由的範疇與本質 148 2.重訪禮儀論證 149 3.行動理由作為語意學之刺的根源 150 a.理由的先驗結構 150 b.理由形成在經驗中的時序問題 155 4.理由作為社會權威的內在表徵 159 5.語意中的錯誤：語言類比的考察 162 a.威廉故事中的啟示 162 b.語言與道德的類比 163 6.重返語意學之刺 168 四、小結：語意學之刺的「錯誤」與其「貢獻」 171 1.語意學之刺的意義 171 2.語意、理由與原因─一個戴維森式的視角 174 第五章、結論：語意、理由與脆弱的規範主體 180 參考文獻 189 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 語意、詮釋與理由─以語意學之刺為中心的討論 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Semantics, Interpretation and Reasons
-Discussion focusing on the Semantic Sting | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 103-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王鵬翔,吳豐維 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 語意學之刺,規範,規範性,詮釋,詮釋性法理學,理由, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | semantic sting,norm,normativity,interpretation,interpretive jurisprudence,reason, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 196 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2014-09-29 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 法律學系 | |
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