異質性借貸限制下的最適成長政策

Abstract

從歷史上可以觀察到，許多經濟體在發展早期，並無良好運作的借貸市場，因而不利於資源分配與資本累積。本文從動態財政學的文獻出發，討論面對這樣的經濟體，政府最適切的角色為何。模型的環境設定中，生產者彼此間有生產力的異質性，而生產力在市場上並非全然的私有資訊，因此也會影響其借貸受限的程度。在考慮政府可以動用勞動稅與儲蓄稅的情境中，最適的成長政策會是在發展早期刺激勞動供給、壓低工資帶來的生產成本；而當生產者已有足夠的財富累積，政策則應平滑地轉向成對資本家不利，使勞工增加休閒，並提升工資。在考慮各式的稅收與補貼政策後，若借款人的生產力資訊愈不透明，則政府介入能帶來的福祉愈多。此外，除了在要素市場中的財政政策，我們進一步考慮公共資本在成長歷程中的最適投資，並發現早期較大量的公共財投資能夠緩解其他財政政策帶來的市場扭曲，且有助於生產者更快地脫離借貸限制帶來的困境。

We follow the dynamic public finance literature to discuss the optimal development policy that overcomes financial frictions in the capital market. In particular, producers are heterogeneous with respect to the extent of collateral constraint. The degree of heterogeneity depends on the correlation between a borrower's productivity and her borrowing successful rate, which we interpret as an information barrier. Aside from a direct transfer policy implemented by the social planner, we further introduce government capital to the official toolkit. Under the Ramsey optimal policy framework, the more severe the information barrier is, the more appreciated the intervention would be. In addition, government capital provision can be a good company while utilizing other distortionary subsidies concurrently, and its dynamic displays similar pattern along the growth path as in the previous literatures: pro-business in the short-run, and pro-worker in the long-run.