審計委員會權益薪酬之決定因素

Abstract

由於權益薪酬之使用漸趨廣泛,其相關討論增加,再加上審計委員會職責逐 漸加重等因素,促使本研究欲找出哪些因素使得公司給予其審計委員會成員權益 薪酬。研究發現代理問題較嚴重之公司傾向不給予權益薪酬。薪酬委員會中成員 同時為審計委員會成員之比例則與給予權益薪酬之可能性呈顯著正向關係。而審 計委員會中董事同時為其他公司之高階主管之比例越高則公司傾向不給予權益薪 酬。本研究期能對審計委員會成員權益薪酬之相關議題做進一步的補充,幫助釐 清採用權益薪酬之決定因素。

Due to the controversy of the rising use of equity-based compensation and enhanced responsibilities of audit committee, this study examines the determinants that affect firm’s use of stock and option to remunerate audit committee members. My results show that firms having severer agency conflicts are significantly negatively associated with the presence of equity-based compensation for audit committee. Furthermore, firms with more compensation committee members serving on audit committee are significantly more likely to adopt stock and option plans for audit committee members. Moreover, if there are more audit committee members who are also top managers of other companies, the probability of equity remuneration for audit committees will be lower. Overall, the study contributes to the research about the determinants of audit committee member’s compensation.