請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17693完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳聖賢(Sheng-Syan Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chia-Hsun Tang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 湯佳勳 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T00:31:24Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2013-07-18 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2013-07-02 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Aggarwal, Rajesh K., Meschke, Felix, & Wang, Tracy. (2009). Corporate Political Contributions: Investment or Agency? Unpublished working paper.
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589-609. Chugh, Lal C., & Meador, Joseph W. (2008). An Analysis Of The Levels And Patterns Of Shareholder Rights: 1990 - 2006. Journal of Business & Economics Research, 6. Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008). Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 554-580. Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., & Ovtchinnikov, A. V. (2010). Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns. Journal of Finance, 65(2), 687-724. Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Rusticus, T. O. (2006). Does weak governance cause weak stock returns? An examination of firm operating performance and investors' expectations. Journal of Finance, 61(2), 655-687. Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., & McConnell, J. J. (2006). Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2597-2635. Faccio, Mara. (2007). The Characteristics of Politically Connected Firms. Purdue CIBER Working Papers. Goldman, Eitan, Rocholl, Jorg, & So, Jongil. (2007). Political Connections and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts. Forthcoming Review of Finance Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107-155. Grier, K. B., Munger, M. C., & Roberts, B. E. (1994). The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986. American Political Science Review, 88(4), 911-926. James M. Snyder, Jr. (1992). Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often. Journal of Law and Economics,, Vol. 35, No. 1, 15-43. Joel F. Houston, Liangliang Jiang, Chen Lin, Yue Ma. (2012). Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans. Working papers series. Larry W. Chavis, Leora F. Klapper, and Inessa Love. (2011). The Impact of the Business Environment on Young Firm Financing. World Bank Econ Rev (2011) 25 (3): 486-507. Mathur, I., & Singh, M. (2011). Corporate political strategies. Accounting and Finance, 51(1), 252-277. Ovtchinnikov, A. V., & Pantaleoni, E. (2012). Individual political contributions and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(2), 367-392. Owen, S., & Yawson, A. (2010). Corporate life cycle and M&A activity. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(2), 427-440. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17693 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 1984到2012年，美國企業政治捐獻有增加的趨勢，而且總資產較大的公司捐獻金額較高，這顯示政治捐獻對企業存在其重要性。因此我們進而探討決定企業政治捐獻的因素。實證結果顯示成長機會較高、較年長及所屬產業集中程度較高的公司捐獻金額較高。此外，經濟狀況比較不好的時候，公司有較高捐獻金額。當我們將樣本以公司總資產大小劃分時，發現大公司中高槓桿的公司捐獻金額比低槓桿公司多，小公司中財務壓力較高的公司捐獻金額較高。考量捐獻與決定因子的關係可能會隨時間改變，因此衡量2000年代前後，捐獻與決定因子間關係變化。結果顯示2000年以前，股東權利較薄弱的公司，企業政治捐獻金額較高，這與過去研究結果相符合。然而，2000以後，股東權利較強的公司，企業政治捐獻金額較高。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | We find a positive time trend in U.S. firms’ total contribution amount from 1984 to 2012, the relation is more significant in firms with larger total assets. We also measure the determinants of political contributions. Empirical results show that high growth opportunity firms, old firms and firms in more concentrated industry contribute more; Moreover, firms contribute more during bear market state. High leverage firms contribute more in condition of large firm size. Distress firms contribute more while we constrain our sample in small firm size. Before 2000, firms with weaker shareholder rights contribute more, which is consistent with previous research. However, the relation reversed in 2000s, firms with stronger shareholder rights contribute more after 2000. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T00:31:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-102-R00723050-1.pdf: 746326 bytes, checksum: b41a7adda034986406193fed2b031511 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i
摘要 ii ABSTRACT iii CONTANTS iv LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES vi 1 Introduction 1 2 Hypotheses development and related literature 3 2.1 Leverage 3 2.2 Growth opportunities 3 2.3 Financial distress 4 2.4 Governance 4 2.5 Firm life cycle 5 2.6 Industrial concentration 5 2.7 Business Life Cycle 6 3 The increase in political contributions 8 4 The determinants of political contribution 11 4.1 Leverage 11 4.2 Growth Opportunities 12 4.3 Financial Distress 12 4.4 Governance 13 4.5 Firm Life Cycle 14 4.6 Industrial Concentration 15 4.7 Business Life Cycle 15 4.8 Regression Model 16 5 Conclusions 19 References 21 Appendix 23 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 企業政治捐獻的決定因素 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Determinants of Political Corporate Contributions | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 101-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 施懿宸,陳鴻毅,林玟君 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 企業政治捐獻, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Corporate Political Contribution, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 35 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2013-07-02 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-102-1.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 728.83 kB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。