美國產險業薪酬與績效的關係以及SOX法案對美國產險業的影響

Abstract

本文研究美國產險業公司在薪酬與績效的敏感度關係以及SOX法案對於不同所有權結構的保險公司所造成的影響，並以固定效果迴歸分析法進行實證研究分析，得到以下結果，當董事會中，越多外部董事的參與 (董事會外部董事的佔比大於75%時)，薪酬變動量與績效變動量間的敏感度關係越高；以及在公司董事會中，外部董事的佔比必須達到85%以上， SOX法案才會對薪酬變動量與績效變動量間的敏感度關係產生正向之影響，且對於不受SOX法案規範之相互公司亦產生顯著的正影響。

This thesis investigates pay–for–performance sensitivity within the U.S. insurance industry and the impact of SOX Act on this sensitivity for casualty and property insurance companies (with different ownership structures) in the United States. In this study, I conduct the fixed effects regression analysis, and obtain the following results: First, changes in the amount of pay–for–performance sensitivity will be higher when the board’s proportion of outside directors is greater than 75%. Second, when the board’s proportion of outside directors is more than 85%, there is positive impact on the pay–for–performance sensitivity due to the SOX Act. Finally, there is significantly positive impact on the mutual companies which are regulated by the SOX Act.