電力市場需量反應之雙層最佳化模型

Abstract

為舒緩供電吃緊的壓力，並避免限電危機，用戶群代表為其中一種需求面管理的機制，透過執行需量反應，消費者在緊急時段抑低用電以幫助平衡電網供需，本研究針對不同電力市場情況，利用史坦伯格賽局(Stackelberg game)，考慮配電系統營運商、用戶群代表(aggregator)、消費者、產銷者(prosumer) 等等，建立雙層最佳化模型，以最大化各參與者的利益，場景分為需量反應市場，以及具間歇性發電來源之需量反應市場，雙層模型在經過Karush–Kuhn–Tucker(KKT) 條件、強對偶理論(strong duality) 轉換後成為單層二次規劃模型(quadratic programming model)，個案分析中使用臺灣歷史資料，藉此分析在電力市場加入用戶群代表後，各決策者的獲利情況。

In order to prevent from electricity shortage, an aggregator is a way of demand side management. By implementing demand response, consumers help reduce demand to meet supply in an emergency period. This research aims at different market situations using the Stackelberg game structure with respect to the distribution system operator(DSO), aggregators, consumers, and prosumers. There are two scenarios. One is demand response market and the other is demand response market with intermittent power generation sources. We reformulate the bilevel programming by KKT conditions and strong duality. The case study makes use of Taiwan’s data to analyze the profits of participants, including DSO and aggregators.