請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17288完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 洪一薰(I-Hsuan Hong) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Ping Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 王怡萍 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T00:05:06Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-09-23 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-08-07 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/17288 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 為舒緩供電吃緊的壓力，並避免限電危機，用戶群代表為其中一種需求面管理的機制，透過執行需量反應，消費者在緊急時段抑低用電以幫助平衡電網供需，本研究針對不同電力市場情況，利用史坦伯格賽局(Stackelberg game)，考慮配電系統營運商、用戶群代表(aggregator)、消費者、產銷者(prosumer) 等等，建立雙層最佳化模型，以最大化各參與者的利益，場景分為需量反應市場，以及具間歇性發電來源之需量反應市場，雙層模型在經過Karush–Kuhn–Tucker(KKT) 條件、強對偶理論(strong duality) 轉換後成為單層二次規劃模型(quadratic programming model)，個案分析中使用臺灣歷史資料，藉此分析在電力市場加入用戶群代表後，各決策者的獲利情況。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In order to prevent from electricity shortage, an aggregator is a way of demand side management. By implementing demand response, consumers help reduce demand to meet supply in an emergency period. This research aims at different market situations using the Stackelberg game structure with respect to the distribution system operator(DSO), aggregators, consumers, and prosumers. There are two scenarios. One is demand response market and the other is demand response market with intermittent power generation sources. We reformulate the bilevel programming by KKT conditions and strong duality. The case study makes use of Taiwan’s data to analyze the profits of participants, including DSO and aggregators. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T00:05:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-0608202014492000.pdf: 1832948 bytes, checksum: 887e000bb2e00b77a898990748f7984e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 誌謝 i 摘要 ii Abstract iii 圖目錄 v 表目錄 vi 第1章 緒論 1 第2章 文獻回顧 5 2.1 賽局模型於需量反應電力市場 5 2.2 用戶群代表於市場上的不同應用 6 第3章 史坦伯格賽局雙層模型 8 3.1 問題描述 8 3.2 消費者需量反應效用函數 14 3.3 需量反應電力市場 16 3.3.1 配電系統營運商模型 16 3.3.2 需量反應用戶群代表模型 17 3.4 具間歇性發電來源之需量反應市場 18 3.4.1 配電系統營運商模型 19 3.4.2 具間歇性發電來源用戶群代表模型 19 第4章 求解方法 21 4.1 模型重組 21 4.1.1 需量反應電力市場雙層模型重組 21 4.1.2 具間歇性發電來源需量反應市場之雙層模型重組 22 4.2 線性化KKT條件 24 4.3 強對偶理論 25 第5章 個案分析 28 5.1 個案背景與參數設定 28 5.2 需量反應市場 31 5.3 具間歇性發電來源之需量反應市場 32 5.3.1 夏季需量反應市場 33 5.3.2 冬季需量反應市場 35 第6章 結論與未來研究方向 38 參考文獻 39 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 電力市場需量反應之雙層最佳化模型 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The application of bilevel programming model on demand response with aggregators | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 胡明哲(Ming-Che Hu),鍾年勉(Nian-Mian Zhong) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 需量反應,用戶群代表,史坦伯格賽局, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Demand Response,Aggregator,Stackelberg game, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 44 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202002540 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2020-08-10 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 工業工程學研究所 | |
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