董監事責任險、債務契約與盈餘保守性

Abstract

本文主要運用Basu (1997)的盈餘時效性不對稱模型，探討董監事責任保險是否影響我國企業會計盈餘保守性，並進一步研究債務契約的影響是否得以解釋董監事責任保險對於企業會計盈餘保守程度的差異。 董監事責任保險的道德風險問題引起經營者和相關利益者之間的代理衝突，會計盈餘保守性向來被視為是一個潛在解決代理問題的機制，會計盈餘保守性主要來自於債權持有人對於債權保護的需求，而公司為了滿足債務發行需求在會計盈餘上將更為保守。因此本研究假設，當公司購買董監事責任保險時，代理衝突的增加會產生更多的會計盈餘保守性。 實證研究結果顯示，購買董監事責任保險的企業中，承受較高外部融資壓力的公司報導更顯著的會計盈餘保守特性。本研究結果支持債務契約需求導致盈餘保守性假說，亦即會計盈餘保守性的實務需求主要來自於債權人對於降低代理衝突與促進契約效率有關。

Prior studies argue that the purchase of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance can reduce litigation risks and increase managerial opportunism. As Watts (2003) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that earnings conservatism can mitigate agency problems through constraining opportunistic behavior of managers, I evaluate whether this earnings conservatism holds when firms with high debt contracting demands purchase D&O insurance. Using data on firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the GreTai Securities Market during 2008-2010, and employing the Basu (1997) specification to measure earnings conservatism, I find that firms with D&O insurance and higher external demand for debts report more earnings conservatism. These results are consistent with prior studies (Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 2003) that debtholders demand greater earnings conservatism as a means of addressing agency problems. This study also provides evidence that debtholders appear to be the primary driver of the demand for earnings conservatism.