行為理論於推行電動車之補貼政策研析

Abstract

本研究擬分析政府補貼電動車消費者之政策成效，透過史坦柏格賽局的模型建置，以政府作為領導者先行決定給予電動車消費者的補貼金額，而電動車廠商和燃油車廠商則作為跟隨者，在觀察政府給出的補貼金額後分別決定電動車與燃油車的售價，同時也於模型中嵌入行為經濟學理論以適切描述政府補貼對於消費者購買決策的影響，最終觀察在三種不同的補貼方案下，所造成的電動車需求、社會福祉與補貼額度之差異，並發現一次性購車補助政策將得以最節省的財政支出便獲得最佳推行電動車之成效。

This research is aimed to analyze the effectiveness of the government’s subsidy policies for consumers purchasing electric vehicles via the Stackelberg game approach, in which the government acts as leader and both electric vehicle manufacturer and automobile manufacturer act as followers. The government determines the subsidy amount for consumers purchasing electric vehicles first, and both firms determine their prices simultaneously after investigating the subsidy amount that the government announces. Moreover, our research considers behavioral theories into the models in order to describe consumer behaviors while making purchasing decisions in a plausible way. Finally, we investigate three proposed subsidy policies with respect to the demand of electric vehicles, the social welfare and the optimal subsidy amount. Our study shows that one-time subsidy policy performs the best in promoting the adoption of electric vehicles with the lowest costs.