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標題: | 「語法」抑或「事實」:評Marmor承認慣習論對法律效力問題的解答 Grammar or Fact: Marmor on Conventions of Recognition Constituting the Conditions of Legal Validity |
作者: | Jun-An Lu 盧俊安 |
指導教授: | 莊世同(Shih-Tung Chuang) |
關鍵字: | 法律效力,承認慣習,構成性慣習,還原論,語法,確實性, legal validity,Conventions of Recognition,Constitutive Conventions,Grammar,Certainty, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 「法律效力的一般性條件為何」是當代分析法理學的核心議題之一。法律實證論者通常假定,法律實踐總體上是一種規則或者規範轄制的活動,而一旦這種活動當中的本質規則得到充分闡明,法律效力問題將迎刃而解。H. L. A. Hart的承認規則理論即是在此一假定之下所提出的傑出理論,這一理論旨在說明,作為社會事實的承認規則構成了法律效力的一般性條件。然而,法律實證論者所假定的實踐圖像在Ronald Dworkin詮釋主義的批判之下變得脆弱不堪,承認規則理論的基礎被動搖。
沿著Hart的進路,法哲學家Andrei Marmor提出了一種新的承認規則理論——承認慣習論,以回應Dworkin的批判。本文的目的在於,整理和重構Marmor承認慣習論對法律效力問題的解答,進而詳細評析Marmor的解答是否能夠充分回應Dworkin對法律實證論實踐圖像的批判。本文將Marmor的承認慣習論重構為兩大命題——構成論以及可還原事實論,並且指出,Marmor是否能夠充分回應Dworkin的批判,懸決於可還原事實論。然而,借鑒哲學家Ludwig Wittgenstein關於「語法命題」的洞見,本文將論證,Marmor的承認慣習論的「理論語句」,沒有陳述任何經驗事實,而是具有經驗命題形式的「語法命題」,進而可還原事實論為假。因此,我們得出結論:Marmor的承認慣習論無法回應Dworkin對法律實證論整體實踐圖像的批判。 The question of “What is the general conditions of legal validity” is one of the core issues in contemporary analytical jurisprudence. Legal positivists typically assume that the practice of law is a kind of rule-governed or norm-governed activity on the whole and once the essential rules within such activity are fully explicated, the question of legal validity settled. As a marked achievement under such kind of assumption, H. L. A. Hart’ s Theory of Rules of Recognition provide a plausible account of the question, arguing that rules of recognition as social fact constitutes the general conditions of legal validity. However, the assumption is far from self-evident and facing serious challenge from anti-positivist philosopher Ronald Dworkin whose interpretive theory radically dissolves the general picture assumed by legal positivists. Following in Hart’ s footsteps, legal philosopher Andrei Marmor proposes a novel version of Theory of Recognition Rules, namely, the Theory of Conventions of Recognition. The main purpose of my thesis is to reconstruct Marmor’ s answer to the question of legal validity, and then to analyze in detail whether Marmor’ s theory is immunized from Dworkin's criticisms on the legal positivist’ s image of legal practice. Marmor’ s Theory of Conventions of Recognition boils down to two separate theses that I label the Constitutivity Thesis and the Reducible Fact Thesis, and the latter of the two determines whether Marmor’ s theory can withstand Dworkin’s critique. However, drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein’ s insight into “grammatical propositions”, I argue that Marmor’ s “theoretical sentences” within his theory does not state any empirical facts, but rather “grammatical propositions” in the form of empirical propositions, which renders the Reducible Fact Thesis false. I therefore conclude that Marmor’ s Theory of Conventions of Recognition fails to respond to Dworkin's dissolution of the overall practical image of legal positivism. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15250 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202000564 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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