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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 莊世同(Shih-Tung Chuang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Jun-An Lu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 盧俊安 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T17:28:57Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-03-03 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-02-23 | |
dc.identifier.citation | H. L. A. Hart著,許家馨、李冠宜、高忠義譯(2018),法律的概念(第三版),台北:商周出版。
Ludwig Wittgenstein著,陳嘉映譯(2005),哲學研究,上海:上海人民出版社。 ——— 陳嘉映編譯(2015),維特根斯坦讀本,上海:世紀出版。 ——— 劉暢譯(2019),最後的哲學筆記(1950-1951),北京:商務印書館。 Joseph Raz著,朱學平譯(2011),實踐理性與規範,北京:中國法制出版社。 John Searle著,文學平、盈俐譯(2015),人類文明的結構——社會世界的構造,北京:中國人民大學出版社。 Ronald Dworkin著,李冠宜譯(2002),法律帝國,台北:時英出版。 陳嘉映(2001),泠風集:思想散論,北京:東方出版社。 ———(2011),說理,北京:華夏出版。 王鵬翔(2010),反對安置命題,中研院法學期刊,第7期,頁141-208。 ———(2014),法律、融貫性與權威,政治與社會哲學評論,第24期,頁23-68。 Baker, G. P & Hacker, P. M. S. 2009. Wittgenstein: Rules, grammar and necessity. 2d ed, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ———. 2013. Wittgenstein: Comparisons and Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brain, Bix. 2018. John Austin. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/austin-john/. Coleman, Jules, & Shapiro, Scott eds. 2002. The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coleman, Jules L. 1982. Negative and Positive Positivism. The Journal of Legal Studies. Volume. 11, Issue 1. ———. 2001. The practice of principle: in defense of a pragmatist approach to legal theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law's empire. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ———. 2006. Justice in robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ———. 2011. Justice for hedgehogs. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ———. 2013. Taking rights seriously. London: Duckworth. Green, Leslie. 2003. Legal Positivism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/. Gardner, John. 2012. The Legality of Law. In Law as a leap of faith: essays on law in general. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hart, H. L. A. 2012. The concept of law. 3d ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kelsen, Hens. 1961. General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Marmor, Andrei. 2001. Positive law and objective values. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2002. Exclusive legal positivism. In The Oxford handbook of jurisprudence and philosophy of law, Coleman, Jules, & Shapiro, Scott eds., Oxford University Press. ———. 2009. Social Conventions: From Language to Law. Princeton, N.J. & Oxford: Princeton University Press. ———. 2011. Philosophy of Law. Princeton, N.J. & Oxford: Princeton University Press. ———. 2012. Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence). USC Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 12-2. ———. 2015. The Nature of Law. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ /lawphil-nature/. ———. 2016. Norms, Reasons, and the Law. Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-19. ———. 2017. What Is Law and What Counts as Law? The Separation Thesis in Context. Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 17-34. ———. 2019. What’s left of general jurisprudence? On law’s ontology and content. Jurisprudence. Volume 10, Issue 2. Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele. 2016. On Certainty and the Grammaticalization of Experience. In The Third Wittgenstein, New York: Routledge. Pears, David. 1986. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University. Raz, Joseph. 1971. Legal principles and the limits of law. Yale Law Journal. Volume 81, Issue 5. ———. 1985. Authority, law and morality. The Monist. Volume 68, Issue 3. ———. 1999. Practical reason and norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2009. The authority of law: essays on law and morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schroeder, Severin. 2006. Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle. Cambridge: Polity Press. ———.2017. Wittgenstein on grammar and grammatical statements. In A Companion to Wittgenstein, Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman eds., Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Searle, John. 2010. Making the social world: The structure of human civilization: Oxford University Press. Shapiro, Scott J. 2007. The “Hart-Dworkin” debate: a short guide for the perplexed. SSRN Electronic Journal. 10.2139/SSRN.968657. Waluchow, Wilfrid J. 2012. Defeasibility and legal positivism. SSRN Electronic Journal. 10.2139/SSRN.1346385. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1969. On Certainty. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright trans., New York: Harper & Row. ———. 1970. Zettel. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright trans., Berkeley: University of California Press. ———. 1984. Culture and Value. Peter Winch trans., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. ———. 2005. Philosophical Grammar. Anthony Kenny trans., Berkeley: University of California Press. ———. 2009. The Big Typescript. C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian E. Aue, trans., Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ———. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, trans., G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte eds., Oxford: Blackwell. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/15250 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 「法律效力的一般性條件為何」是當代分析法理學的核心議題之一。法律實證論者通常假定,法律實踐總體上是一種規則或者規範轄制的活動,而一旦這種活動當中的本質規則得到充分闡明,法律效力問題將迎刃而解。H. L. A. Hart的承認規則理論即是在此一假定之下所提出的傑出理論,這一理論旨在說明,作為社會事實的承認規則構成了法律效力的一般性條件。然而,法律實證論者所假定的實踐圖像在Ronald Dworkin詮釋主義的批判之下變得脆弱不堪,承認規則理論的基礎被動搖。
沿著Hart的進路,法哲學家Andrei Marmor提出了一種新的承認規則理論——承認慣習論,以回應Dworkin的批判。本文的目的在於,整理和重構Marmor承認慣習論對法律效力問題的解答,進而詳細評析Marmor的解答是否能夠充分回應Dworkin對法律實證論實踐圖像的批判。本文將Marmor的承認慣習論重構為兩大命題——構成論以及可還原事實論,並且指出,Marmor是否能夠充分回應Dworkin的批判,懸決於可還原事實論。然而,借鑒哲學家Ludwig Wittgenstein關於「語法命題」的洞見,本文將論證,Marmor的承認慣習論的「理論語句」,沒有陳述任何經驗事實,而是具有經驗命題形式的「語法命題」,進而可還原事實論為假。因此,我們得出結論:Marmor的承認慣習論無法回應Dworkin對法律實證論整體實踐圖像的批判。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The question of “What is the general conditions of legal validity” is one of the core issues in contemporary analytical jurisprudence. Legal positivists typically assume that the practice of law is a kind of rule-governed or norm-governed activity on the whole and once the essential rules within such activity are fully explicated, the question of legal validity settled. As a marked achievement under such kind of assumption, H. L. A. Hart’ s Theory of Rules of Recognition provide a plausible account of the question, arguing that rules of recognition as social fact constitutes the general conditions of legal validity. However, the assumption is far from self-evident and facing serious challenge from anti-positivist philosopher Ronald Dworkin whose interpretive theory radically dissolves the general picture assumed by legal positivists.
Following in Hart’ s footsteps, legal philosopher Andrei Marmor proposes a novel version of Theory of Recognition Rules, namely, the Theory of Conventions of Recognition. The main purpose of my thesis is to reconstruct Marmor’ s answer to the question of legal validity, and then to analyze in detail whether Marmor’ s theory is immunized from Dworkin's criticisms on the legal positivist’ s image of legal practice. Marmor’ s Theory of Conventions of Recognition boils down to two separate theses that I label the Constitutivity Thesis and the Reducible Fact Thesis, and the latter of the two determines whether Marmor’ s theory can withstand Dworkin’s critique. However, drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein’ s insight into “grammatical propositions”, I argue that Marmor’ s “theoretical sentences” within his theory does not state any empirical facts, but rather “grammatical propositions” in the form of empirical propositions, which renders the Reducible Fact Thesis false. I therefore conclude that Marmor’ s Theory of Conventions of Recognition fails to respond to Dworkin's dissolution of the overall practical image of legal positivism. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T17:28:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-109-R04a21118-1.pdf: 2259145 bytes, checksum: aceb02addbd2c2aa4d3aafd40da1ad4c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 引論 1
第一節 問題意識 1 第二節 本文關鍵概念和核心觀點 5 一、 關鍵概念 5 二、 核心觀點 7 第三節 論文架構 8 第二章 法律效力問題、承認規則理論與Dworkin的批判 9 第一節 法律效力問題的型構 9 一、 法律效力與規範的存在性 9 二、 法律效力與合法律性命題為真的一般性條件 11 第二節 承認規則理論對法律效力問題的解答 14 一、 Hart的承認規則理論 14 二、 承認規則理論對法律效力問題的解答 26 三、 承認規則理論的一般性承諾:社會事實論 27 第三節 Dworkin的批判對承認規則理論的衝擊 29 一、 法律原則無法由系譜性的法律效力判准所鑒別 30 二、 澄清關於Dworkin早期論證的一項誤解 34 三、 法律實踐和法概念的詮釋性:法律效力問題的消解 37 四、 小結Dworkin對承認規則理論的整體批判 48 第四節 本章小結 49 第三章 Marmor的承認慣習論對法律效力問題的解答 51 第一節 包容性承認規則理論的失敗 51 一、 包容性承認慣習論概覽 51 二、 包容性承認慣習論的理論得失 55 三、 小結 59 第二節 Marmor的承認慣習論 60 一、 構成性慣習的概念 63 二、 構成性的承認慣習論對法律效力問題的解答 79 三、 Marmor承認慣習論的一般性承諾:可還原事實論 83 四、 小結 90 第三節 本章小結 92 第四章 評Marmor對法律效力問題的解答 95 第一節 再訪Marmor的承認慣習論 95 一、 再訪承認慣習論的兩大要旨 95 二、 起點:承認慣習論的兩個「事實語句」 98 三、 初步啟發:重考Hart的「法效力」分析 99 四、 出發 103 第二節 Wittgenstein論「語法」 105 一、 「語法」初探 105 二、 「語法」之為語言遊戲的邊界 108 三、 語法的拓展:具有經驗命題形式的語法命題 112 四、 小結:語法是「事理」的語言結晶 121 第三節 評Marmor解答中的「構成論」和「可還原事實論」 122 一、 可還原事實論的謬誤:規則事實語句不是經驗命題 122 二、 構成論的洞見:凝結在「法效力語句」中的確實性事理 130 三、 小結 134 第四節 本章小結 135 第五章 結論 138 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 「語法」抑或「事實」:評Marmor承認慣習論對法律效力問題的解答 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Grammar or Fact: Marmor on Conventions of Recognition Constituting the Conditions of Legal Validity | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 顏厥安(Chueh-An Yen),王鵬翔(Peng-Hsiang Wang),陳弘儒(Hung-Ju Chen) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 法律效力,承認慣習,構成性慣習,還原論,語法,確實性, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | legal validity,Conventions of Recognition,Constitutive Conventions,Grammar,Certainty, | en |
dc.relation.page | 146 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202000564 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-02-24 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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