論以法律貫徹道德－重省法律道德主義與自由主義的論辯

Abstract

本論文藉由重新檢視法律道德主義與自由主義的論辯，重省以法律貫徹道德的問題。本文首先反省Stephen-Devlin的法律道德主義，與Mill-Hart所支持的以傷害原則為核心的自由主義之間的傳統辯論，從中看到雙方所各自存在的侷限與難題。接著以此為線索，探索法律道德主義陣營為何難以維持其主張，並認為自由主義陣營以Ronald Dworkin理論一貫且深入的自由主義論點，對以法律貫徹道德的問題給予了較令人滿意的回答。 本文第二章首先將針對James Fitzjames Stephen與Lord Patrick Devlin的法律道德主義理論進行分析與批評，並從中整理出法律道德主義共同面對的難題；第三章則轉而梳理John Stuart Mill與H.L.A. Hart以傷害原則為核心的自由主義，以及傷害原則所面對的批評；第四章則試圖反省前兩章所整理出對雙方陣營的批評，並藉由當代論者對雙方陣營的回應來再次反省雙方的問題，最後總結出為何法律道德主義難以維持其論點，而自由主義則由Ronald Dworkin的論點對於以法律貫徹道德的問題給出了較令人滿意的回答。

This thesis intends to re-evaluate the issue of the legal enforcement of morality in the light of the debates between legal moralism and liberalism. The initial objective of this thesis is to examine the classic debates between the Stephen-Devlin legal moralism and the Mill-Hart liberalism which is centred on the harm principle, and render the limits and difficulties of both positions. Taking these limits and difficulties as the clue, this thesis explores the reason why legal moralists can hardly maintain their position, and argues that Ronald Dworkin's liberalism theory provides better solution to the question of the legal enforcement of morality with coherent and profound arguments. Chapter two focuses on the analysis and criticisms of the legal moralism theory held by James Fitzjames Stephen and Lord Patrick Devlin, and points out the difficulties confronted by the legal moralism in general. Chapter three turns to review the liberalism centred on the harm principle which is supported by John Stuart Mill and H.L.A. Hart, and the criticisms of the harm principle. Chapter four intends to reconsider the criticisms of both legal moralism and liberalism in previous chapters , and re-evaluate both positions with the reply from contemporary theorists. In conclusion, this thesis points out the reason why legal moralists can hardly maintain their position, and argues that Ronald Dworkin's liberalism theory which provides better solution to the question of the legal enforcement of morality.