台灣的律師自治——法規範及實踐的歷時性考察（1896年迄今）

Abstract

本文以律師自治為核心問題，以法律史為研究方法，強調法規範與實踐之間的互動，追問國家監督如何被安置於法規範，又如何在不同情勢下變形再現，同時觀察律師社群如何回應、對抗或合作，並在長時段累積自我治理能力。材料涵蓋各時期管理律師之法規範，並系統性使用報紙、公會內部檔案、立法院會議紀錄、律師刊物與訪談等。 本文的核心發現是：在台灣律師業絕大多數的歲月裡，律師自治的空間都是被政府給定的。此一格局早在律師業出現於台灣之前即已決定——明治日本基於中央集權需求繼受法國法，將律師定位為司法制度的輔助角色，這套高度管制的制度被二度移植到殖民地台灣。日治近五十年間，律師自治呈現階段性變化：從執業利益競逐，到 1920 年代人權擁護與政治參與的高峰，再到 1930年代中期後因法西斯化與戰爭而中輟。然而辯護士會的運作始終在政府劃定的框架內進行，1935 年朱諾號事件中臺灣辯護士協會在官方施壓下一夕解散，最直白地揭示此一現實。 戰後施行於台灣的中華民國律師制度與日治辯護士制度系出同門——清末民初的《律師暫行章程》幾乎是日本《辯護士法》的中譯本。不同政權選擇相近的制度藍本，係基於相似的統治考量。戰後初期，資格轉換問題激發了律師團結對抗政府的精彩自治實踐，接收之初律師界亦展現為民服務與擁護人權的活力；惟二二八事件造成大量法律菁英罹難，律師自治再度凍結。戒嚴時期，國家干預達到歷史高峰：制度層次延續日治以來的行政管制，更疊加了黨國體制對律師團體的系統性滲透——在公會設置黨團書記、以外省人律師與軍法官出身律師長期主導公會、在政治案件中透過多重模式干預辯護權。黨務與特務人員滲透律師團體甚至不具備法規範的授權，是對律師自治最大程度的戕害。不過，中國比較法學會在威權縫隙中長期培養改革人才，為日後改革埋下火種。 解嚴後，律師自治的轉折並非始於 1987 年這一單一時點。1982 年《律師管理規則》爭議已見律師界大規模團結對抗政府干預並正面論述律師自治。1992 年律師法全面修法確立律師使命條款、將章程核准改為備案、將派員監督改為得派員列席，是法制度上前所未有的斬獲。此後自治議題發生根本性轉向，從對外抵抗國家干預，轉向對內處理組織失能、資源分配與代表性等結構性問題。全聯會因間接會員制而失能、複數入會造成執業壁壘，路線分歧在2016 至 2017 年激化，同時法務部 2018 年草案構成行政權反撲的威脅。在對內組織民主化與對外執業獨立性的雙重動力下，2020 年新《律師法》以全律會直接選舉、單一入會與跨區服務費、強化倫理自律與公益義務完成制度重建；惟新制上路時間尚短，運作效果仍有待檢證。

Taking lawyer self-governance as its core problem and legal history as its method, this study foregrounds the interaction between legal norms and practice. It asks how state supervision has been embedded in legal norms through institutional mechanisms and how it has been transformed under changing circumstances, while observing how the legal profession has responded, resisted, or cooperated, accumulating capacities for self-governance over the long term. Its materials span lawyer-regulatory regimes across all periods, systematically drawing on newspapers, internal bar-association files, Legislative Yuan records, lawyers’ periodicals, and interviews. The study’s central finding is that throughout most of the legal profession’s history in Taiwan, the space for lawyer self-governance has been defined and delimited by the state. This pattern was determined before lawyers first appeared in Taiwan: Meiji Japan, driven by the imperatives of centralization, adopted French law and positioned lawyers as auxiliaries to the courts. This high-control framework was transplanted twice to colonial Taiwan. Over the nearly fifty years of Japanese rule, lawyer self-governance underwent phased changes—from competition over practice-related interests, to a peak of human-rights advocacy and political participation in the 1920s, to an abrupt interruption caused by fascism and war from the mid-1930s onward. Throughout, bar associations operated within boundaries set by the state; the overnight dissolution of the Taiwan Bengoshi Association under official pressure in the 1935 Juno Incident laid this reality bare. The ROC lawyer regime implemented in post-war Taiwan shared a common origin with the colonial bengoshi system: the early Republican Provisional Lawyer Regulations were virtually a Chinese translation of Japan’s Bengoshi Act. Different regimes chose similar institutional blueprints based on parallel governance imperatives. In the early post-war period, qualification-conversion conflicts provoked vigorous collective self-governance, and lawyers initially exhibited an active commitment to public service and human-rights defense; yet the February 28 Incident decimated the legal elite, freezing self-governance once again. During the martial-law period, state intervention reached its historical zenith: institutional controls continued from the colonial era, compounded by the KMT regime’s systematic infiltration of bar associations—installing party-cell secretaries, ensuring that Mainlander and former military-court lawyers dominated association leadership, and intervening in political-case defense through multiple mechanisms. The infiltration of party and intelligence personnel lacked even the formal legality of administrative regulation, constituting the most severe damage to lawyer self-governance observed in this study. Nevertheless, the Chinese Society of Comparative Law quietly nurtured reform-minded legal professionals within the crevices of the authoritarian regime, sowing seeds for future change. After the lifting of martial law, the turning point for lawyer self-governance did not begin at the single moment of 1987. The 1982 conflict over the Lawyers Management Rules already saw the profession unite against government interference and articulate self-governance claims on a large scale. The comprehensive 1992 amendment to the Attorney Regulation Act established a “lawyer’s mission” clause, converted charter approval from a permit to a registration system, and changed supervisory attendance at meetings from mandatory monitoring to permissive observation—unprecedented statutory advances. Thereafter, the agenda of self-governance shifted fundamentally: from resisting external state interference to addressing internal structural problems such as organizational dysfunction, resource allocation, and representativeness. The National Bar Association’s incapacity under its indirect-membership structure and the practice barriers of the multiple-membership system fueled an intensifying rift in 2016–2017, while the Ministry of Justice’s 2018 draft bill posed the threat of administrative counter-encroachment. Driven by the twin imperatives of internal organizational democratization and external professional independence, the new Attorney Regulation Act of 2020 accomplished an institutional reconstruction: democratizing the Taiwan Bar Association through direct elections, adopting single membership paired with cross-regional service fees, and strengthening ethical self-regulation and public-interest obligations. As the new system has been in place for only a short time, its operational effects remain to be verified.