罪責概念與責任能力

Abstract

近幾年來，精神障礙者犯下的多起犯罪事件，逐漸地引起社會矚目與關心，其中關於精神障礙者的刑事責任判斷，由於法院在刑法第19條規定的適用上，欠缺一致性的判斷標準，以致於判決結果往往招致不少的爭議與輿論批評。即使立法者有意仿效德國法引入新模式而修正舊法規定，在新法制度下，因仍未與精神醫學界達成良好的協作，爭議依舊源源不斷，尤其是在重大矚目的犯罪案件。 本文首先釐清罪責的意義及其必要性，並透過責任理論與自由意志爭辯的探討，找出責任能力（罪責能力）的內涵與基礎，使之化為較具體、可操作的規範性概念。接著梳理我國關於精神障礙者責任能力判斷的舊法與新法規定的變化，試著釐清新法修正後，是否有改善舊法下的困境。然現行實務對於刑法第19條的要件欠缺共通性標準，本文進而逐一探討第19條生理要件與心理要件的內涵。 在生理要件方面，透過比較法研究，參考美國法以及德國法對於生理特徵的解釋，認為生理原因應非純粹的醫學概念，而是需要經過一定的法律評價，而有法官介入判斷的空間。另就心理結果部分，參酌美國法相關法則的內涵，對於辨識能力與控制能力定義其概念，希冀達成實務上運用能有一致性的標準，並以精神醫學與心理學的科學方式解析辨識能力與控制能力的本質，更進一步地形成具體判準。 最後，則指出我國鑑定人與法官之間的分工模式亦為責任能力判斷爭議的來源之一，本文嘗試從生理要件與心理要件的內涵出發，認為兩者的判斷其實都有法官與鑑定人參與合作的空間，應依照各自的專業領域為合理的權限分配，俾能充分發揮社會依專業分工的最大效能，同時減少判斷精神障礙者責任能力的爭議。

In recent years, a number of criminal cases committed by individuals with mental disorders have gradually drawn public attention and concern. Among these, the determination of criminal responsibility for offenders with mental disorders has often been a source of controversy, as courts have lacked consistent standards in applying Article 19 of the Criminal Code. Consequently, the outcomes of such cases frequently spark public debate and criticism. Even though legislators, inspired by German law, have sought to introduce a new model by amending the old provisions, the new legal framework still faces continuous disputes due to the absence of effective collaboration with the psychiatric community—particularly in high-profile criminal cases. This paper first clarifies the meaning and necessity of criminal responsibility and, through an examination of theories of responsibility and the debate on free will, identifies the content and foundation of criminal responsibility (capacity for culpability), transforming it into a more concrete and operable normative concept. It then traces the changes between the old and new legal provisions in Taiwan regarding the determination of criminal capacity for individuals with mental disorders, in an effort to clarify whether the revisions have improved upon the difficulties of the old system. However, since current judicial practice still lacks consistent standards for applying the requirements of Article 19 of the Criminal Code, this paper further examines, one by one, the physiological and psychological elements stipulated in Article 19. Regarding the physiological element, through a comparative legal study referencing the interpretations of physiological characteristics under U.S. and German law, this paper argues that the physiological cause should not be viewed as a purely medical concept. Rather, it requires a certain degree of legal evaluation, leaving room for judicial discretion. As for the psychological element, by drawing upon relevant principles in U.S. law, this paper defines the concepts of cognitive capacity and volitional capacity (the abilities to recognize and to control one’s actions), with the aim of establishing consistent standards for practical application. Furthermore, it analyzes the nature of these capacities through scientific approaches from psychiatry and psychology, thereby developing more concrete criteria for assessment. Finally, this paper points out that the division of labor between expert evaluators and judges is also one of the sources of controversy in determining criminal responsibility. Starting from the substantive meanings of the physiological and psychological elements, it argues that both aspects allow room for collaboration between judges and experts. The allocation of authority should be reasonably based on each party’s area of professional expertise, so as to maximize the effectiveness of the social system of professional division of labor while simultaneously reducing disputes over the determination of criminal responsibility for individuals with mental disorders.