臺灣上市公司公開收購案中董事利益衝突與救濟管道之探討

Abstract

公開收購程序簡便迅速、收購失敗風險小，逐漸成為上市櫃公司經營權介入方式之主要選項。觀察近年來公開收購案例發現，即便是上市公司，無論是公開收購公司或被收購公司的董事，原本應該要本於信賴義務，為公司股東評量把關進行或接收收購之整體性綜效，然多數仍無法合理展現中立之專業或擺脫權責自利之弊端。 忠實義務為信賴義務之核心內涵，利益衝突為其關鍵需處理狀況。本文以董事信賴義務（注意義務及忠實義務）與公開收購之相關理論、法規、司法見解為基準，觀察上市公司公開收購實例，辨識可能發生之董事利益衝突態樣。同時，本文整理並研析對應之防免救濟法規、理論、判例，目的在於強化個人運用司法資源解決爭議之能力，杜絕董事在公開收購中濫用權力所帶來的非正當性。 整合上述研究之作業，本文主張（1）董事表決權迴避制度之存在有其可取性；（2）董事會為較適之公開收購策略裁量者；（3）適用救濟者門檻與法官介入程度仍有改善空間；（4）商審法及商業法院制度強化救濟管道。本文建議（1）讓更具獨立性之專業第三方介入；（2）更細緻化與借重司法裁量之救濟法規範設計；（3）建置非合意收購之法規範體制；（4）進行與國際接軌之法規範修改。

Tender offer has gradually become the key option for intervention of the management among the publicly-listed and OTC-listed companies, due to its relatively rapid procedure and lower acquisition failure risk. It is found that, however, even the directors of the offerors and the tenderers of the publicly-listed companies, who should abide by fiduciary duty to thoroughly evaluate the comprehensive synergy of tender offer, are still unable to reasonably demonstrate professional neutrality and avoid the desire of self-interest. Duty of loyalty is the core connotation of fiduciary duty；the conflict of interest is the primary issue to be dealt with. Based on the acknowledgement of the relevant theories, laws and regulations and judicial opinions related to fiduciary duty (duty of care and duty of loyalty) and tender offer, this article intends to identify the patterns attritibed to directors’ conflict of interest during the process of tender offer cases of publicly-listed companies in Taiwan. At the same time, this article studies the corresponding judicial remedies and the theories behind them, aiming at strengthening the judicial capability to prevent directors from abusing their power to bring illegitimacy during the tender offer. Integrating the above-mentioned work, this article concludes (1) Abstaining from directors' voting rights is desirable; (2) The board of directors is a more discretionary one for tender offer related strategies; (3) The requirement to be qualified for the use of judicial remedies and the extent to which judges engage in the judicial remedies are to be improved;(4) the Commercial Case Adjudication Act strengthens the judicial remedies corresponding to directors' conflict of interest. This article suggests (1) A more independent third-party intervention is recommended; (2) Designing judicial remedies toward more sophisticated regulation content and further-leved judes’ discretion power; (3) Constructing a system of laws and regulations special for non-consensual acquisitions; (4) Amending the very laws and regulations to keep abreast of the international standards.