考慮行為差別取價與顧客忠誠計畫之廠商最適定價策略分析

Abstract

使用行為差別取價(behavior-based pricing discrimination, BBPD)，廠商可以根據消費者過往購買商品的歷史資料來對之前沒購買過商品的新顧客與舊顧客做差別取價。使用顧客忠誠計畫(customer loyalty program, CLP)，廠商可以利用各種形式的獎勵，像是給予贈品、會員集點等，來鼓勵舊顧客持續於該廠商購買商品。行為差別取價與顧客忠誠計畫在現實社會中是很常見的，過往有許多文獻探討行為差別取價以及顧客忠誠計畫如何影響市場競爭。有趣的是幾乎所有過往研究都是探討市場為對稱均衡(symmetric equilibrium)的情況，也就是兩間競爭廠商都是使用行為差別取價策略或是兩間競爭廠商皆採用顧客忠誠計畫策略。因此本研究將著重於非對稱均衡(asymmetric equilibrium)，也就是一間廠商使用行為差別取價而另一間廠商使用顧客忠誠計畫，如何影響廠商的定價、利潤與消費者的購買決策，並分析當忠誠獎勵(loyalty reward)的大小以及消費者型態不同下，廠商會使用何種策略。此外本研究也分別討論了當市場存在策略型顧客(strategic customer)與短視型顧客(myopic customer)以及市場部分覆蓋時市場的變動情形。

With behavior-based pricing discrimination(BBPD), firms can take advantage of customers’ purchase history data to price discriminate between regular customers and new customers. With customer loyalty program(CLP), firms use various rewards, such as gift giving and membership card, to encourage loyalty customers to keep buying. BBPD and CLP are very common in practice, many researchers have worked at how BBPD and CLP impact on market competition. Interestingly, almost all of the studies have explored symmetric equilibrium case where both of the competing firms simultaneously use behavior-based pricing discrimination strategy or simultaneously offer a loyalty program strategy. Therefore, in our paper, we focus on asymmetric equilibrium where one of the competing firms use behavior-based pricing discrimination strategy and the other one use customer loyalty program strategy. Particularly, we examine how firms’ adoption of BBPD and CLP affects selling price, profits and customers’ purchasing behavior. Furthermore, we explore conditions for the market that simultaneously exists strategic customers and myopic customers and market which is partially covered.