董事之失格與解任

Abstract

淘汰經營者制度標誌出經營者的最低行為標準，為市場樹立了行為規範。我國淘汰經營者制度有眾多缺失。其中，淘汰事由不符時宜、或與保護市場或公司之目的缺乏相關性，使吾人難以從中檢視我國公司經營者行為標準的核心概念究何所指。其他不足處尚有:判斷是否淘汰經營者的機關不明或不適合、淘汰後經營者可立即回任或淘汰之期間僵化、規範對象(主體、行為)不足、未設淘汰後有條件回任市場之機制、未置淘汰後或違反淘汰制度之效果、法條所列或實務所增之淘汰條件的必要性令人存疑、無公示制度以昭市場、是否及如何搭配定暫時狀態假處分制度的討論尚未完備等等。 大英國協國家有董事/經營者失格制度，規範各種類公司之董事/經營者之失格，頗為完善。本文以英國CDDA 1986董事失格法為研究主軸，並詳研澳洲、紐西蘭、新加坡的淘汰經營者制度。 本文先檢視我國主要的淘汰經營者制度，包括公司法第30條當然解任、金融法規上眾多解任規範、公司法第200條、投保法第10條之1裁判解任之訴，嗣後，並統整我國缺失。在研究大英國協失格制度相對應的解決方法後，縝密討論以之適用於我國，以截長補短的法律上或事實上可能性。最後，新訂或修訂諸多公司法及投保法法條。整體而言，建議刪除公司法第30條、引進部分大英國協失格制度取代；保留公司法第200條，惟以失格制度之優點修正之；刪除投保法第10條之1，並對金融法規的諸多解任規範提出修正方向。

This thesis examines a mechanism for disqualification and removal of directors and managers, henceforce to be referred to as a ruling-out-system. The ruling-out-system I consider sets out guidelines for better enforcing already exsiting behavioral norms for directors and managers. There are shortcomings in our current directors and managers removal system. For example, the specified behaviors for removal are not suitable for today’s markets, or these behaviors are even irrelevant to the purposes of market or company protection under the law. This makes it difficult to identify the core concept of behavioral norms provided by such specified behaviors. Other shortcomings are as follows: first, no clear designated authority to initiate the removal porcedures; second, no method for preventing a previously removed director or manager from returning to the same or a similar position; third, the current removal systems are not applicable to shadow or de facto directors; fourth, no procedure for allowing a removed director or manager to apply for a special permission to act in the capacity of a manager if warranted; fifth, there are no consequences for a director or a manager who violates the removal system; sixth, the necessity of the conditions added by court for removal is doubtful; seventh, no publication system to warn the markets about the removal of a director or a manager; eighth, no complete discussion of how to apply injuctions, etc. The company directors/managers disqualification system in the Common Wealth is complete. The system rules the disqualification of directors and managers in all kinds of companies. This thesis focuses mainly on the CDDA 1986 in the UK, and also studies the ruling-out-system in Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. This thesis firstly reviews the removal system in Taiwan, including Article 30 and Article 200 of the Company Act, many removal rules of financial regulation, Article 10-1 of the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act, and sums up the shortcomings. After studying the solutions to these shortcomings provided by the disqualification system in the UK and other Common Wealth countires, it further discusses the possibility on the legality and on the factual aspects of applying such solutions to our system in Taiwan. Finally, this thesis sets up new and modifies existing articles according to the above discussion. In general, we could eliminate Article 30 of the Company Act, and replace it with some parts of the UK disqualification system ; keep Article 200 of the Company Act while modifying it with some features provided by the UK disqualification system; eliminate Article 10-1 of the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act. This thesis also suggests ways to modify the removal rules of financial regulation.