股權結構、支付方式與購併溢價

Abstract

本文以購併為主題，以2001年第四季至2005年底之台灣金融業購併案件為樣本，研究下列四因素對購併溢價的影響：支付方式；主併、目標公司最終控制者的異同與分別持股多寡；主併公司本身偏離的程度；金字塔型股權結構之購併方式造成的最終控制者偏離程度。本研究與一般常見之購併研究不盡相同，非從綜效或絕對價格或股價之反應切入，而是著重不同購併方式之相對價格的變化。 國外研究發現換股購併者，其出價比現金價購者高；而本文以無母數統計方法實證之結果發現以換股支付購併之主併者，會支付相對較高的產業調整價格淨值比，但產業調整價格盈餘比並無顯著差異。另外，過去也有文獻指出，當主併者本身偏離程度越低，越無法開出較好條件的價格，因此主併者偏離程度與購併溢價是正向關係；本研究發現的證據顯示，偏離程度越高的主併者會支付越高的產業調整價格盈餘比，但是產業調整價格淨值比並無顯著差異。 當主併者透過金字塔型股權結構購併或取得目標控制權時，會產生股權槓桿的效果。也就是金字塔型股權結構之層數越多，所獲之股權槓桿越大，亦即更可以透過較少的現金權，取得較大的控制權，此時購併者自然願意付較高價格。在我們以無母數統計方法實證的結果當中發現，創造出越大股權槓桿的主併者，支付較高的產業調整價格淨值比，但是產業調整價格盈餘比並未有顯著差異。此外我們也觀察了是否主併、目標公司最終控制者的異同與分別持股多寡會對購併溢價有顯著影響；最後我們發現，以產業調整價格盈餘比衡量的內併樣本的購併溢價高於外併樣本。 關於主併、目標公司最終控制者的異同與分別持股多寡，以及金字塔型股權結構之購併方式造成的最終控制者偏離程度，對於購併溢價的影響，在過去的文獻中尚未有所述及。另外，主併公司本身偏離的程度與購併溢價的關係，亦未有詳細的研究。因此本研究提供開創性的研究方向，期能對台灣市場購併資訊有所貢獻。

This paper examines how ownership structure and payment methods influence mergers and acquisitions premiums offered in Taiwanese financial industry in the period between the 4th quarter of 2001 and the year end of 2005. Our investigation of the factors that determine bid premiums paid for targets focuses on the importance of affiliation of both acquirers’ and targets’ ultimate controllers, payment methods, the divergence of control right and cash flow right of acquirer’s ultimate controller, and control leverage created by the acquirer. Different from traditional studies on mergers and acquisitions, this research centers on the relation between premiums and the ways of mergers and acquisitions. Previous studies show that there is a premium paid for stock over cash. With nonparametric statistic methods, our evidences also show that acquirer pays higher extra price-to-book ratios in mergers and acquisitions with stock payment, though there is no significant difference in terms of extra price-to-earning ratios. Our results further reveal that divergence of acquirer’s ultimate controller is significantly positive correlated with premiums measured in extra price-to-earning ratios. The results are consistent with Lu (2003) who suggests that acquirer with lower divergence is expected to pay lower premiums to the target. However, there is no significant relationship between divergence of acquirer’s ultimate controller and extra price-to-book ratios. When the acquirer enters mergers and acquisitions at a higher level of control chain (or pyramid), he will be willing to pay higher premiums for the target’s control with larger control leverage and divergence over the target. Our evidence supports this hypothesis when the premiums are measured in terms of extra price-to-book ratios. For the affiliation of both acquirers’ and targets’ ultimate controllers, we find higher extra price-to-earning ratios to the target in an internal merger and acquisition deal. This research contributes to the theory and practice of mergers and acquisitions in that the relationship between premiums paid and the ownership structure of the bidders as well as the targets has not been studies in the literature before. More statistical inferences may be made possible provided that the sample size is large enough.