企業股權結構對公司價值的影響

Abstract

本研究分析企業股權結構對公司價值的影響。Berle與Means(1932)文中指出公司股權大多分散在各個小股東之間。其後，多數研究都假設公司所有權是分散在眾多小股東的手中。但是最近的研究顯示，公司的所有權常常集中在一位或是少數幾位的股東手中。當股權集中時，大股東會比較有能力與動機去監控管理階層，避免經理人做出對公司不利的行為，這些因素可能提升公司價值。但是，伴隨著股東手中的控制權越來越大，控制股東極有可能利用自己手中的權力為自己謀取私利，挪用公司資產，犧牲其他股東權益，導致公司價值下降。因此本研究利用臺灣上市公司股權資料來分析此種存在大小股東之間的代理問題。 本研究以2007年的臺灣上市公司做為研究對象，進行相關研究。對於股東的所有權，以現金流量權來衡量:在控制權衡量上，在除了使用傳統的股份控制權之外，還加入國內學者建議的席次控制權。 實證結果發現臺灣上市公司多屬於家族控制公司，股權分散者屬於少數。公司價值會隨著控制股東手中掌握的現金流量權增加而增加，符合正向誘因效果；但是公司價值也會因為控制股東手中的控制權與現金流量權的偏離程度擴大而降低，符合負面侵佔效果。

This thesis analyzes the effect of ownership structure on firm value. A large number of studies reveal that ownership is concentrated on the hands of a single or a few shareholders, in contrast to the assumption of Berle and Means (1932) of widely dispersed ownership. Big shareholders have strong incentives to oversee managers and maximize the firm value. This is called the positive incentive effect. However, with control right concentration, the large shareholder may use their power to expropriate small shareholders. Thus the firm value may decline. The risk of expropriation of small shareholders by big shareholders is a vital agency problem in many countries. This is called negative entrenchment effect The data on ownership structures of publicly traded corporations in Taiwan are used for study. This result show that most of Taiwan listed companies are ownership concentrated and controlled by a small group of individuals or family. Firm value increases with cash-flow right in the hands of controlling shareholders. This result is consistent with positive incentive effect. Large deviation of control from ownership rights lowers firm value. This result is consistent with negative entrenchment effect.