內線交易禁止之射程範圍與監理策略

Abstract

內線交易法制的運作對我國資本市場或產業發展影響甚鉅，惟我國理論或實務均尚未對禁止內線交易之正當化基礎達成明確的共識，這也使得現行證交法第157條之1的解釋適用引發許多爭議。因此本文藉由比較法的分析，進而提出內嵌詐欺要素的「市場信賴理論」，希冀能為內線交易規範之立法論或解釋論作出貢獻。市場信賴理論主張應區分內部訊息來源及外部訊息來源，並以「兩手策略禁止原則」作為市場誠信之核心內涵，來建構內部人對交易相對人之「告知義務」。再者，市場信賴理論為兼顧市場交易機制之公平性與效率性，亦建議未來修法增訂豁免事由之參考方向。 關於內線資訊治理可採取的策略行動，本文主張應建立「透明揭露規則」、適時搭配公司內部防治措施並且善用主管機關之行政管制手段。例如得以行政罰鍰整合所有對內線交易行為人之金錢制裁，亦可於內線交易管制的灰色地帶設立「不當使用資訊」之行政責任。最後本文一再強調應釐清內線交易禁止之射程範圍，以提升金融法規遵循之可預測性。在內部人範圍擴張的界限上，本文認為單純於集中交易市場上買進目標公司股票的敵意收購者不是內部人；另外也為消息受領人衍生義務之認定提供判準。在受管制行為態樣之調整上，本文建議新增「鼓勵他人完成交易」之行為態樣，以填補法律漏洞。至於內線交易規範於場外交易的運作，則應思考「不對稱管制」之可行性。

The insider trading regime deeply influences the capital market and the industrial growth in Taiwan, but there is no consensus as to the legitimate foundation of insider trading proscription in our theories or practice. This leads to many arguments regarding how to apply the §157–1 of Taiwanese Securities and Exchange Act. Therefore, by the analysis of comparative laws, this thesis proposes “Market Reliance Theory” containing the fraud factor, and hopes to contribute to the legislation, application as well as interpretation of Taiwanese insider trading regime. The Market Reliance Theory asserts that we should distinguish outside or inside information source, and we must define “market integrity” more explicitly to establish the insider’s obligation to disclose inside information before transactions. Furthermore, the Market Reliance Theory also suggests that we should legislate safe harbors for insider trading regime to balance the fairness and the efficiency of transactions on the securities market. With respect to the strategic moves of corporate inside information governance, this thesis maintains that not merely should the FSC draw up “Disclosure and Transparency Rules” for listing companies, but the competent authority should also take advantages of administrative regulation methods to regulate the gray zone of misusing information in Taiwanese insider trading regime. For instance, we could use “civil penalties” to integrate all the monetary punishments sanctioned on the insiders who abuse the inside information to trade corporate securities. Last but not least, this thesis emphasizes that we should define the scope of insider trading regulations to enhance the predictability of complying with the financial statutes. Concerning the boundary of expanding insider’s category, this thesis confirms that the hostile takeover acquirers are not always the insiders, and the Market Reliance Theory also provides the criteria to judge the tippee’s derivative liability. In respect of adjusting the types of regulated behaviors, this thesis suggests that “insider’s encouraging others to deal” should be regulated after amending the Securities and Exchange Act. As to whether the insider trading regime should be applied off market, we should consider the practicability of “asymmetric regulations”.