全球化導致的傳訊成本

Abstract

全球化下，行銷海外的機會漸增。出口產品要能成功地打入另一國家的市場時，往往需將其產品與當地文化結合加以銷售。而此種將產品與外國生活文化整合的工作，適合由同時掌握技術及異國文化的人力來完成。因此隨著全球化的步伐，將產生一種對既掌握該國生產技術也瞭解異國文化的人才需求。透過擴大市場帶來的利基，掌握技術及異國文化的人將相對其他類型勞動者有較高的產出，廠商也願意用高薪聘僱。但基於勞動市場資訊不對稱的特性，出口廠商在聘用前並不清楚員工是否具有其需要的特質，所以廠商需要透過勞動者的傳訊以辨識需要的人才。 本文以Spence教育傳訊模型為基礎，探討在勞動市場資訊不對稱下，一個出口國在面臨新的勞動需求時，對國內勞動市場的衝擊。我們的發現是，當新的需求產生，市場上願以高薪聘僱此類雙才時，其他勞動者將由於覬覦其報酬，競相模仿「雙才」在市場上傳遞的訊號，於是引起連鎖的傳訊競爭。這將使得許多原先不必傳訊的勞動者現在必須傳訊，也讓整體勞動市場上的傳訊成本大幅提升。 本文證明在某些條件下，所有滿足Intuitive Criterion條件的均衡結果，傳訊產生的成本會抵銷出口帶來的好處，所有人都變得比全球化之前更差。這是全球化所可能衍生的一個負面結果。

As the deepening of globalization, intensified contact and decreased trade barrier brings new opportunities for marketing abroad. A problem arises facing export firms that the popularity of their products in a foreign country may not remain in a different country. Due to cultural difference, export firms have to adapt their products for a specific country or region, which is called localization. Moreover, this task of adapting products to a foreign culture would be better done by workers who masters the producing techniques and acquaints foreign culture. Then there arises new demand for workers who possess both two abilities, and those workers will be more productive than others workers in the labor market. Under asymmetric information, firms choose workers by signals they observe and allocate workers into appropriate position. We consider Spence education model to analyze the effect of the new demand. Our result shows that it gives rise to a chain of signaling in the labor market, in which some workers who are not capable of two abilities will send signals that is also sent by workers who master both skills. Then it turns out to generate too much signaling in the labor market. When parameter in a certain range, we can prove that in all equilibrium outcomes which satisfies Intuitive Criterion workers send too much signals as to become worse than before globalization .