加權平均薪酬剩餘既得期間與實質盈餘管理程度之關聯性—標普五百指數企業執行長為例

Abstract

本研究主要探討美國執行長是否有頃向短期決策的現象，以執行長薪酬加權平均既得期間(Executive Compensation Duration)代表個人遞延性薪酬利益是否在短期內即將實現為短期決策的誘因，並且以企業是否有透過給予不正常的銷貨折扣或銷貨條件提升營收、過度生產以降低固定成本分攤至銷貨成本金額與裁減裁決性支出等可能傷害企業長期經濟利益以換取短期會計利益的實質盈餘管理(Real Earning Management)方式來檢視執行長是否有的實際行為。實證結果發現執行長再有誘因之下，確實會傾向短期決策以成就自身利益的行為，當薪酬加權平均既得期間愈短時，正向實質盈餘管理的幅度則愈大。此外也發現，在裁決性應計基礎之負向盈餘管理(Negative Discretionary Earning Management)中，洗大澡(Big Bath)的現象在薪酬加權平均既得期間較短時，幅度會相對較小。而對於那些損失趨避(Loss Avoidance)的企業，也發現薪酬加權平均既得期間對正向實質盈餘管理有交互作用，會減緩薪酬既得期間對盈餘管理程度的影響。

We focus on CEOs short-termism by using Executive Compensation Duration and Real Earning Management as representative to CEOs incentive of maximizing upcoming profit and to real action of CEOs short-termism respectively. We find negative relation between Executive Compensation Duration and representatives of Real Earning Management. That is, the shorter Executive Compensation Duration the bigger Positive Real Earning Management scale. In addition, CEOs tend to not take big bath, which Discretionary Accrual Earning Management is negative, as their Executive Compensation Duration is shorter than 1 year. We also find that Executive Compensation Duration has interactive effect with Loss-avoidance company on Positive Real Earning Management. That is, in Loss-avoidance company, CEOs have more incentive to manage earnings despite the length of Executive Compensation Duration.