中國大陸雙層股權結構制度探究

Abstract

本文首先分析了雙層股權結構的內涵、類型、發展歷史。雙層股權結構是對傳統公司法中「一股一權」原則的背離，後者存在著遏制公司意思自治空間、無法滿足股東異質化利益偏好、增加公司控制權集中的成本、導致股東實質不平等諸多缺陷，所以逐漸被各國立法所修正。取而代之的雙層股權結構將表決權與收益權進行非比例性配置，允許公司發行表決權倍數不同的股份，既充分尊重了公司意思自治、契合了股東不同的投資偏好，又有助於激勵創始人創新發展、推動公司長期成長，因此受到越來越多的創新企業青睞。不過也應當注意到，雙層股權結構存在上述諸多優勢的同時，也可能產生惡化代理問題、導致公司內部監督失衡的風險。對此也需要通過公司法當中的監管策略與治理策略加以規制。 其次，通過對美國、香港、台灣關於雙層股權結構的歷史變遷、法律淵源、上市規則、監管制度等方面進行探討，闡釋雙層股權結構的利弊得失，為中國大陸雙層股權結構制度的完善提供有益借鑑。 最後，通過探討中國大陸公司對於雙層股權結構的實踐需求，分析中國大陸建立完善雙層股權結構制度的必要性和可行性。同時對目前已經採用雙層股權結構上市的公司進行實證分析，提出完善相關立法，建立雙層股權結構制度的建議，以期增強中國大陸資本市場的國際競爭力。

This article first analyzes the connotation, type and development history of Dual-Class Share Structure. The Dual-Class Share Structure is a departure from the principle of 'one-share-one-vote principle' in the traditional company law. The latter restrict the autonomy of the company’s will, cannot satisfy the heterogeneous interest preferences of shareholders, increase the cost of concentration of company control rights, and cause substantial inequality of shareholders. Therefore, many deficiencies have been gradually amended by national legislation. Instead, Dual-Class Share Structure disproportionately allocates voting rights and income rights, allowing companies to issue shares with different multiples of voting rights, which fully respects the autonomy of the company’s will, conforms to the different investment preferences of shareholders, and helps to inspire founders to innovate development and promote the company’s long-term growth, so it is favored by more and more innovative companies. However, it should also be noted that while the Dual-Class Share Structure has many of the above-mentioned advantages, it may also cause the risk of worsening agency problems and leading to imbalances in the company’s internal supervision. This also needs to be regulated by the regulatory and governance strategies in the company law. Secondly, by discussing the historical changes, legal sources, listing rules, regulatory systems and other aspects of Dual-Class Share Structure in the United States, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, the pros and cons of Dual-Class Share Structure are explained, which provides useful reference for the Dual-Class Share Structure in mainland China. Finally, by discussing the practical needs of companies in mainland China for a Dual-Class Share Structure, it analyzes the necessity and feasibility of establishing a perfect Dual-Class Share Structure in mainland China. At the same time, it conducts an empirical analysis of companies that have adopted a Dual-Class Share Structure to list, proposes to improve relevant legislation and establish a Dual-Class Share Structure in order to enhance the international competitiveness of mainland China’s capital market.