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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/9988完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 孫雅麗(Yeali S. Sun) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ming-Lung Lu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 呂明龍 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-20T20:54:05Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2011-08-04 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-20T20:54:05Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2011-08-04 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2011-08-02 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | [1] F. Report and Order, “Federal communication commission std,” FCC 02-48, February 2002.
[2] V. Rodriguez, K. Moessner, and R. Tafazolli, “Auction driven dynamic spectrum allocation: optimal bidding, pricing and service priorities for multi-rate, multi-class CDMA,” IEEE 16th International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC 2005), vol. 3, pp. 1850-1854, September 2005. [3] J. Huang, R. A. Berry, and M. L. Honig, “Auction-based spectrum sharing,” Mobile Networks and Applications, vol. 11, no. 3, June 2006. [4] S. Gandhi, C. Buragohain, L. Cao, H. Zheng, and S. Suri, “A general framework for wireless spectrum auctions,” 2nd IEEE International Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2007), pp. 22-33, April 2007. [5] D. Niyato and E. Hossain, “A game-theoretic approach to competitive spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC 2007), pp. 16-20, March 2007. [6] D. Niyato, E. Hossain, and Z. Han, “Dynamics of multiple-seller and multiple-buyer spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks: a game-theoretic modeling approach,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 1009-1022, August 2009. [7] O. Ileri, D. Samardzija, and N. B. Mandayam, “Demand responsive pricing and competitive spectrum allocation via a spectrum server,” First IEEE International Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN 2005), pp. 194-202, November 2005. [8] S. Sengupta and M. Chatterjee, “An economic framework for dynamic spectrum access and service pricing,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, Vol. 17, No. 4, August 2009, pp. 1200-1213. [9] J. Acharya and R. D. Yates, “Profit maximizing pricing strategies for dynamic spectrum allocation,” 41st Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS '07), pp. 345-350, March 2007. [10] M. Blomgren and J. Hultell, “Demand-responsive pricing in open wireless access markets,” IEEE 65th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2007-Spring), pp. 2990-2995, April 2007. [11] L. Badia, M. Lindstrom, J. Zander, and M. Zorzi, “Demand and pricing effects on the radio resource allocation of multimedia communication systems,” IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM ‘03), vol. 7, pp. 4116-4121, December 2003. [12] Sundararajan, “Nonlinear pricing of information goods,” Management Science, Vol. 50, No. 12 (Dec., 2004), pp. 1660-1673. [13] E. Maskin and J. Riley, “Monopoly with incomplete information,” The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1984, pp. 171-196. [14] K. Black, Business Statistics for Contemporarry Decision Making, 4th ed., John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 2006, pp. 456-459. [15] R. V. Hogg and E. A. Tanis, Probability and Statistical Inference, 7th ed., Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006, pp. 334-337. [16] L. Devroye, Non-Uniform Random Variate Generation, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp. 28. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/9988 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 頻寬是很稀少且珍貴的資源。為了增進頻寬使用效率,解決原先使用方法的低效率,感知無線電(cognitive radio)以及動態頻譜分配(dynamic spectrum allocation)的概念被提了出來。在此篇論文,我們考慮一個由單一 mobile network operator (MNO) 以及眾多有著不同類別(type)的 mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) 組成的無線網路。我們以下提供一個由兩個階段組成的開放式動態頻寬交易模型來讓 MNO 將頻寬販賣給 MVNOs。
這個開放式動態頻寬交易模型的第一個階段的目的是在一連串MNO與MVNOs的互動中,去找到參與的MVNOs的購買意願或者他們的類別,並且計算出要被販賣的頻寬的最佳價目表。計算最佳價目表的同時也會考慮到MVNOs的需求價格函數以及效用函數。最重要的是,最佳價目表必須滿足誘因相符性(incentive compatible, IC) 以及個體理性(individually rational, IR)的限制。前者確保了為某個類別的MVNO設計的數量-價格組能給該MVNO帶來最大的效用;後者確保了為其設計的數量-價格組可以給其非零的效用。我們同時也提供了一個將連續的最佳價目表轉成離散形式,以提供一個比較容易閱讀的格式;此時每個MVNO都會去選擇最靠近其在連續最佳價目表中類別的數量-價格組。在反覆進行的互動收斂且停止之後,如果全部的需求超出了可以提供的頻寬,那麼此模型就會使用背包問題的解法來將頻寬分配給一部分的MVNOs,已使得分配出去的頻寬不會超出可提通頻寬的限制。最後,我們用一個例子來說明這個開放式動態頻寬交易模型是如何運作的。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The wireless spectrum is a limited resource. The concepts of cognitive radio and dynamic spectrum allocation (DSA) have been considered as a possible mechanism to improve the efficiency of bandwidth usage and solve the bandwidth deficiency problem. In this work, we consider a wireless network access environment comprised of a mobile network operator (MNO) and a distribution of different types of mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). We propose an open dynamic bandwidth trading model that comprises of two phases. The goal of the phase one is to find out the distribution of the buying preferences or types of the participating MVNOs through a sequence of interactive rounds and compute the optimal price schedule for the unused bandwidth for sale. The derivation of the optimal price schedule also considers the demand and utility functions of the MVNOs. Most importantly, the optimal price schedule satisfies the incentive compatible (IC) and the individually rational (IR) constraints. The former ensures that the quantity-price pair designed for MVNO of a specific type will choose the pair that maximizes its utility; while the latter assures that the pairs cause non-negative utility. We also give an algorithm to convert the continuous optimal price schedule to a discrete one so as to provide a simple easy-to-read format for MVNOs’ selection while ensuring that individual type of MVNOs will choose the pair whose corresponding utility value is closest to the value in the original function. After the iterative process converges and terminates, if the total number of bandwidth requests exceeds the total capacity constraint, the process proceeds to address the finite capacity constraint by solving a bounded knapsack problem for final bandwidth allocation. Lastly, an example is provided to explain how the proposed open dynamic bandwidth trading process with optimal incentive-compatible price schedule is derived. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-20T20:54:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-100-R98725002-1.pdf: 1117323 bytes, checksum: 272505783a1f25581aabfd3b2c7e074a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝詞 I
論文摘要 II THESIS ABSTRACT IV Table of Contents VI List of Figures VII List of Tables VIII Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Related Work 4 Chapter 3 System Model 7 3.1 MVNO: the Buyer 7 3.2 MNO: the Seller 8 Chapter 4 Optimal Price Schedule 11 4.1 Optimal Bandwidth Quantity 14 4.2 Optimal Price 15 4.3 Discrete Price Schedule 15 Chapter 5 Open Dynamic Bandwidth Trading Model 20 5.1 Re-estimation of MVNO Type Distribution 21 5.2 Estimation of F(i)(θ) from R(i) 22 5.3 Capacity Constraint 23 5.4 Example 25 A. Optimal Price Schedule 26 B. Discrete Price Schedule 27 C. Quantity-Price Selection 28 D. Hypothesis Testing 28 E. Estimation of MVNO Type Distribution 29 F. Bandwidth Allocation 32 Chapter 6 Conclusion 33 Reference 35 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 不完整資訊下動態頻寬交易之最佳定價方法 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Optimal Pricing for Dynamic Bandwidth Trading with Incomplete Information | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 99-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳孟彰,蔡志宏(Zsehong Tsai),林宗男(Tsungnan Lin),潘育群 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 動態頻譜分配,誘因相符性,頻寬交易,最佳價目,定價方法,有限頻寬分配, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | dynamic spectrum sharing,incentive-compatible pricing,bandwidth trading,optimal price schedule,finite bandwidth sharing, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 37 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2011-08-02 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 資訊管理學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 資訊管理學系 | |
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