我國憲法解釋中的人性尊嚴—從Waldron的理論出發

Abstract

本文旨在釐清人性尊嚴於我國憲法解釋中的性質、內涵與條文依據。大法官從釋字第71號解釋起便開始使用尊嚴一詞，更在釋字第603號解釋中將人性尊嚴稱之為自由民主憲政秩序之核心價值。然而，從大法官解釋與憲法判決的整理中可以發現大法官對於人性尊嚴之性質、內涵與條文依據始終沒有清楚地闡釋。 國內學者則大多主張可以援引康德哲學來說明人性尊嚴於我國憲法解釋中的內涵，以及能夠將人性尊嚴理解為一種基本權利，並且透過一般法與特別法之關係處理其與其他基本權之關係。然而，本文認為上述觀點忽略康德哲學提出人性尊嚴之目的在於說明個人的道德義務，而非為國家權力行使劃定界限。並且將人性尊嚴理解為一種基本權利，除了會與憲法第22條的功能產生衝突，也無法從我國憲法條文中得到依據。 面對上述的困境，本文認為能夠透過Jeremy Waldron的人性尊嚴觀來加以解決。Waldron從羅馬法中的dignitas出發，指出尊嚴原本僅屬於貴族或騎士等高階級的人，但在法國大革命後，經歷「向上平等化」（upward equalization）的過程，轉變為所有人皆平等享有之地位。此種地位除了包含各種權利與義務外，背後更存在一個共同理念來說明這些權利與義務。Waldron更表明了法律體系是以尊重人們尊嚴的方式來進行治理的，具體表顯在法律保護尊嚴的兩種方式，分別是透過法律的自我適用（self-application）來預設人們有能力認識規範、理解規範對於自身行為的影響，並以此作出決定與採取行動，以及透過在訴訟程序中提供人們表達意見與提交證據之機會，來肯定人們對於規範能有自身的觀點與視角。 本文認為大法官在釋字第784號解釋中指出人民擁有得以主張各種憲法權利之法律上地位，並不會因為同時具有學生等其他身分而受到影響，其實便已經揭示人性尊嚴作為一種地位的實質內涵。並且大法官對於法律明確性原則與訴訟程序保障之論述，也能夠與Waldron所說的法律保障尊嚴的方式進行呼應。 本文進一步地主張將憲法第7條至第18條及第22條作為人性尊嚴之條文依據。憲法第7條除了宣示所有人在本質上都是相同的，更能夠將平等尊嚴地位的要求落實在其他基本權中，確保所有人都享有相同的基本權利，且沒有人擁有凌駕於他人之上的特權。憲法第16條之訴訟權則確保訴訟程序提供人民表達意見之機會，使人民在法庭上得以表達自身對於法律適用之觀點。至於複數基本權條款的組成與憲法第22條概括基本權則展現出地位集合各種權利義務之本質，並且提供後續擴張的可能性。總而言之，本文認為透過結合Waldron的理論，將能夠建構出一套立基於我國憲法條文與實務的人性尊嚴詮釋框架。

This thesis aims to clarify the nature, meaning, and provision basis of human dignity in Taiwan’s constitutional court. Since J. Y. Interpretation No. 71, the Constitutional Court began to use the term dignity, and in J.Y. Interpretation No. 603, identified it as a core value of the liberal democratic constitutional order. However, the Justices have never explicitly defined its normative content or identified its provision basis. Domestic scholars generally advocate invoking Kantian philosophy to elucidate the meaning of human dignity in constitutional court and to treat human dignity as a fundamental right. They propose addressing the relationship between human dignity and other fundamental rights through the framework of general and special laws. However, this thesis argues that relying on Kantian philosophy to interpret human dignity within the Constitution overlooks the fact that Kant's concept of human dignity is aimed at explaining individuals’ moral duties, rather than setting the limits of state power. Moreover, the interpretation of human dignity as a fundamental right and as a general clause governing other specific fundamental rights conflicts with the function of Art. 22 of the Constitution and fails to adequately demonstrate how human dignity can be derived as a fundamental right from the constitutional text. To address these challenges, this thesis turns to Jeremy Waldron’s account of human dignity. Waldron traces the origin of dignity to the Roman law concept of dignitas, which was initially exclusive to the nobility and equestrian class. Following the French Revolution, it underwent an “upward equalization,” transforming into a status shared equally by all individual. This status encompasses not only a bundle of rights, but also an underlying idea describing and shaping those rights. Waldron further suggests that the legal system is governed in a way that respect dignity, which is evidenced by the two ways in which the law protects dignity: through the self-application of the law, which presupposes that the people have ability to recognize and understand norms, and making decisions and taking actions accordingly, and through the provision of opportunities for people to submission and present evidence in the court, which affirms that people are capable of having their own view or perspectives on norms. This paper argues that in J.Y. Interpretation No. 784, the Justices recognized that individuals possess a legal status enabling them to assert constitutional rights, and that this status is not diminished by other social identities such as being a student. This reflects the substantive content of human dignity as status. Furthermore, the Court’s emphasis on the principle of legal clarity and the protection of procedural rights aligns with Waldron’s account of how law protect dignity. This thesis contends that Article 7 through 18 and Article 22 of the Constitution can serve as the provision basis for human dignity. Article 7 declares the essential equality of all persons and underpins the idea that all individuals possess equal dignity and rights. Article 16 ensures individuals can explain their views or perspective on the application of norm. The multiplicity of rights provisions, along with Article 22, further illustrates the nature of dignity-as-status and provides room for future expansion of rights. In conclusion, this paper argues that by introducing Waldron’s theory, we can construct a coherent and textually grounded interpretive framework for human dignity.