股份有限公司董事會規範之檢討—從董事長選任與解任爭議談起

Abstract

我國公開發行公司董事長選任與解任制度在實務運作上存在諸多法律爭議與困境。近年來，公司經營權爭奪事件頻傳，其中不乏公司派即使股權或董事席次居於劣勢，仍能藉由董事長選任高門檻及對解任方式的法規不明確，有效鞏固其經營權，例如2022年台開公司之爭議即為顯例，突顯現行制度中即使過半數董事同意卻仍未能合法解任或選任董事長之不合理。 透過文獻分析、比較法並輔以數據分析，深入剖析公司法與證券交易法在董事會召集權、特別決議出席門檻及臨時動議制度上的規範問題。研究發現，現行公司法對董事長選任採行特別決議缺乏明確的立法理由支持，且未明文規定解任方式，導致實務上多參照選任方式辦理，無形中墊高解任門檻。此外，金融監督管理委員會2022年修正公開發行公司董事會議事辦法，明文禁止以臨時動議方式提出董事長之選任或解任事項，雖意在防堵突襲，卻實質上剝奪了過半但未達三分之二董事挑戰現任董事長的合法途徑，加劇公司治理僵局。 本文主張，應重新檢視董事會臨時動議的限制，將議案資訊是否充足的判斷權限歸還與會董事，並考慮賦予個別董事提案權。最核心的建議為董事長之選任與解任應考慮修正為適用普通決議，並參照公發公司股東會未達特別決議定足數時之例外規定，增修董事會特別決議之配套設計（以董事過半數之出席，及出席董事三分之二以上同意之決議行之），以徹底解決少數董事杯葛導致重要議案無法通過的問題，提升董事會運作彈性。透過數據分析，本文亦論證合法的經營權變動，未必不利於公司長期發展。因此，建議主管機關應轉變監理思維，將重點置於確保經營權爭奪程序的公平性與資訊揭露的充分性，而非過度抑制競爭本身，以實現資本市場汰弱留強之功能，維護金融市場穩定與保障投資人權益。

The current system for electing and dismissing chairpersons of public company boards in Taiwan presents significant legal disputes and operational challenges. Recent corporate control contests frequently illustrate how incumbent management, even with minority equity or board seats, can consolidate their power. They do this by leveraging the high election threshold for chairpersons and the legal ambiguity surrounding dismissal procedures. The 2022 Taiwan Land Development Co., Ltd. dispute, for instance, vividly exposed how difficult it is for a board to effectively remove an unsuitable chairperson within the current regulatory framework, leading to significant corporate governance deadlocks. This study uses doctrinal analysis, comparative law, and quantitative data analysis to examine regulatory issues concerning board meeting convocation rights, special resolution quorum requirements, and the ad hoc motion system as prescribed by the Company Act and Securities Exchange Act. We find that the Company Act's special resolution requirement for chairperson election lacks clear legislative justification. The absence of explicit removal provisions has led to a problematic reliance on the election method for removal, inadvertently elevating its practical threshold. Furthermore, the Financial Supervisory Commission's (FSC) 2022 amendment to the Regulations Governing the Procedures for Board Meetings of Public Companies, which expressly prohibits the introduction of chairperson election or removal matters via ad hoc motions, though intended to prevent disruptive surprises, effectively eliminates a legitimate avenue for a majority (albeit less than two-thirds) of directors to challenge the incumbent, thereby exacerbating existing corporate governance impasses. This thesis argues for a critical reassessment of the restrictions on ad hoc motions in board meetings, proposing that the authority to determine the sufficiency of agenda information be restored to the attending directors, with consideration given to individual directors' proposal rights. Our core recommendation is to revise the election and dismissal of the chairperson to be subject to an ordinary board resolution. Alternatively, we propose adopting a complementary special resolution exception for board meetings, mirroring the exceptions for shareholder special resolutions in public companies (allowing for resolutions with a majority of directors present and two-thirds of those present agreeing), should the special resolution requirement persist. This would fundamentally address the issue of minority director obstruction to crucial resolutions and significantly enhance board operational flexibility. Moreover, our data analysis demonstrates that legitimate changes in corporate control, when conducted fairly and transparently, can promote a company's long-term development. Consequently, we recommend a shift in the regulatory paradigm. We urge authorities to prioritize ensuring the fairness of corporate control contest procedures and the sufficiency of information disclosure, rather than excessively suppressing competition. Such an approach would enable the capital market to effectively weed out underperforming entities and foster stronger ones, thereby maintaining financial market stability and safeguarding investor interests.