北京市老舊小區改造的政策執行：居委會街頭官僚的角色與作用

Abstract

自改革開放以來，中國的工業化率、城市化率不斷攀高，人口流動性增強，城市基層治理從以單位為主、基層政府為輔的雙重治理模式，邁向以街道辦和居委會為主的街居制。居委會人員作為城市基層街頭官僚，處於「一套班子，兩塊牌子」的制度環境之下，同時承擔著行政、黨政和群眾自治工作。他們在落實諸如老舊小區改造（以下簡稱「舊改」）這種具有集體行動性質的政策時，於基層發揮著第一線執行者的作用。 在今日中國，社區居委會既是行政體系的末梢，其領導班子又與社區黨委熔於一爐，還要推行群眾自治。其「三位一體」的基本面，映照出中國特色的街頭官僚組織樣態。這直接從制度設置上挑戰了以Woodrow Wilson（1887）為代表的傳統公共行政學派的政治―行政二分觀點，也無法簡單套用以Michael Lipsky（1980）為代表的街頭官僚理論家對於自由裁量權的探討視角。本文結合中國特殊的政治現實，採取一種中觀視角，以北京市舊改政策為依託，探究中國居委會街頭官僚之獨特的三重組織角色（即政策執行第一線、準基層黨組織、群眾自治組織）如何在舊改的執行過程中展演。舊改作為內容豐富、項目多樣、範圍廣泛的大型政策，有其複雜性和異質性。故本文選取廣義舊改政策中的三種項目（綜合治理中的拆除違建、基礎類改造、屬於完善類的入戶上下水改造）作為重點關注對象，以便進行橫向對比。 在舊改的既有文獻中，從政策執行的角度聚焦於居委會街頭官僚的研究並不多，著眼於居委會混合角色的視角更是罕見。為了彌補這一缺憾，本文通過對北京市居委會人員（及其所在小區的居民、物業等）的半結構式訪談，探問居委會街頭官僚對於執行舊改政策（含上述三種項目）的組織態度，及其面對小區具體情況所採用的執行方式；並以這些實證資料為據，結合對政策文件的考察，析論居委會街頭官僚在舊改政策執行中的角色展演。 本文最主要的研究結論如下： 第一，就舊改政策而言，基層黨組織發揮了形式上的引領作用。在程序上，「黨建引領基層治理」貫穿了舊改政策執行的全過程，規定居委會街頭官僚無論是向上反映問題、尋求上級指導，還是接收上級的交辦任務，都要經過黨組織的中介。然而，相對於疫情期間的封控和清零政策，黨的角色之於舊改政策並不是那麼顯著。儘管社區居委和社區黨委是同一套班子，居委會服膺於黨的領導，但絕大部分的舊改工作實際上是事務性的。 第二，在中國的體制脈絡下，作為一項大型民生政策，舊改具有從高位推動的、勢在必行的龐大勢能。這大致解釋了居委會街頭官僚在基層推動舊改的積極性。而其執行舊改的實際行動，具有明確的行政目的，即協助上級地方政府或其派出機構（即街道辦事處）開展舊改工作。 第三，居委會街頭官僚從事了大量的、各式各樣的群眾工作。在此，行政與群眾工作的關係，既非二元對立，亦非此消彼長。儘管居委會被界定為「群眾自治性」組織，但究其實質，主要是承擔了「做好群眾工作」和「協助行政」的職責。居委會街頭官僚與舊改小區居民的互動，與其說是在促進自下而上的群眾自治，或「居民自我管理、自我教育、自我服務」的社區自治，不如說是「以群眾工作輔助舊改行政」。 第四，從北京市舊改政策的基層執行過程，不難看出，以行政為主導、以群眾工作為輔助、形式上接受黨的領導的「街居制」，依然是中國城市（尤其北京市）基層治理的一種主流樣態。近十多年來，有部分論者認為隨著社經生活的現代變遷，「街居制」正逐漸轉型為自治活力更充沛的、社會自發性更強的、愈發不受黨和政府制約的「社區制」。但這並未在本研究中得到證實。

Since the launch of the reform and opening-up policy, China has seen a continuous rise in industrialization and urbanization rates, along with growing population mobility. Urban grassroots governance has shifted from a dual model—primarily unit-based with grassroots government as a supplement—to one primarily led by subdistrict offices and residents’ committees. Personnel of the residents’ committees, as urban grassroots street-level bureaucrats, operate within a system known as “one team, two signboards,” simultaneously undertaking administrative, party-political, and mass self-governance works. When implementing policies with collective-action characteristics, such as the renovation of old residential communities (hereafter referred to as “old community renovation” or “OCR”), they serve as frontline executors at the grassroots level. In contemporary China, community residents’ committees are the terminal point of the administrative system and are organizationally merged with community party committees, while also being tasked with promoting mass self-governance. This “three-in-one” foundation reflects the uniquely Chinese organizational form of street- level bureaucracy. This institutional arrangement directly challenges the dichotomy between the political and the administrative in traditional public administration school represented by Woodrow Wilson (1887), and it cannot be easily explained through the theory of discretion in street-level bureaucracy, as articulated by theorists like Michael Lipsky (1980). This dissertation adopts a meso-level perspective, grounded in China’s unique political realities, and uses Beijing’s OCR policy as a case study to explore how residents’ committee street-level bureaucrats perform their unique triple organizational roles (as frontline policy implementer, grassroots quasi-party organization, and mass self-governance body) in the process of OCR implementation. Given the complexity and heterogeneity of the OCR as a large-scale policy with rich content, diverse projects, and broad scope, this dissertation selects three types of projects from the broadly defined OCR policy—demolition of illegal structures (as a demand of comprehensive governance), renovation of the basic kind, and in-home water supply and drainage renovation of the perfection kind—for horizontal comparison. Existing literature on the OCR rarely focuses on the role of residents’ committee street-level bureaucrats from the viewpoint of policy implementation, and even less so from the viewpoint of their hybrid roles. To address this gap, this dissertation conducts semi-structured interviews with residents’ committee personnel (as well as residents and property management staff in their respective communities) in Beijing. The aim is to investigate the organizational attitudes of residents’ committee street- level bureaucrats toward the implementation of the OCR policy (including the three aforementioned types of projects), as well as the implementation methods they adopt in response to specific situations in the communities. Based on these empirical data and an examination of policy documents, the study analyzes the role performance of residents’ committee street-level bureaucrats in the execution of the OCR policy. The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: 1.For the OCR policy, grassroots party organizations formally play a guiding role. Procedurally, “party-building leading grassroots governance” permeates the entire process of OCR implementation, requiring that residents’ committee street-level bureaucrats, whether reporting issues upward, seeking guidance from above, or receiving tasks from higher authorities, go through the party organization as an intermediary. However, compared to COVID-19 lockdowns and zero-COVID policies, the party’s role in the OCR is less prominent. Although the leaders of community residents’ committee and those of community party committee are the same team, and residents’ committee is subject to party leadership, most of the OCR works are actually administrative affairs. 2.Under China's institutional context, the OCR as a major livelihood policy has strong momentum driven from above, making its implementation imperative. This largely explains the markedly proactive attitude of residents’ committee street-level bureaucrats at the grassroots level. Their actual actions in executing the OCR policy have clear administrative objectives, namely assisting local governments or their agencies (i.e., subdistrict offices) in carrying out the OCR works. 3.Residents’ committee street-level bureaucrats undertake a large amount and variety of mass work. The relationship between administrative and mass work is neither a binary opposition nor a zero-sum game. Although residents’ committees are defined as “mass self-governing” organizations, their main responsibilities are essentially “doing a good job in mass work” and “assisting administration.” The interaction between street-level bureaucrats and residents in OCR communities is less about facilitating bottom-up mass self-governance, or community self-governance defined as “residents’ self-management, self- education, and self-service,” and more about “supporting OCR administrative tasks through mass work.” 4.Seen from the grassroots implementation process of the OCR policy in Beijing, it is rather clear that the “street-residence model,” which is administratively led, supplemented by mass work, and formally under party leadership, remains one mainstream model of urban grassroots governance in China (especially in Beijing). In recent years, some scholars have argued that with the modernization of socio-economic life, the “street-residence model” is gradually transforming into a more autonomous, socially spontaneous, and less party- and government- constrained “community model.” However, this has not been confirmed in this study.