大股東干政：從公司治理觀點探討銀行大股東之監管措施——以「不當干預」為中心

Abstract

銀行從事收受存款之專營業務，向不特定多數人收受款項或吸收資金，其負債權益比達到十至十五倍之高，存款更係於銀行資產占七成之多，對存款人之保護至關重要，銀行之公司治理似乎應有不同思考。對此，為避免銀行大股東在此槓桿較大之環境裡，從事自利行為而有害於銀行經營，金管會在2023年4月提出銀行法修正草案與金融控股公司修正草案，擬就「大股東干政」予以規範，惟由於仍存有疑慮，至今該等草案仍未三讀通過。 為探討銀行法與金融控股公司修正草案構成要件之設計，本文首先介紹金管會過去之裁罰案，點出現行法制之不足，並比較股東與債權人之風險偏好及其帶來之代理問題，在我國銀行多受少數控制股東之股權集中結構影響之情形，說明少數控制股東之特殊代理問題、銀行個體與總體之財務風險以及存款人之劣勢，建構主管機關代表存款人監督銀行大股東之正當性，避免銀行大股東從事過度承擔風險與風險轉移等損害銀行或存款人之行為。再者，爬梳美國控制股東忠實義務、英國及我國多數股東表決權行使界限之判決，以及英系國家影子董事之法律與判決，以理解兩種規範多數股東之公司治理制度。最後，採擇影子董事制度作為銀行法與金融控股公司修正草案對於大股東干政構成要件設計之基礎，考量金融監理與少數控制股東之特性，對修正草案之「有控制能力者」與「不當干預」提出立法建議，建立一套對於銀行大股東干政行為之行政裁罰制度，透過迅速且合目的性之行政罰，在事發之初且事態未擴大即遏止之，並搭配對聽從不當干預之董事予以解任之措施，有效防範大股東干政之情事，健全銀行經營並保護存款人之利益。

Banks engage exclusively in businesses of accepting deposits and accept payments or receive funds from an unspecific majority of people. Their debt-to-equity ratios often reach ten to fifteen times, with deposits accounting for over 70% of their assets. Given this structure, protecting depositors’ rights becomes critically important, and corporate governance in the banking sector requires a distinct approach. To prevent majority shareholder from engaging in self-interested conduct harmful to bank operations under such high leverage, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) proposed amendments to the Banking Act and the Financial Holding Company Act in April 2023, aiming to regulate “shareholder intervention.” However, due to unresolved concerns, these bills have yet to pass the third reading. To evaluate the design of the proposed constituent elements under the Banking Act and Financial Holding Company Act amendments, this thesis begins by identifying the shortcomings of the current legal framework. It compares the risk preferences of shareholders and creditors and the agency problems arising therefrom. Given the prevalence of concentrated ownership in Taiwanese banks, where control often lies in the hands of controlling minority shareholders, this thesis analyzes the particular agency issues they present, the financial risks posed at both firm and systemic levels, and the disadvantage faced by depositors. These observations establish the legitimacy of regulatory oversight over the majority shareholder on behalf of depositors, particularly to prevent harmful behaviors such as excessive risk-taking or risk-shifting. This thesis further examines governance mechanisms used to regulate the majority shareholder, including the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders under U.S. law, judicial decisions on limits on the exercise of majority shareholders in the U.K. and Taiwan, and the law and decisions of shadow directors in the U.K., Australia and New Zealand. Drawing upon the shadow director concept, this thesis proposes using it as the basis for defining constituent elements of “improper intervention” and “the person who has control” under the draft amendments. In light of financial regulatory concerns and the unique nature of controlling minority shareholders, it recommends a legislative framework that introduces an administrative penalty mechanism targeting improper intervention of the majority shareholder in banks. This mechanism would allow for prompt and purposive administrative penalty at the early stages of the improper intervention, before the situation escalates, and should be accompanied by mechanisms for removing directors who comply with improper intervention. Together, these measures aim to prevent improper intervention, strengthen bank governance, and protect depositors’ interests.