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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 楊金穆 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Chin-Mu Yang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 許樹和 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Shu-He Shiu | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-07-30T16:23:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-07-31 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2025-07-30 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2025-07-28 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Bedke, M. (2009). The iffiest oughts: A guise of reasons account of end-given reasons and end-given oughts. Ethics, 119, 672-698.
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Philosophical Studies, 155(2), 227-239. Way, J. (2012). Explaining the instrumental principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(3), 487-506. Wedgwood, R. (2006). The meaning of ‘ought’. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 1, 127-160. Williams, B. (1980). Internal and external reasons’. In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, 17-28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Worsnip, A. (2015). Narrow-scoping for wide-scopers. Synthese, 192(8), 2617-2646. Worsnip, A. (2016). Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality. Philosophical Quarterly, 66(263), 341-361. Worsnip, A. (2018). The conflict of evidence and coherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(1):3-44. Worsnip, A. (2018). What is (in)coherence? Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 13, 184-206. Worsnip, A. (2021). Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/98223 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文探討工具理性的規範結構，聚焦於【寬域版本】與【窄域版本】的理論分歧。透過語義分析、邏輯形式與規範性評估，本文主張：【寬域版本】雖具有形式一致性優勢，卻無法說明不被允許的修正、缺乏實踐導向性，且削弱對理性錯誤的批評力。相對地，【窄域版本】能更清楚捕捉理由與態度之間的規範連結，並在語義與邏輯層面上展現穩定結構。本文結合模態語義學與動態邏輯資源，建構一套以理由為核心的理性觀，並回應「拔靴自助」問題。最終提出修正型的【窄域版本】，兼顧結構一致性與理由回應，提供更具說服力的工具理性理論。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the normative structure of instrumental rationality by evaluating the theoretical disagreement between wide-scope and narrow-scope accounts. Through semantic analysis, formal logic, and normative assessment, I argue that while the wide-scope view emphasizes consistency among attitudes, it fails to explain why certain revisions are impermissible, lacks practical guidance, and undermines the evaluative force of rational criticism. In contrast, the narrow-scope view more clearly captures the normative connection between reasons and attitudes, and proves to be semantically and logically more stable. Drawing on tools from modal semantics and dynamic logic, this paper defends a reasons-based account of rationality that avoids the bootstrapping problem. I ultimately propose a revised narrow-scope formulation that integrates structural coherence with responsiveness to reasons, offering a more compelling theory of instrumental rationality. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2025-07-30T16:23:51Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2025-07-30T16:23:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 ...................................................................................... I
謝辭 .......................................................................................................... II 中文摘要 .................................................................................................. III ABSTRACT ............................................................................................. IV 目次 .......................................................................................................... V 第一章、寬域版本還是窄域版本？ ............................................................. 1 第一節、問題 .............................................................................................. 1 第二節、語境主義語意學 ............................................................................ 5 第三節、【窄域版本】真的不如語境主義語義學嗎？ .................................. 37 第四節、小結 ............................................................................................ 60 第二章、拔靴自助 ................................................................................... 61 第一節、什麼是「拔靴自助」？ ................................................................ 61 第二節、「拔靴自助」並無法擊倒【窄域版本】 ......................................... 66 第三節、BRUNERO 的版本 .......................................................................... 74 第四節、SCANLON 的理由觀 ....................................................................... 85 第五節、小結 ............................................................................................ 89 第三章、【窄域版本】的邏輯系統 ............................................................. 91 第一節、KRATZER的模態語義學與【窄域版本】 ........................................ 92 第二節、VAN BENTHEM 的動態邏輯與【窄域版本】 .................................... 99 第三節、STALNAKER 的條件句邏輯與【窄域版本】 .................................. 106 第四節、小結 .......................................................................................... 111 第四章、【寬域版本】與【窄域版本】的對比及其哲學意義 ...................... 113 第一節、【寬域版本】與【窄域版本】的規範性 ....................................... 113 第二節、規範性析取主義與「神話論」 ................................................... 117 第三節、「規範析取主義」的挑戰 ............................................................ 120 第四節、KIESEWETTER 對 BRUNERO 理論的回應 ........................................ 132 第五節、小結 .......................................................................................... 136 第五章、【寬域版本】的問題 .................................................................. 138 第一節、【寬域版本】無法解釋某些不一致情況為何「不被允許」 ........... 139 第二節、【寬域版本】拒絕理由基礎理論帶來的代價 ................................ 145 第三節、在實踐推理中，【寬域版本】規範性不足以指導行動 .................. 148 第四節、SCANLON 對【寬域版本】的修正 ................................................ 149 第五節、小結 .......................................................................................... 155 第六章、結論 ........................................................................................ 157 參考文獻 ............................................................................................... 171 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | 理由 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 動態邏輯 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 模態語義學 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 工具理性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | instrumental rationality | en |
| dc.subject | dynamic logic | en |
| dc.subject | modal semantics | en |
| dc.subject | reason | en |
| dc.title | 工具理性：對理由導向的窄域理性觀辯護 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Instrumental Rationality: A Defense of a Reason-Responsive Narrow-Scope Account of Rationality | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 113-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | - |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | 王榮麟 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | Rong-Lin Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 苑舉正;陳思廷;李國揚;簡士傑 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Jeu-Jenq Yuann;Szu-Ting Chen;Kok Yong Lee;Jay Jian | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 工具理性,理由,模態語義學,動態邏輯, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | instrumental rationality,reason,modal semantics,dynamic logic, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 177 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202502554 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2025-07-30 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學系 | - |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | N/A | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
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