政治不確定性對首次公開發行活動之影響：臺灣總統選舉的實證分析

Abstract

本研究探討臺灣總統選舉所帶來的政治不確定性，對首次公開發行（IPO）活動之影響。雖然臺灣選舉制度具高度制度化與可預測性，但政黨輪替往往伴隨政策方向的重大轉變，對企業與投資人皆形成潛在風險。本文特別聚焦於兩個高政治不確定性時點：總統連任任期的第二任期（因法律規定而無連任可能所導致之總統更替）、以及選舉後的第三年亦即下期選舉的前一年（市場對新任總統與其政策尚無明朗之預期），以此作為衡量政治不確定性的指標。 研究使用2000年至2023年間臺灣1,419筆IPO資料，透過橫斷面迴歸模型實證分析政治週期如何影響IPO的數量、募資金額、承銷折價、估值與上市時機。結果顯示：政治不確定性對IPO數量與募資金額的抑制有限，僅在個別市場觀察到IPO數量的顯著減少。然而，在總統第二任期的選舉前一年，IPO折價顯著提高，特別是在中小型市場（上櫃股票市場），顯示投資人於政權更迭前要求更高風險補償。同時，在第二任期的選舉前一年，可以觀察到IPO相對估值顯著下滑的現象，顯示投資人對政策的不確定性可能反映於估值中，但整體證據僅提供有限支持。最後，公司並未因政治不確定性而普遍延後上市，故整體而言，IPO活動主要透過價格調整反映政治風險。 本研究有助於理解制度化政治週期如何影響新興民主國家的資本市場行為，並指出即使選舉制度穩定，若政治領袖更替已成定局，市場仍會對政策方向產生重大反應。研究結果亦對投資人、承銷商及監理機關具實務意涵。其中，對監理機關而言，尤應重視政權交替期間的政治不確定性對IPO市場的影響，透過強化資訊揭露、提升政策預測性與監理溝通，穩定市場預期、降低風險溢酬，進而促進資本配置效率。

This study investigates the impact of political uncertainty stemming from Taiwan’s presidential elections on initial public offering (IPO) activity. While Taiwan’s electoral system is highly institutionalized and predictable, changes in ruling parties often lead to significant shifts in policy direction, posing potential risks for firms and investors. The analysis focuses on two periods of heightened political uncertainty: the president’s second term, when re-election is constitutionally prohibited and leadership change is inevitable, and the third year following an election, which precedes the next presidential race and is characterized by market uncertainty regarding the administration’s policy outlook. Using a dataset of 1,419 IPOs from 2000 to 2023, this study employs cross-sectional regression models to examine how political cycles influence IPO frequency, proceeds, underpricing, valuation, and listing timing. The results show that political uncertainty has a limited suppressive effect on IPO frequency and proceeds, with significant declines in IPO frequency observed only in specific market segments. In contrast, IPO underpricing rises significantly during the pre-election year of a second-term presidency, especially in the TPEx-MB market, suggesting that investors demand greater risk compensation amid anticipated leadership transitions. Valuation discounts are also observed during this period, indicating that political uncertainty may be partially priced in; however, the empirical support remains limited. Lastly, there is no evidence of systematic delays in listing, implying that political risk is primarily reflected through price adjustments rather than timing shifts. This study contributes to our understanding of how institutionalized political cycles affect capital markets in emerging democracies. It demonstrates that even within stable electoral systems, predetermined leadership transitions can elicit substantial market responses. While the findings hold implications for investors and issuers, the policy relevance is especially salient for regulators. In particular, the results underscore the importance of enhancing disclosure practices, improving policy predictability, and maintaining consistent regulatory communication during periods of political turnover to stabilize market expectations, reduce risk premiums, and improve capital allocation efficiency.