論雙層股權結構──以複數表決權股為中心

Abstract

一股一表決權為我國公司法長期以來的原則規範。1980年，公司法允許發行無表決權股；2015年及2018年分別開放閉鎖性股份有限公司及非公開發行公司發行複數表決權股，逐步敞開雙層股權結構的大門。然而，目前僅閉鎖性股份有限公司及非公開發行公司得發行複數表決權股，公開發行公司仍不得為之。根據立法理由，立法者擔心若公開發行公司得發行複數表決權股，將產生萬年董監的問題，有害公司治理。然而，透過無表決權股及普通股亦可達到雙層股權之效果，立法者唯獨禁止複數表決權股，似有再思考的空間。 反對雙層股權結構的論者指出，雙層股權結構將使代理成本問題加劇；經營階層若表現不彰，其他股東也難以透過股東會將其汰換，公司經營效率也會產生問題。再者，有許多學者以實證研究指出，採取雙層股權結構將使公司價值降低。最後，機構投資人也大力反對雙層股權結構，認為一股一表決權是長期以來的公司治理原則，應賦予所有股東相同的表決權。支持雙層股權結構的論者則指出，控制者之所以欲獲得控制權，並不再於追求私益，而在於追求獨特的遠見，能不畏追求短期利益的股東，規劃公司長遠發展。同時，相較交叉持股、股東協議等機制，雙層股權結構是較透明度交高的鞏固控制權方式，代理成本問題較易被偵測。最後，也有不少實證研究指出，雙層股權結構公司的表現較一般公司來得更好。 在比較法上，美國、英國、香港及新加坡的公司法皆允許發行複數表決權股，得在章程上訂立各類股份的權利義務，至於其他詳細的規範皆由證券交易所之上市規則處理。本文接著比較了紐約、那斯達克、倫敦、香港及新加坡五間證交所的上市規則，先回顧這五家交易所如何從禁止雙層股權結構走向開放，再整理雙層股權結構的相關配套措施。本文將配套措施分為三部分，分別為事前設計、事中運作及事後救濟。首先在事前設計上，有些交易所對公司規模或公司類型有更高要求或特別規定，並且訂有強制日落條款規定，有些則訂有表決權比率限制，使複數表決權的表決權數不得超過普通股表決權的一定倍數。其次，在事中運作上，少數證交所對公司的委員會成員選任有較高要求；多數的證交所對雙層股權結構公司的資訊揭露都訂有許多規範，確保股東清楚知悉該雙層股權結構的意涵與風險。最後，在事後救濟上，股東可透過代位訴訟或集體訴訟追溯董事責任，然案例數量並不多。 整理完抽象規範後，本文以Facebook（Meta）、福特汽車及阿里巴巴三家公司作為代表，觀察雙層股權結構的實務運作。整體而言，這些公司的複數表決權股除了表決權數較高，通常還附有其他權利，譬如公司重大事項須經複數表決權股股東決議，或者在公司清算上有優先分派權。另外，這些公司還運用其他方式鞏固控制權，包含簽訂表決權拘束契約、或者在章程訂立反併購款等。這些控制者以雙層股權結構長期安穩地握有控制權，雖然每年都有股東提案回復單層股權結構，但因控制者的複數表決權股，目前仍皆維持雙層股權結構。 綜覽比較法上的抽象規範與實務運作案例後，我國法制的訂立仍須注意我國實務與外國實務的不同，建立「因地制宜」的法制，不應全盤接收外國法。首先，本文認為，部分證交所訂立的公司規模或公司類型限制，並無助於監管雙層股權結構公司，且比較法上的規範標準也十分抽象模糊，因此我國不必訂立相關規定。其次，IPO時有公開說明書清楚的資訊揭露，資本重組時也經過股東會特別決議，本文認為上市公司可在IPO時或透過資本重組發行複數表決權股，若上市前公司已有複數表決權股的存在，亦屬合法。第三，雖然許多證交所對複數表決權股持有人設有身分限制，但本文認為設有過多限制不利於公司長期發展，蓋創始人可能經營多年從外部尋找接班人選，也將公司轉變為家族企業，若在上市規則就限制持有人身分，可能過度缺乏彈性，公司便不願利用雙層股權結構。 第四，本文認為在發行價格及決策程序上，應要求公司須經股東會特別決議始得發行，並說明發行複數表決權股的理由、價格及合理性，以及選擇特定人作為持有人的理由，藉此拘束經營階層恣意發行複數表決權股，鞏固控制權。第五，為避免一般股東在公司重大事項上無置喙餘地，本文認為香港及新加坡證交所的加強表決程序值得作為我國法的參考：在某些特定情況下，複數表決權股將回歸一股一表決權。最後，資訊揭露當然是基本且必要的配套措施─公司應在各種揭露文件中清楚載明雙層股權結構的各項資訊，包含解釋何謂雙層股權結構、為何公司採取雙層股權結構，並說明此制度所帶來的風險，確保所有投資人與股東皆在充足的資訊揭露下作出決定。

The principle of "one share one vote" has long served as a cornerstone of Taiwan’s Company Act. However, in 1980, amendments permitted the issuance of non-voting shares. In 2015 and 2018, Taiwan’s Company Act allowed closely held corporations and non-public companies, respectively, to issue multiple voting shares. These developments have incrementally opened the door to dual-class structures (DCS). Nevertheless, the issuance of multiple voting shares remains prohibited for public companies. Legislative concerns underpinning this restriction primarily centered on the potential entrenchment of directors and supervisors. Yet, the policy inconsistency is notable: dual-class effects can also be achieved through combinations of non-voting shares and common shares, while only multiple voting shares are expressly proscribed. This asymmetry warrants further reflection and reconsideration. Critics argue that DCS intensify agency costs by decoupling voting power from economic ownership. Moreover, poor managerial performance becomes more difficult to rectify through shareholder action. Numerous empirical studies further indicate that DCS may result in diminished firm value. Institutional investors have consistently opposed DCS, advocating for the preservation of the "one share, one vote" principle as a normative standard of corporate governance. On the other hand, proponents of DCS argue that the pursuit of control is often motivated not by private interests but by idiosyncratic vision. Dual-class structures can insulate management from short-term market pressures, allowing for consistent and forward-looking corporate planning. Compared to mechanisms such as cross-shareholding or shareholder agreements, DCS offer greater transparency, which facilitates the detection of agency problems. Moreover, some empirical studies suggest that companies employing DCS may, in fact, outperform their single-class counterparts. From a comparative legal perspective, jurisdictions such as the United States, United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and Singapore permit the issuance of shares with multiple voting rights, while more detailed governance requirements are set forth in the listing rules of securities exchanges. Subsequently, this article traces each exchange's evolution from prohibiting to permitting DCS and then categorizes the accompanying regulatory safeguards into three stages. First, ex ante design measures include heightened listing requirements based on company size or type, mandatory sunset provisions, and limitations on voting ratios—typically capping the voting power of multiple-vote shares at a fixed multiple of common shares. Second, operational safeguards during the company’s lifecycle often involve stricter requirements for board and committee composition (in select exchanges), and robust disclosure obligations. Last, ex post remedies provide shareholders with the ability to initiate derivative or class action lawsuits to hold directors accountable, although such litigations remain relatively infrequent in practice. In Chapter 4, this article examines the practical implementation of DCS through three prominent cases: Meta Platforms (Facebook), Ford Motor Company, and Alibaba Group. These companies illustrate the operational nuances of DCS: their multiple-vote shares not only confer enhanced voting rights but often carry additional privileges, such as veto powers over critical corporate decisions or priority in liquidation proceedings. Moreover, these companies utilize supplementary mechanisms to entrench control, including voting agreements and anti-takeover provisions embedded in their corporate charters. Despite recurring shareholder proposals advocating a transition to single-class structures, the sustained dominance of controlling shareholders through multiple voting shares has enabled the persistence of DCS in each case. This study contends that a legal system tailored to local conditions should be established, rather than indiscriminately adopting foreign models. First, this article argues that certain restrictions imposed by stock exchanges—such as limitations based on company size or type—do not effectively contribute to the regulation of dual-class share structures. Second, the issuance of multiple voting shares (MVS) should be permissible at the time of the IPO or through recapitalizaion. If MVS exist prior to the IPO, such a structure should also be deemed legitimate. Third, although many stock exchanges impose identity-based restrictions on holders of MVS, this article argues that excessive limitations may hinder a company’s long-term development. If the listing rules rigidly restrict the identities of MVS holders, such inflexibility may deter firms from adopting a dual-class share structure. Fourth, this study maintains that the issuance of MVS should be subject to a special resolution of the shareholders’ meeting. The company should be required to disclose the rationale for the issuance, the proposed pricing, and the justification for selecting specific individuals as MVS holders. Fifth, to prevent ordinary shareholders from being excluded from decisions on significant corporate matters, in some specific circumstances, the “one share, one vote” principle should be reinstated. Finally, disclosure of information constitutes a fundamental and indispensable safeguard. Companies should clearly specify all aspects of the dual-class share structure in relevant disclosure documents, including explanations of what a dual-class structure entails, the rationale for its adoption, and the risks it may pose. This ensures that all investors and shareholders are able to make informed decisions based on adequate and transparent information.