論金融控股公司治理與提名委員會設置芻議

Abstract

我國金融控股公司治理面臨多重挑戰，而「人」為強化或處理金融控股公司特有的公司治理問題的關鍵因素。比較法上，提名委員會正是用以處理公司治理「人」的問題的關鍵功能性委員會，金融主管機關近年雖然陸續透過修正公司治理實務守則及推動「公司治理3.0」等政策倡導上市櫃公司設置提名委員會，惟因現行規範多屬自律性質，導致制度推動效果有限。實務觀察亦顯示，多數金融控股公司仍未設置提名委員會，至於已設置提名委員會者，亦有提名委員會獨立性不足、運作內容流於形式與資訊揭露不足情形，導致未能發揮其實質功能。 本文透過分析我國制度現況、個案觀察與國際比較，參酌OECD與BCBS公司治理原則以及美國與新加坡法制後，建議我國應將提名委員會制度納入證券交易法規範，並由金融控股公司及符合一定標準之金融機構優先適用。在提名委員會法制設計方面，本文建議提名委員會應由全體獨立董事組成，以強化提名委員會之獨立性。提名委員會之職權應涵蓋董事候選人選任標準之制定與審查，並就資訊揭露部分參酌美國法，於公告董事候選人名單時一併揭露提名審查過程與標準適用情形，提升提名程序之透明性與問責性。本文認為，唯有將提名委員會制度法制化，並配合有效監理與資訊揭露義務，方能確保其落實效果，進而真正提升金融控股公司董事會組成品質與公司治理整體水準。

Taiwan’s financial holding companies are facing corporate governance challenges. Among these challenges, the human factor plays a pivotal role in strengthening or resolving governance-related issues unique to financial holding companies. In comparative law, the nomination committee serves as a key functional committee specifically designed to address the governance challenges related to personnel and leadership selection. Although Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) have, in recent years, promoted the establishment of nomination committees by listed companies through amendments to the Corporate Governance Best Practice Principles and the implementation of policies such as "Corporate Governance 3.0", the effectiveness of these measures has been limited due to the largely self-regulatory nature of the current framework. Practical observations also indicate that most financial holding companies in Taiwan have yet to establish nomination committees. Furthermore, among those that have done so, there are concerns that the committees lack independence, operate in a merely procedural manner, and provide insufficient information disclosure—raising doubts about whether they are truly fulfilling their intended function. This thesis, through an analysis of the current regulatory framework in Taiwan, case studies, and international comparisons and drawing on the corporate governance principles of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), as well as United States and Singaporean laws, proposes that Taiwan incorporate the nomination committee system into its Securities and Exchange Act, applying initially to financial holding companies and financial institutions meeting certain criteria. Regarding the legal design of the nomination committee, is the thesis proposes that the committee be composed entirely of independent directors to enhance its independence. The committee’s authority should include the formulation and review of standards for the selection of board candidates. In terms of information disclosure, drawing on U.S. law, the thesis proposes that companies disclose both the nomination process and the application of selection criteria when announcing the list of board nominees, thereby improving the transparency and accountability of the nomination process. This thesis advocates that only through the legal institutionalization of the nomination committee system, accompanied by effective regulatory oversight and robust information disclosure requirements, can its implementation be ensured. Such measures are essential to genuinely improving the quality of board composition in financial holding companies and enhancing the overall standard of corporate governance.