選擇放棄還是堅持到底？經濟制裁中發起者縮手行為的分析

Abstract

自中美貿易戰以來，經濟制裁作為歐美國家主要的對外手段引起國際社會關注，在烏俄戰爭中經濟制裁也居中扮演十分重要的角色。經濟制裁的結果大致可以分為目標者妥協、發起者縮手、持續進行三種，至今為止有關經濟制裁結果的研究大多聚焦於目標者妥協，鮮少研究特別聚焦於發起者縮手；然而，發起者縮手並非制裁結果的少數。 令人費解的是，當發起者發動經濟制裁時，就注定會消耗一定程度的成本，而且如果隨意移除制裁將會對外釋放無法有效處理國際衝突，或是姑息破壞國際秩序行為的訊號，此舉會撼動發起者的國際地位，故本論文主要討論的研究問題是為什麼經濟制裁發起者要選擇縮手？什麼因素促使發起者傾向或不傾向縮手？ 本論文針對歐盟主導、發起者(sender)政治競爭性、目標者(target)軍事上的國家能力等因素探討對發起者縮手的影響。研究發現成本考量是影響發起者縮手行為的關鍵，歐盟主導、發起者政治競爭性會影響發起者的縮手行為，目標者的國家能力則會部分影響。歐盟主導、發起者政治競爭性會使得發起者傾向於不縮手，而目標者軍事上的國家能力則會讓發起者傾向於縮手。在研究設計上，採用IST (International Sanctions Termination)經濟制裁資料庫作為研究分析對象，此資料庫包含 1950 年到 2018 年的經濟制裁，本論文將以無序多分類羅吉斯模型(multinomial logit model, MNL)作為主要的統計模型，來分析會影響發起者縮手的因素。 本研究的貢獻有四：一、制裁結果的精確分類有助於剖析自變數對依變數的影響；二、資料更新，有別於使用傳統年代久遠的資料庫，本論文採取的IST資料庫能分析2015年後的經濟制裁；三、分析對象的增廣，本研究不只分析傳統上以單一國家為主的制裁，更增加國際組織制裁，讓制裁行為者更多樣化；四、補充既有研究的不足。據此，將有助於人們了解經濟制裁在國際衝突中所扮演的角色，以及其實際效力與影響。

Since the US-China trade war, economic sanctions have become a key foreign policy tool for Western countries, drawing considerable attention from the international society. During the Russia-Ukraine war, economic sanctions have also played a central role. The outcomes of economic sanctions can generally be categorized into three types: target compliance, sender capitulation, and ongoing. So far, most studies on economic sanctions have focused on target compliance, with little research specifically studying sender capitulation. However, sender country capitulation is not a rare outcome of sanctions. What is puzzling is that when a sender imposes economic sanctions, it inevitably incurs certain costs. Moreover, lifting sanctions arbitrarily may send a signal that the sender country is unable to effectively handle international conflicts or to condon actions that undermine the international order. Sender capitulation could undermine the sender's international status. Thus, why would a sender choose to capitulate? What factors make a sender more or less likely to capitulate? These are the key research questions of this study. This study investigates how EU leadership, sender political competition, and target military state capability influence sender capitulation. The paper argues that cost is the key factor that influence the sender capitulation. The findings suggest that EU leadership and sender political competition significantly affect the likelihood of capitulation, while target military state capability have a partial influence. Specifically, EU leadership and sender political competition make the sender less likely to capitulate. In contrast, stronger target military state capability increases the likelihood of capitulation. The analysis draws on the International Sanctions Termination (IST) dataset, which covers economic sanctions from 1950 to 2018. A multinomial logit model (MNL) is employed to examine the determinants of sender capitulation. There are four contributions in this study. First, the precise classification of sanction outcomes helps to better analyze the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable. Second, the use of updated data distinguishes this research from prior studies that rely on older datasets; by employing the IST dataset, this study is able to analyze economic sanctions imposed after 2015. Third, the scope of analysis is expanded—this research includes not only traditional sanctions imposed by individual states but also those initiated by international organizations, thereby capturing a more diverse set of sanctioning actors. Fourth, it addresses gaps in existing research. Taken together, these contributions enhance our understanding of the role economic sanctions play in international conflicts, as well as their actual effectiveness and impact.