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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/97715
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor唐欣偉zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorHsin-Wei Tangen
dc.contributor.author呂奇樺zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorChi-Hua Luen
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-11T16:18:55Z-
dc.date.available2025-07-12-
dc.date.copyright2025-07-11-
dc.date.issued2025-
dc.date.submitted2025-07-02-
dc.identifier.citation一、中文文獻
Atkinson(2024)。人才短缺與文化衝突,半導體企業在美建晶圓廠大喊好難。TechNews科技新報,8月19日。https://technews.tw/2024/08/19/semiconductor-companies-complain-about-the-difficulty-of-building-wafer-fabs-in-the-united-states/
Atkinson(2025)。先進製程2奈米之戰,台積電維持領先,三星、英特爾能否彎道超車。TechNews科技新報,2月11日。https://technews.tw/2025/02/11/2025-semiconductor-special/
BBC中文網(2019a)。華為危機:除美國還有哪些國家對華為5G說不。5月27日。https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world-48394191
BBC中文網(2019b)。日韓貿易爭端 你需要知道的幾件事。8月9日。https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world-49292261
BBC中文網(2023)。日本加入限制芯片設備出口陣營 美國完成對華合圍。5月26日。https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world-65710230
Cheng, J. (2022)。中國半導體業「大基金」掀肅貪風暴。EE Times Taiwan,8月11日。https://www.eettaiwan.com/20220811nt11-china-big-fund/
Choe, S.-H.(2023)。韓國放棄要求日本公司賠償「二戰」勞工受害者。紐約時報中文網,3月7日。https://cn.nytimes.com/asia-pacific/20230307/south-korea-japan-forced-labor/zh-hant/
Kiki(2024)。2023年中國芯片:進口額下滑15.4%,進口量下降10.8%。全球半導體觀察,1月16日。https://www.dramx.com/News/IC/20240116-35592.html
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Sumzi(2021)。SEMICON China:中國半導體產業30年發展歷程的見證者。Sumzi響拇指,9月6日。https://www.sumzi.com/englishnew/news_info.aspx?id=9434
千人計劃網(未註明)。千人計劃介紹。檢索日期2025年4月29日,取自https://web.archive.org/web/20200313080106/http://www.1000plan.org.cn/qrjh/section/2?m=rcrd
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中商產業研究院(2024a)。2024年中國半導體材料行業市場前景預測研究報告(簡版)。中商情報網,6月4日。https://m.askci.com/news/chanye/20240604/083448271746128855363254.shtml
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中國共產黨中央委員會、中華人民共和國國務院(2021)。中共中央 國務院印發《國家標準化發展綱要》。中華人民共和國中央人民政府門戶網站,10月10日。https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-10/10/content_5641727.htm
中國共產黨中央委員會組織部(2012)。關於印發《國家高層次人才特殊支持計劃》的通知。中國人才網,8月17日。http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0129/c355107-20361611.html
中國共產黨中央委員會辦公廳(2008)。中共中央辦公廳轉發《中央人才工作協調小組關於實施海外高層次人才引進計劃的意見》的通知。千人計劃網,12月25日。https://web.archive.org/web/20120114075549/http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/article/339
中國科學院半導體研究所(2008)。中國半導體產業發展歷史大事記(至1999年)。11月5日。http://www.semi.cas.cn/kxcb/kpwz/201408/t20140818_4186219.html
中國國際貿易促進委員會北京市分會(2023)。荷蘭出口管制新規生效之際 中國半導體設備進口創新高。9月16日。https://www.ccpitbj.org/web/static/articles/catalog_40fcc036830c53550183597640d5026e/article_40fcc036830c5355018a9b76bbb03f73/40fcc036830c5355018a9b76bbb03f73.html
中華人民共和國工業和信息化部(2024)。首台(套)重大技術裝備推廣應用指導目錄(2024年版)。中華人民共和國中央人民政府門戶網站,9月2日。https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202409/P020240915739390210902.pdf
中華人民共和國商務部(2024)。商務部公告2024年第46號 關於加強相關兩用物項對美國出口管制的公告。中華人民共和國商務部產業安全與進出口管制局,12月3日。https://aqygzj.mofcom.gov.cn/flzc/gzjgfxwj/art/2024/art_daaa02c05d8946179dcf5d1ba499ac46.html
中華人民共和國商務部、海關總署(2023)。商務部 海關總署公告2023年第23號 關於對鎵、鍺相關物項實施出口管制的公告。中華人民共和國商務部,7月3日。https://m.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zwgk/gkzcfb/202307/20230703419666.shtml
中華人民共和國商務部、海關總署(2024)。商務部 海關總署公告2024年第33號 關於對銻等物項實施出口管制的公告。中華人民共和國商務部產業安全與進出口管制局,8月15日。https://aqygzj.mofcom.gov.cn/qdml/art/2024/art_b907a108e35945db9f8b04e1ed77b659.html
中華人民共和國商務部、海關總署(2025a)。商務部 海關總署公告2025年第10號 公布對鎢、碲、鉍、鉬、銦相關物項實施出口管制的決定。中華人民共和國商務部,2月4日。https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_e623090907fc4e1092f0a4db72f57b95.html
中華人民共和國商務部、海關總署(2025b)。商務部 海關總署公告2025年第18號 公布部分中重稀土相關物項實施出口管制的決定。中華人民共和國商務部,4月4日。https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_9c2108ccaf754f22a34abab2fedaa944.html
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中華人民共和國國家知識產權局(2022)。國家知識產權局關於持續嚴格規範專利申請行為的通知。1月25日。https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2022/1/25/art_75_172922.html
中華人民共和國國家發展和改革委員會(2011)。中華人民共和國國民經濟和社會發展第十二個五年規劃綱要。檢索日期2025年5月7日,取自https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjfzgh/201109/P020191029595702423333.pdf
中華人民共和國國家發展和改革委員會(2021)。中華人民共和國國民經濟社會發展第十四個五年規劃和2035年遠景目標綱要。檢索日期2025年5月7日,取自https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/202103/P020210323538797779059.pdf
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多部田俊輔(2024a)。中國半導體製造設備市場2025年或縮小。日經中文網,11月8日。https://zh.cn.nikkei.com/industry/itelectric-appliance/57185-2024-11-08-05-00-56.html
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艾米(2023)。路透社:中國“千人計畫”易名後 已悄然在海外招募半導體精英。法國國際廣播電台,8月24日。https://rfi.my/9sA1
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何明彥(2024)。美中科技新戰場:中國「電子設計自動化(EDA)」的發展與策略。科技、民主與社會研究中心,2月23日。https://dset.tw/research/00005/
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吳金榮(2024a)。【觀點】AI PC點火CPU戰場,高通Arm架構狂搶英特爾生意!蘇姿丰也全力應戰。數位時代,6月3日。https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/79311/ai-pc-copilot-arm-pc-cpu
吳金榮(2024b)。【圖解】中國半導體默默布局,自製設備會成科技戰最大破口?3張圖解密新競爭態勢。數位時代,7月23日。https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/79833/china-developing-semiconductor-equipment-industry
吳宥蓁(2023a)。【美股研究報告】應用材料Applied Materials FY22Q4營收創新高,後市仍能逆風高飛還是迴光返照。美股放大鏡,1月12日。https://magnifier.cmoney.tw/applied-materials-fy22q4/
吳宥蓁(2023b)。【產業動態】SEMI最新報告出爐,半導體設備股守得雲開見月明,2024年設備支出有望重返成長,誰將成為大贏家。美股放大鏡,3月27日。https://www.forecastock.tw/article/yolandawu-a4535de1-d95a-11ef-aafe-0ab827b31086
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李哲、占豪(2024)。半導體零部件國產化程度低,蘊含巨大投資機會。民生證券,8月11日。https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H3_AP202408111639232303_1.pdf
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葉長城(2021)。近期美國對中科技政策的形成、轉變及其主要可能影響研析:以半導體產業為例。全球政治評論,(76),55-83。[Yeh, C.-C. (2021). The Formation, Evolution and Major Possible Influence of the US's Technology Policy toward China: A Case Study of the Semiconductor Industry. Review of Global Politics, (76), 55-83.] https://gioip.nchu.edu.tw/Front/Publication/ReviewofGlobalPolitics/News.aspx?id=QxC8fpvDLH0=&page=2&Sn=476
電子工程專輯(2025)。海關公布中國2024年芯片進出口數據,出口首破萬億元。EE Times China,2月5日。https://www.eet-china.com/news/202502059154.html
廖立人(2024)。【美股新聞】美中科技戰火加劇!中國力阻企業購買輝達H20晶片,恐面臨巨額損失。9月30日。https://www.forecastock.tw/article/renliao-8c39b1cb-d95a-11ef-871c-677381bbd371
廖修武(2019)。剖析華為風波後全球5G發展變局。兩岸經貿月刊,(327),4-7。https://www.sef.org.tw/files/10324/92D0D53E-DD43-440B-857C-3DB223498060.pdf
滿投財經(2024)。美國制裁落地之際,中國半導體國產化情況如何。OFweek維科網,12月10日。https://mp.ofweek.com/ee/a156714331517
甄樹基(2020)。多人被美國通緝逮捕後“千人計畫”突然消失中國網絡。法國國際廣播電台,5月7日。https://rfi.my/5rXe
億渡數據(2022)。2022年中國EDA行業深度研究報告。深圳市億渡數據科技有限公司,5月。https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H3_AP202208301577860551_1.pdf
劉玉書(2021)。我國半導體早期發展與908和909工程。半導體芯科技,12月10日。https://www.siscmag.com/news/show-4694.html
劉佩真(2019)。日韓貿易戰對半導體業的影響與啟示。交流雜誌,(167),33-36。https://www.sef.org.tw/article-1-129-4608
劉佩真(2022)。美國《晶片法案》及相關措施牽動美中臺半導體發展趨勢。兩岸經貿網,9月7日。https://www.seftb.org/cp-4-1749-07cd7-1.html
劉佩真(2023)。全球變局下 東南亞國家建立半導體供應鏈態度積極。科技產業資訊室,11月1日。https://iknow.stpi.narl.org.tw/post/Read.aspx?PostID=20127
劉佩真(2025)。論美國祭出最新AI晶片三級管制措施的影響層面。科技產業資訊室,1月21日。https://iknow.stpi.narl.org.tw/Post/Read.aspx?PostID=21448
劉昱辰(2019)。美國對中國大陸的進出口管制措施。經濟前瞻,(185),27-32。https://www.cier.edu.tw/site/cier/public/data/185-027-032-%E7%BE%8E%E5%9C%8B%E5%B0%8D%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E5%A4%A7%E9%99%B8%E7%9A%84%E9%80%B2%E5%87%BA%E5%8F%A3%E7%AE%A1%E5%88%B6%E6%8E%AA%E6%96%BD-%E5%8A%89%E6%98%B1%E8%BE%B0.pdf
劉家明(2022)。習近平時代的中共軍民融合發展-以軍工集團為例。發展與前瞻學報,(37),77-101。[Liu, C.-M. (2022). Military-Civilian Fusion Policy of CCP in Xi Jinping Era-The Case of Military-Industrial Groups. Journal of Development and Prospect, (37), 77-101.] https://doi.org/10.6737/JDP.202209_(37).04
蔡承啟(2025)。中國需求+AI 日本24年度晶片設備銷售額將創史高。MoneyDJ理財網,1月17日。https://www.moneydj.com//kmdj/news/newsviewer.aspx?a=d60e2def-d34c-450d-9ec1-70b2c94544c3
蔡晴雯(2023)。美國商務部發布《晶片與科學法案》最終國家安全護欄規則。中華經濟研究院WTO及RTA中心,10月4日。https://web.wtocenter.org.tw/Page/120/389707
衛湛松、劉賓、杜漢頤(2024)。EDA軟件行業全景分析:市場格局、技術挑戰與國產替代前景。國新咨詢,12月25日。https://www.crhcc.com/hydj/2024/12/7b587fa522f84123a36705c2a7e65ad3.htm
豬俁里美、藤生貴子、小河愛實、坂野日向子(2024)。全球份額調查:日本成為半導體材料大國。日經中文網,9月11日。https://zh.cn.nikkei.com/industry/manufacturing/56664-2024-09-10-16-51-50.html
鄭昀欣、顏慧欣(2022)。以關鍵技術、基礎建設與個資為核心的外資審查法制改革:以美歐為例。當代法律,(7),181-188。https://web.wtocenter.org.tw/Page/15484/396232
盧伯華(2024)。中國晶片產業仍高速發展 2023年進口佔全球67%出口佔26%。中時新聞網,2月16日。https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20240216004250-260409?chdtv
蕭麗君(2024)。美通過臨時撥款 解關門危機 馬斯克被嘲諷「影子總統」。工商時報,12月22日。https://www.ctee.com.tw/news/20241222700062-439901
賴瑩綺(2024)。陸晶片市場兩極化 今年倒超過1.46萬家 新加入5.2萬家。工商時報,12月23日。https://www.ctee.com.tw/news/20241223701449-430804
賴瑩綺(2025)。騰訊、寧德時代 被美拉黑。工商時報,1月8日。https://www.ctee.com.tw/news/20250108700048-439901
閻啟(2024)。 3440億大基金三期來了 未來投向何方。南方財經網,6月1日。https://m.sfccn.com/2024/6-1/4NMDE0MDRfMTkyMzA4Nw.html
鮑金玲(2022)。2022年中國EDA行業概覽(摘要版)。頭豹研究院,3月。https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H3_AP202204211560705251_1.pdf?1650575333000.pdf
謝彥民(2024)。美國針對新興科技之出口管制新策略。經貿法訊,(337),16-21。https://tradelaw.nccu.edu.tw/epaper/no337/4.pdf
謝游麟、葛惠敏(2015)。論戰爭型態之發展與因應。國防雜誌,30(1),79-99。[Shei, Y.-L., & Ko, H.-M. (2015). A Study on the Development and Necessary Adaptation of the Form of War. National Defense Journal, 30(1), 79-99.] https://doi.org/10.6326/NDJ.2015.30(1).4
鍾詠翔(2024)。2024年全球半導體市場規模估超過6,000億美元 中國增速最快。鉅亨網,12月6日。https://news.cnyes.com/news/id/5799775
聶廷榛(2023)。拜登政府公布海外投資審查新制。中華經濟研究院WTO及RTA中心,8月23日。https://web.wtocenter.org.tw/Page/251/388327
藍孝威(2023)。美國聯邦養老基金 不再投資陸港股票。中時新聞網,11月20日。https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20231120000631-260303?chdtv
顏慧欣(2020)。【轉載】貿易戰走向科技衝突之美國政策與影響。中華經濟研究院WTO及RTA中心,3月26日。https://web.wtocenter.org.tw/Page/438/338080
顏慧欣、李淳(2021)。美國供應鏈檢洽談報告之結論與意義:以半導體為例。中華經濟研究院WTO及RTA中心,9月2日。https://web.wtocenter.org.tw/mobile/page?pid=360918&nid=126
魏國金(2024)。晶片設計遭美鎖喉 中國EDA全球市佔率低於2%。自由財經,10月27日。https://ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/4843260
羅家彤(2025)。由美國對中國製傳統晶片啟動301調查看新川普政府對中之經貿圍堵。經貿法訊,(340),5-9。https://tradelaw.nccu.edu.tw/epaper/no340/2.pdf
藤生貴子、岡田江美(2024)。日本半導體產業從上游發力。日經中文網,5月14日。https://zh.cn.nikkei.com/industry/itelectric-appliance/55537-2024-05-14-05-00-11.html?start=1
藥文江(2020)。拆解華為Mate30,看到美國影響。日經中文網,5月15日。https://zh.cn.nikkei.com/china/ccompany/40567-2020-05-15-09-04-57.html?start=0
鐘映庭(2022)。TrendForce:2022年聚焦十二吋產能擴充,預估成熟製程產能年增20%。TrendForce,6月23日。https://www.trendforce.com.tw/presscenter/news/20220623-11272.html

二、日文文獻
日本国経済産業省(2024)。「輸出貿易管理令別表第一及び外国為替令別表の規定に基づき貨物又は技術を定める省令の一部を改正する省令」等の改正の概要について。7月8日。[Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan. (2024). Outline of the revision to the ministerial ordinance partially amending the ministerial ordinance that designates goods or technologies under the provisions of Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and the Appended Table of the Foreign Exchange Order. July 8.] https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law_document/shourei/20240708_gaiyo.pdf

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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/97715-
dc.description.abstract自2018年美中貿易戰爆發以來,美國逐步強化對中國科技實力之限制與打擊,逐漸構建出一套具有核心戰略目標的科技封鎖體系,成為當代國際權力政治與科技治理交織下極具代表性的戰略競爭案例。隨著科技於國家安全層面的重要性日益提升,先進半導體產品及相關新興技術已不再僅是促進經濟成長的生產工具,而被視為可重塑地緣政治格局與國際制度規範的戰略資產與結構性權力來源。
本研究以美中科技戰中的半導體產業為分析案例,旨在探究美國選擇半導體作為科技戰主戰場的戰略考量與政策操作邏輯。透過比較美中雙方在全球半導體產業的市場地位與結構性優勢,本文指出美國因掌握先進晶片設計工具與高階製造設備等關鍵技術節點而在供應鏈上游佔據主導地位;相較之下,中國雖在成熟製程具備規模經濟與生產成本優勢,惟其在先進製程領域仍高度仰賴外部供應之核心技術與製造設備。美國遂以先進半導體製程技術為主軸發起科技封鎖,意圖延滯中國的技術自主化進程並抑制其科技進步。
本文從出口管制、投資限制與盟友協作三個面向觀察美國拜登政府在科技圍堵過程中所運用之政策工具,系統性梳理其政策重心由市場端轉向技術端的過程,展現美國科技圍堵政策的制度性演化與擴張邏輯。研究顯示,拜登政府主要透過修訂出口管制法規以強化行政部門執法權限、擴大對敏感技術和關鍵基礎設施的雙向投資審查,以及推動小多邊主義,與關鍵盟友合作提升供應鏈韌性和鞏固圍堵防線,逐步將科技戰升級為牽動全球科技產業、地緣政治與國際治理的戰略性布局。
本研究揭示美國發動科技戰不僅為回應中國在經貿、科技、地緣政治影響力等層面的上升趨勢,更試圖將自身科技優勢轉化為主導未來科技秩序與技術標準制定之權力來源。此發展凸顯美國作為霸權國家對關鍵新興技術外溢的高度重視與前瞻性部署,也預示著科技治理將成為未來國際秩序重構的重要戰場。
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dc.description.abstractSince the outbreak of the U.S.-China trade war in 2018, the United States has progressively intensified its restrictions and countermeasures against China’s technological advancement. Over time, this has evolved into a coherent and strategically driven framework of technological containment. This situation has become one of the most representative examples of strategic rivalry shaped by the intersection of international power politics and technology governance in the contemporary era. As the significance of technology to national security continues to grow, advanced semiconductor products and related emerging technologies are no longer merely instruments of economic productivity. Instead, they are increasingly regarded as strategic assets and sources of structural power capable of reshaping geopolitical configurations and global institutional norms.
This thesis examines the semiconductor sector as the primary battlefield in the U.S.-China tech war, aiming to explore the strategic rationale and policy logic behind the United States’ decision to target this specific industry. By comparing the structural positions and market influence of the U.S. and China within the global semiconductor industry, this study finds that the U.S. dominates the upstream segments of the supply chain through its control over critical technological nodes, including advanced chip design tools and high-end manufacturing equipment. In contrast, while China benefits from economies of scale and a cost advantage in mature-node manufacturing, it remains heavily reliant on foreign suppliers for essential technologies and fabrication tools in advanced processes. Consequently, the U.S. has initiated a technological blockade focused on advanced nodes to impede China’s pursuit of technological self-sufficiency and suppress its technological advancement.
This thesis further analyzes the Biden administration’s policy instruments for the technological containment of China across three dimensions: export controls, investment restrictions, and collaboration with like-minded allies and partners. It systematically traces the shift in U.S. policy emphasis from market access to technological chokepoints, illustrating the institutional evolution and expansion of the United States’ containment policy. The findings indicate that the Biden administration has reinforced executive enforcement powers through reforms in export control regulations, expanded scrutiny of inbound and outbound investments in sensitive technologies and critical infrastructure, and pursued a minilateral approach to deepen cooperation with strategic allies and partners, improve supply chain resilience, and strengthen the containment framework. These efforts elevate the tech war into a comprehensive strategic framework that reshapes the global tech industry, geopolitical alignments, and international governance.
Ultimately, this research reveals that the U.S. technological offensive serves not only as a strategic countermeasure to China’s expanding economic, technological, and national power but also as a proactive effort to institutionalize its own technological leadership as a source of power in shaping global order and establishing technological standards for the future. This development underscores the hegemon’s keen awareness and strategic foresight in managing the diffusion of critical emerging technologies, indicating that technology governance is likely to become a decisive battlefield in restructuring the international order.
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dc.description.tableofcontents口試委員會審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目次 v
圖次 viii
表次 ix
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
壹、美中關係轉變與美中貿易戰 1
貳、美中科技戰目標轉向半導體產業 3
第二節 研究動機與目的 5
第三節 研究方法與研究限制 7
壹、研究方法與案例選擇 7
貳、資料來源 8
參、研究限制 8
第四節 章節安排 9
第五節 預期貢獻 11
第二章 文獻回顧 12
第一節 科技發展在國際關係領域的重要性提升 12
第二節 技術擴散對霸權地位的影響 16
第三節 美中科技競爭背景 23
壹、新興技術領域學術研究表現 23
貳、研發投資 27
參、綜合討論 29
第四節 美國對半導體產業與新興技術的關注提升 33
壹、中國獲取技術方式引起美國政府警惕 33
貳、美國政府提高對關鍵新興技術的重視 36
第五節 小結 42
第三章 半導體產業成為美國科技戰主戰場 44
第一節 背景 44
壹、半導體產業生產模式介紹 44
貳、全球供應鏈地理分布 47
參、半導體製造業的國際分工型態變遷 52
第二節 美國在全球半導體供應鏈中的優勢與挑戰 54
壹、優勢:在供應鏈上游居於主導地位 54
貳、劣勢:國內晶圓先進製造與封裝產能不足 59
參、其他潛在挑戰與機會 62
第三節 中國在全球半導體供應鏈中的優勢與挑戰 75
壹、優勢:內需龐大、在成熟製程具價格優勢與高市佔率 75
貳、劣勢:先進製程技術與關鍵生產設備對外依存度高 78
參、其他潛在機會與風險 86
第四節 小結 94
第四章 美國對中半導體圍堵具體做法 99
第一節 出口管制 99
壹、美國出口管制規定改革歷程 99
貳、ECRA作為對中科技戰重要執法工具 101
參、美國對中出口管制規範升級 105
第二節 外資審查與投資管制 128
壹、美國加強外資審查 128
貳、美國限制對中投資禁令升級 140
第三節 聯合盟友加強圍堵力道 154
壹、美、日、荷共組半導體設備出口管制聯盟 155
貳、美、日、臺、韓共組晶片四方聯盟 158
參、美歐貿易和技術委員會 166
肆、其他小多邊主義合作機制 168
第四節 小結 169
壹、出口管制 169
貳、投資限制 172
參、聯合盟友 175
第五章 結論 177
第一節 美國科技戰的戰略目標與行動邏輯 177
第二節 科技戰手段轉變的驅動因素與戰略意涵 180
壹、美國科技管制政策擴張的驅動因素 180
貳、美國科技封鎖策略的政治意涵 181
第三節 對中科技圍堵的政策挑戰 183
壹、走私問題 183
貳、對成熟製程半導體實施管制 185
參、中國的反制措施 187
肆、美國圍堵目標轉向防範新興AI技術擴散 190
第四節 結語 192
參考文獻 193
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dc.language.isozh_TW-
dc.subject科技治理zh_TW
dc.subject科技圍堵zh_TW
dc.subject戰略性產業政策zh_TW
dc.subject供應鏈安全zh_TW
dc.subject半導體zh_TW
dc.subject科技地緣政治zh_TW
dc.subjectTechnology governanceen
dc.subjectStrategic industrial policyen
dc.subjectSupply chain securityen
dc.subjectSemiconductoren
dc.subjectTechno-geopoliticsen
dc.subjectTechnological containmenten
dc.title美國拜登政府對中科技戰具體做法:以半導體產業為例zh_TW
dc.titleThe Biden Administration's Concrete Measures in the U.S.–China Tech War: A Case Study of the Semiconductor Industryen
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear113-2-
dc.description.degree碩士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee黃奎博;唐豪駿zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommitteeKwei-Bo Huang ;Hao-Chun Tangen
dc.subject.keyword科技圍堵,科技地緣政治,半導體,供應鏈安全,戰略性產業政策,科技治理,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordTechnological containment,Techno-geopolitics,Semiconductor,Supply chain security,Strategic industrial policy,Technology governance,en
dc.relation.page221-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202501350-
dc.rights.note同意授權(全球公開)-
dc.date.accepted2025-07-03-
dc.contributor.author-college社會科學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept政治學系-
dc.date.embargo-lift2025-07-12-
顯示於系所單位:政治學系

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