為何一國與歐盟簽訂貿易協定納入貿易與永續發展章節？—以事件史分析為途徑

Abstract

隨著永續發展議題在全球治理的重要性日益提升，歐盟2010年與韓國簽署自由貿易協定中首次納入「貿易與永續發展」（Trade and Sustainable Development, TSD）章節。學界過去多以歐盟規範性權力（Normative Power Europe）解釋歐盟向第三國輸出價值與規範，而永續發展即是歐盟積極倡導的核心價值之一。然而，在實務運作上，並非所有歐盟與第三國簽署之貿易協定均包含TSD章節，顯示單純以歐盟規範性權力理論仍不足以解釋此一現象。因此，本文從條約遵循成本角度出發，主張當一國在永續發展表現與歐盟更為趨近時，遵循TSD章節的成本相對較低，進而提高該國在貿易協定中納入TSD章節的可能性。 為了驗證上述假設，本研究採用事件史分析中的Cox比例風險模型，針對2007年至2023年間138筆歐盟與第三國貿易協定談判記錄所構成的564筆國家－年度觀察資料進行實證分析。此模型可以有效處理談判啟動時間與歷程長短的差異性，進而衡量各自變數如何影響一國與歐盟談判貿易協定最終是否會納入TSD章節的機率。穩健度測試方面，筆者使用競爭風險模型以考量條約簽署失敗及簽署不包含TSD章節的貿易協定對於納入TSD章節風險的影響，同時透過控制國家群集以解決可能的異質性變異數問題。在案例分析方面，筆者以印度與印尼為例，分析兩國與歐盟進行貿易協定談判期間所公布之談判回合報告（Round Paper），並聚焦於歐盟如何描述與兩國就TSD章節進行協商的過程。 實證結果發現，當一國與歐盟在SDGs Index指標的差距縮小1分時，於貿易協定中納入TSD章節或其他永續承諾的機率分別增加7.9%及8.2%。穩健度測試得到的結果與主要模型一致，進一步支持本文提出之假設。案例分析亦呈現談判的動態過程，顯示出與歐盟在永續發展表現差距相對越小的印尼，與差距較大的印度相比，在談判過程中對TSD章節展現出更高的接受度與合作意願。

As sustainable development has become more important in global governance, the European Union (EU) incorporated a Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapter for the first time in its 2010 Free Trade Agreement with South Korea. While the EU’s external promotion of values has often been explained through the lens of Normative Power Europe, the fact that not all EU trade agreement include TSD provisions suggests that this theory alone is insufficient to explain the observed variation. This thesis offers a new explanation based on compliance cost theory: if a country’s performance on sustainable development is closer to the EU’s level, it will face lower costs to follow the TSD rules. As a result, such countries are more likely to agree to include TSD chapters in their trade agreement. To test this hypothesis, this thesis employs a Cox proportional hazards model using a dataset of 564 country-year observations derived from 138 EU trade agreement negotiation records between 2007 and 2023. This method accounts for variation in the timing and duration of negotiations and assesses how various factors influence the likelihood of a TSD chapter being included. Robustness checks are conducted by using a competing risk model to address the potential impact of alternative outcomes, such as the signing of trade agreements s without TSD provisions or negotiation failure. Country clustering is applied to mitigate issues related to heteroskedasticity. In addition, the study conducts case analyses of India and Indonesia, drawing on EU-released round reports to examine how TSD provisions were negotiated. The quantitative results show that for every one-point decrease in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Index gap between a country and the EU, the likelihood of including a TSD chapter or other sustainability-related commitments increases by 7.9% and 8.2%, respectively. These findings are consistent across robustness tests. The case studies show that Indonesia, whose sustainable development performance is closer to the EU, was more open and willing to cooperate on TSD provisions than India, which had a larger gap with the EU in SDG performance.