從社會法治國到法治原則：論Franz Leopold Neumann法治觀的轉變

Abstract

本論文旨在研究Franz Leopold Neumann的法治觀的變遷。Neumann的法治觀與其整體理論關聯密切，因而，我們必須參酌他的整體理論發展，將法治觀的發展區分為三個階段：1933年流亡前、1933年到1940年〈論自然法的幾種類型〉出版前、1940年〈論自然法的幾種類型〉出版後。本研究使用三個軸線，亦即 (1) 方法論軸線、(2) 經濟秩序軸線、(3) 國家觀與權力分立軸線等，統整他的法治觀的諸多要素，以徹底理解他的法治觀。 在1933年流亡前，Neumann的法治觀是社會法治國，這是一個廣包的法治觀。從第一本博士論文的批判相對主義，Neumann發展出功能變遷理論的方法論。社會法治國的概念指出，威瑪憲法的終局目標是社會主義式的經濟秩序。依循憲法開放性之概念，Neumann將威瑪憲法作為改革的框架，這使他的方法論與實質主張結合在一起。Neumann支持議會中心主義，以工會與立法者為核心追求社會主義理想，是故，Neumann認為法官的違憲審查權會妨害威瑪憲法的社會主義目標。 在1933年到1940年〈論自然法的幾種類型〉出版前，Neumann經歷兩個小階段：流亡初期與《法治》一書出版後。流亡初期，出於對德國政治情勢的失望，Neumann轉向基進的馬克思主義，提出以階級分析為基礎的權力分立觀，以及追求以平等公民地位為前提的擴大的民主。這兩種觀點在他後來的理論中沈潛並延續著。《法治》一書則發展出一套更深化的唯物辯證方法論，並據此將法治連結到特定的法律觀與國家觀。承襲功能變遷理論與馬克思主義，他提出一套法社會學（the sociology of law），建構出法律與社會間、自由與制度間、主要自由與補充性自由間、制度與制度間的辯證結構。Neumann區分出理性（rationality）與理性主義（rationalism），而法治是現代國家當中，協調理性與理性主義的機制。是故，法治得以橋接法律所具備的理性（ratio）與意志（voluntas）要素。法治一方面依賴國家的強制力，另方面也限制國家絕對主權的行使。依據《法治》，Neumann仍然強調競爭性市場不能淪為壟斷，但是，法治本身不再明確要求國家建立特定的經濟秩序。就權力分立，Neumann開始採取柔化態度，不正面肯定司法違憲審查，但也不明確反對它。 在1940年〈論自然法的幾種類型〉出版後的第三個時期，至少部分出於二戰與冷戰經驗，Neumann更偏向自由主義，並強調個人心理與行動，在抵抗、應對集體焦慮、保存政治自由的重要性。法治的概念也變得更為狹窄。Neumann接受了民主自然法的前提與一些對國家的原則性要求，因此，連帶納入許多自由主義的憲政元素。儘管民主自然法本身並無法劃定具體的權利義務界線，但是，Neumann對於納粹政權的分析，揭露出非法律與無國家的狀態，為法治或法治國家提供明確的消極限制。Neumann的抵抗論述也強調，權利或理論無法回答正當抵抗的具體邊界問題，抵抗的正當性繫乎個人良知。最後，在〈政治自由的概念〉，法治被放入政治自由的體系，作為掩蓋人對人統治的意識形態，而且是從屬於法律的一般性結構。此時，Neumann明確支持法律的契約功能，儘管他仍然警示，壟斷經濟可能侵害自由。德國式的法治國被認為在歷史經驗上無法保護自由，英美的憲政模式被肯定，因而也肯認了司法違憲審查對人權的保障。然而，Neumann並沒有要求國家建立某一種特定的憲政制度。 本論文主張，Neumann的法治觀變遷，無法被納入形式或實質法治的後設理論，而是必須考量到法治觀本身所奠基的價值判斷、世界觀，以及包容性與排除性的面向，並將法治視為一種對制度或程序所提出的要求。由三個軸線觀察，他的法治觀與理論發展既有連續，也有斷裂。Neumann流亡前的法治觀偏向社會主義，最終他的法治觀呈現出溫和左翼的立場，具備自由主義傾向。探討Neumann法治觀，不應該忽視Neumann在各時期間價值判斷上的差異。

This thesis aims to analyze the transformation of Franz Leopold Neumann’s conceptions of the rule of law. We should refer to Neumann’s overall theory, since it is closely related to the rule of law conception, and divide the transformation into three stages: before his exile in 1933, before the publication of "Types of Natural Law" from 1933 to 1940, and after the publication of "Types of Natural Law." This study uses three axes, namely (1) the methodological axis, (2) the economic structure axis, (3) the conception of the state axis or the separation of powers axis, to integrate many elements of his view of the rule of law, in order to interpret it thoroughly. Before his exile in 1933, Neumann’s view of the rule of law was sozialer Rechtsstaat, which was a broad conception of the rule of law. From the critical relativism of his first doctoral thesis, Neumann developed the change of function theory. Sozialer Rechtsstaat believed that the ultimate goal of the Weimar Constitution was a socialist economic structure. Based on the concept of constitutional Offenheit, he regarded the Weimar Constitution as a framework for reformation, which led to the collaboration between his methodological stance and substantial ideas. Neumann also advocated parliamentary centrism to pursue socialist ideals with trade unions and legislators as the core. Neumann therefore believed that the judicial review would hinder the socialism target of the Weimar Constitution. Between 1933 and the publication of "Types of Natural Law" in 1940, Neumann went through two substages: the early period of exile and the publication of "The Rule of Law." In the early days of his exile, out of disappointment with the political situation in Germany, Neumann turned to radical Marxism, proposing a view of separation of powers based on class analysis and pursuing democracy based on an equal citizenship status. These two latently perpetuated later. The book "The Rule of Law" developed a deeper set of materialist dialectical methodology and accordingly connected the Rule of Law to a specific conception of law and of the state. Inheriting the change of function theory and Marxism, he proposed the sociology of law and constructed a dialectical structure between law and society, liberties and institutions, main liberties and auxiliary liberties, as well as institutions and institutions. Neumann distinguished between rationality and rationalism and the Rule of Law was the mechanism that coordinated rationality and rationalism in modern countries. Therefore, the rule of law could bridge the ratio and voluntas elements of the law. Moreover, the rule of law relied on the coercive power of the state on the one hand, and on the other hand, it also limited the exercise of the state’s absolute sovereignty. According to the book "The Rule of Law," he still emphasized that competitive markets should not be reduced to monopolies. However, the Rule of Law itself no longer explicitly required the state to establish a specific economic structure. Regarding the separation of powers, Neumann began to adopt a soft attitude, not positively affirming judicial review, but also not explicitly opposing it. In the third period after the publication of "Types of Natural Law" in 1940, Neumann became more liberal and emphasized individuals’ phycological status and actions, which are of significance for resistance, tackling masses anxiety as well as preserving political freedom. The concept of the rule of law also became narrower, which was at least partly influenced by the experience of World War II and the Cold War. Neumann accepted the premise of democratic natural law, which contained some principled requirements for the state and thus incorporated many liberal constitutional elements. Although democratic natural law itself could not draw specific boundaries of rights and obligations, Neumann’s analysis of the Nazi regime revealed the lawlessness and the non-state and provided clear negative limits for the Rechtsstaat or the rule of law. Neumann’s discussion of resistance also emphasized that the legitimacy of resistance could depended on only personal conscience, neither rights nor theories. Finally, in “The Concept of Political Freedom,” the rule of law was integrated into a system of political freedom, as an ideology concealing the rule of man, and was subordinate to the generality of law. At this time, Neumann explicitly supposed the contractual function of law, although he still warned that the monopoly economy might infringe on freedom. According to the historical experience, Neumann stated that the German-style Rechtsstaat was considered to be unable to protect freedom. Contrastingly, the British and American constitutional models were affirmed, and thus the protection of human rights provided by judicial review was recognized. However, Neumann’s view remained open to specific constitutional arrangements. This thesis contends that the transformation of Neumann’s conception of the rule of law cannot be incorporated into a metatheory of formal or substantive rule of law. Instead, three elements underlying the rule of law, namely value judgments, worldview (Weltanschauung), as well as the inclusion and exclusion aspects, must be considered, and the rule of law must be regarded as demands of institution or procedure. Observed from three axes, there are both continuities and ruptures in his transformation of the rule of law. Neumann’s view of the rule of law before his exile was inclined toward socialism. In the end, Neumann took on a moderate left-wing stance with liberal tendencies. When discussing Neumann’s view on the rule of law, one cannot ignore the differences in his value judgments in different periods.