侍從者的逆襲：國民黨與地方派系權力關係的轉型―以苗栗縣為例

Abstract

威權時期國民黨藉由恩庇侍從主義與地方派系結盟，藉此鞏固自身統治基礎，雖然隨著台灣展開政治經濟轉型，國民黨已經難以再藉由分配壟斷性資源來攏絡地方派系，但是仍不時能見到國民黨與地方派系的結盟，因此本文的目的即是探討民主化後地方派系為什麼繼續與國民黨合作。 出於對地方派系的一致性觀察，本文以威權時期至今派系皆未變動的苗栗縣作為研究個案，藉由文獻整理以及訪談地方派系要角、前國民黨幹部、公職、記者，暸解地方派系與國民黨的互動。循恩庇侍從主義的資源基礎途徑，區分出國民黨與地方派系所需要的關鍵資源，並且引入資源依賴理論衡量國民黨與地方派系在威權鞏固時期、民主轉型期、民主深化期，因為資源掌握程度的變遷，導致權力關係的變動，以說明為什麼地方派系現在仍與國民黨合作。 本文藉縣長、立委、議員選舉的案例說明，苗栗地方政治仍以地方派系為重，國民黨必須依賴地方派系才得以勝選。地方派系則隨著獲取特許、寡占、灰色經濟資源的自主性上升，並不依賴國民黨分配經濟資源，反而黨產遭凍結的國民黨卻亟需地方派系挹注經濟資源，呈現地方派系權力大於國民黨的關係。地方派系願意涉入國民黨的誘因在於，掌控地方黨部能夠提升派系勝選機會，而政治權力作為獲取特殊經濟利益的前提，鞏固政治權力即可鞏固經濟利益。 綜觀歷史變遷，國民黨從掌控地方派系到地方派系入主國民黨，實際上可以視為國民黨「落地」的過程，從正向來看這是台灣民主化的成果，然而民主化的未盡之業便在如何卸除地方派系長期以來的尋租、不正利益，以及如何將政黨政治帶到台灣的地方政治。

Since 1949, the Kuomintang (KMT) has consolidated its authoritarian regime in Taiwan by forming alliances with local factions through a patron-client system. Today, although Taiwan’s political and economic transformation has made it difficult for the KMT to co-opt local factions by distributing monopolized resources, alliances between the KMT and local factions still persist. This study aims to explore why local factions continue to cooperate with the KMT after democratization. To ensure consistency in the observation of local factions, this study selects Miaoli County—where factional structures have remained unchanged since the authoritarian period—as the case study. Through a literature review and interviews with key figures—including local faction leaders, former KMT officials, ex-public officials, and former journalists—this study examines the interactions between local factions and the KMT. This study builds upon the mainstream research on patron-clientelism—resource-based model—to distinguish the key resources required by both the KMT and local factions. As a political party, the KMT primarily depends on votes, whereas local factions rely on economic benefits. Furthermore, this study incorporates resource dependence theory to assess the power dynamics between the KMT and local factions. With political and economic reforms, the ability of both the KMT and local factions to access resources has undergone significant changes, leading to a shift in their power relations. Accordingly, this study divides this evolution into three phases: the authoritarian consolidation period, the democratic transition period, and the democratic deepening period. By examining changes in the KMT's and local factions' control over votes and resources across these three periods, this study constructs an evolving framework of power relations and explains why local factions continue to cooperate with the KMT today. Through an analysis of county mayoral, legislative, and local council elections, this study finds that local politics in Miaoli County remains dominated by local factions, with the KMT heavily dependent on them for electoral success. As local factions gain greater autonomy in acquiring concessionary, monopolistic, and gray economic resources, their reliance on the KMT for economic benefits has diminished. Instead, with its party assets frozen, the KMT now finds itself in need of financial support from these local factions. This study concludes that the current power structure between the KMT and local factions is characterized by local factions having great power than the KMT, reversing the traditional relationship of dependency. Local factions, however, remain incentivized to engage with the KMT because controlling the local party branch enhances their electoral prospects. Moreover, political power serves as a means to secure special economic privileges—strengthening political power, in turn, solidifies their economic interests. From a historical perspective, the KMT’s transformation from controlling local factions to being controlled by local factions can be seen as a process of localization, shedding its identity as an external ruling party. From a positive standpoint, this shift reflects the achievements of Taiwan’s democratization. However, the unfinished task of democratization lies in dismantling the long-standing rent-seeking practices and illicit benefits of local factions and fully integrating party politics into Taiwan’s local political landscape.