有線電視獨占市場分組付費轉換之誘因政策分析與設計

Abstract

分組付費（tiered charging, TC）政策是有線電視市場的主流政策，旨在維護價格合理性、節目類型多樣性、提升內容品質等市場良性發展。然而，由獨占的有線電視市場由單一費率（flat rate, FR）轉換為 TC 需要監理機關提出創新且具誘因性的措施，以使系統業者（system operator, SO）和消費者處於柏拉圖改進 (Pareto Improvement) 的雙贏局面。提出具有誘因效果的政策需要分析原市場施行分組付費的潛在誘因及機會，並設計、評估出合理的分組付費相關參數範圍，如：單一費率頻道組合下的每頻道價格、基本頻道組合(basic channel bundle, BCB) 的頻道數量，以及進階頻道組合 (advanced channel bundle, ACB) 的數量、頻道組合及價格。 本研究之設計挑戰在於：SO 提供給監理機關的數據有限而分散，並且缺乏用以分析的計量模型。本研究提出的創新方法，係利用有限的分區實務數據來衡量、分析訂戶如何依據其偏好，做出頻道套餐的訂閱選擇決策。結合消費者偏好模型，我們建構出 SO 收費方案和消費者之間可能的交互作用模型，並設計出由兩個雙贏條件指數所組成的價格頻道縮減（Price-Channel-Downscale, PCD）和 ACB 的建議費率結構。 在本研究中，我們為監理機關提出了一個針對獨占有線電視市場的創新TC政策誘因設計。監理機關需評估在TC政策架構下，具有適當 BCB 規模和 ACB 價格水準等參數設定，並以計量性佐證分組付費政策可激勵 SO 和消費者從單一費率頻道組合 FR 改採 TC 方案與收視消費，達成柏拉圖改進 (Pareto improvement)，即所謂市場中的「雙贏」狀態。此設計方法整合了機率建模及以實證數據為基礎的數值模擬，可供監理機關運用較直觀的 TC 政策參數設置，來評估「當服務費率方案由 FR 轉換為 TC 時，在該區域獨占的 SO 和訂戶是雙贏的」政策結果。TC 政策誘因設計在此使用了臺灣兩個經濟特性不同但皆為獨占 SO 的有線電視服務區（一偏遠地區 (臺東縣，TTC) 及一個臺灣西部市區 (臺南市永康區，YKFA) 的有線電視服務區）的實務數據進行評估和分析。 模擬評估和分析結果顯示，各區 TC 政策參數都存有相當的合適區間供 SO 設定其分組付費方案並與消費者獲致雙贏。偏遠地區的雙贏 TC 政策參數可設定範圍比市區大，因為偏遠地區在經濟特性上具有較高的價格彈性。本論文研究提出的 TC 政策誘因設計方法，有利於監理機關為 TC 政策的激勵設計提供量化分析與評估工具，並可供實證檢驗。藉著劃定雙贏區域及 TC 政策可設定的參數範圍，為推動與實現政策目標提供了可執行的基礎。

Tiered charging (TC) policy is a mainstream policy of cable television (cable TV) markets to facilitate healthy market developments such as maintaining the price rationality, enriching the variety of programs, and raising content quality. However, conversion from a flat rate (FR) monopolistic cable TV market to TC policy needs innovative incentivization by the market regulator such that both system operators (SOs) and consumers are in a Pareto improvement, that is, win-win situation. Incentivizing TC policy requires analyzing TC policy potential for the legacy market and quantitative design of TC policy parameters such as the bundle size of basic channel bundle (BCB) at the same per-channel price as the legacy bundle and the bundle size, channel mix and price of advanced channel bundles (ACBs). Design challenges are that SO data provided to a regulator is limited and fragmented and that there is lack of quantitative design models. In this research, we present an innovative design for incentivizing TC policy for a monopolistic cable TV market regulator. The incentivization is achieved through properly setting, by the regulator, TC policy parameters such as the BCB size and the price level of ACBs. The design approach integrates probabilistic modeling and empirical market data-based simulation. Such an approach enables a regulator to identify TC policy parameter settings where the monopolistic SO and the subscribers are win-win when the service charging scheme converts from FR to TC. Evaluation and analysis of the incentivizing TC policy design are over the empirical data of two economically different but monopolistic cable TV service districts in Taiwan, one rural and one urban cable TV service districts. Results show that there exists a Pareto improvement region of TC policy parameter settings for each district. The win-win TC policy parameter setting region of the rural district is larger than the urban one, because the rural district has a higher price elasticity. Such method proposed in this research is beneficial for regulatory authorities, as it provides quantitative analysis and evaluation tools for TC policy incentive design, and can be used for empirical testing, serving as an executable basis for promoting and achieving policy goals.