上下級法院間的政治經濟學模型

Abstract

上級法院在發展判例時，會選擇明確規則還是裁量標準？一方面，當上級法院選擇明確規則，它需要擔心該規則離自己的偏好多遠；而另一方面，當上級法院選擇裁量標準，因為下級法院成員的異質性，它需要擔心下級法院成員對個案有和自己不同的判斷。本篇文章的模型發現，當裁量標準對於下級法院成員越模糊時，或是當下級法院成員越黨派化時，上級法院越願意選擇偏離自己偏好的明確規則。與此同時，若商業和社會組織越害怕法律的不確定性，願意選擇偏離自己偏好明確規則的效果會更加明顯。

When a higher court develops precedents, does it favor bright-line rules or discretionary standards? On the one hand, when the higher court chooses bright-line rules, it must consider how far those rules diverge from its own preferences. On the other hand, when it chooses discretionary standards, because of the heterogeneity of lower court members, it needs to worry that the judgments of lower court members may differ from its own. This article’s model finds that when discretionary standards are more ambiguous for lower court members, or when those members become more partisan, the higher court is more inclined to select bright-line rules that deviate from its own preferences. Furthermore, if business and social organizations are increasingly fearful of legal uncertainty, the tendency to adopt bright-line rules that diverge from its own preferences becomes even stronger.