請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/96516完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳業寧 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Yehning Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳思穎 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Su-Yin Chen | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-02-19T16:19:21Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-02-20 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2025-02-19 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2025-01-24 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Ali, A., Li, N. Z., & Zhang, W. N. (2019). Restrictions on Managers' Outside Employment Opportunities and Asymmetric Disclosure of Bad versus Good News. Accounting Review, 94(5), 1-25.
Ali, A., & Zhang, W. N. (2015). CEO tenure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 59(1), 60-79. Booth, J. R., & Deli, D. N. (1996). Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(1), 81-104. Borusyak, K., Jaravel, X., & Spiess, J. (2024). Revisiting Event-Study Designs: Robust and Efficient Estimation. Review of Economic Studies, 91(6), 3253-3285. Brickley, J. A., Linck, J. S., & Coles, J. L. (1999). What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 52(3), 341-377. Cai, X. S., Gao, N., Garrett, I., & Xu, Y. (2020). Are CEOs judged on their companies' social reputation? Journal of Corporate Finance, 64, 101621. Callaway, B., & Sant'Anna, P. H. C. (2021). Difference-in-Differences with multiple time periods. Journal of Econometrics, 225(2), 200-230. Canil, J., Karpavicius, S., & Yu, C. F. (2023). CEO mobility and corporate payouts. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 50(9-10), 1743-1778. Chen, D. Q., Gao, H. S., & Ma, Y. J. (2021). Human Capital-Driven Acquisition: Evidence from the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine. Management Science, 67(8), 4643-4664. Chen, W., Jung, S. M., Peng, X. X., & Zhang, I. X. (2022). Outside Opportunities, Managerial Risk Taking, and CEO Compensation. Accounting Review, 97(2), 135-160. Dang, C. Y., Li, Z. C., & Yang, C. (2018). Measuring firm size in empirical corporate finance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 86, 159-176. Ding, R., Sainani, S., & Zhang, Z. Y. (2021). Protection of trade secrets and corporate tax avoidance: Evidence from the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Journal of Business Research, 132, 221-232. Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., & Stulz, R. M. (2010). Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors? Journal of Financial Economics, 97(1), 12-32. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 301-325. Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1087-1111. Fich, E. M. (2005). Are some outside directors better than others? Evidence from director appointments by fortune 1000 firms. Journal of Business 78(5), 1943-1971. Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2007). Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2), 306-336. Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1989). Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes. Strategic Management Journal, 10(2), 121-134. Flammer, C., & Kacperczyk, A. (2019). Corporate social responsibility as a defense against knowledge spillovers: Evidence from the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Strategic Management Journal, 40(8), 1243-1267. Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1992). Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy, 100(3), 468-505. Godfrey, E.R., 2004. Inevitable disclosure of trade secrets: employee mobility vs. employer’s rights. Journal of High Technology Law, 3, 161-179. Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 40(1-3), 3-73. Harford, J. (2003). Takeover bids and target directors' incentives: the impact of a bid on directors' wealth and board seats. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(1), 51-83. Harford, J., & Schonlau, R. J. (2013). Does the director labor market offer ex post settling-up for CEOs? The case of acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(1), 18-36. Kang, H., & Lee, W. (2022). How innovating firms manage knowledge leakage: A natural experiment on the threat of worker departure. Strategic Management Journal, 43(10), 1961-1982. Kaplan, S. N., & Reishus, D. (1990). Outside directorships and corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 389-410. Kim, K., Mauldin, E., & Patro, S. (2014). Outside directors and board advising and monitoring performance. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 57(2-3), 110-131. Kini, O., Williams, R., & Yin, S. R. (2021). CEO Noncompete Agreements, Job Risk, and Compensation. Review of Financial Studies, 34(10), 4701-4744. Klasa, S., Ortiz-Molina, H., Serfling, M., & Srinivasan, S. (2018). Protection of trade secrets and capital structure decisions. Journal of Financial Economics, 128(2), 266-286. Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013). The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence. Review of Financial Studies, 26(6), 1561-1605. Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Weigelt, K. (1991). How sensitive is executive compensation to organizational size? Strategic Management Journal, 12(5), 395-402. Lanis, R., Richardson, G., Liu, C., & McClure, R. (2019). The Impact of Corporate Tax Avoidance on Board of Directors and CEO Reputation. Journal of Business Ethics, 160(2), 463-498. Leone, A. J., Rock, S., & Vasvari, F. P. (2007). Disclosure of intended use of proceeds and underpricing in initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting Research, 45(1), 111-153. Li, N. Z., Shevlin, T., & Zhang, W. N. (2022). Managerial Career Concerns and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 39(1), 7-49. Li, Y. H., Lin, Y. P., & Zhang, L. D. (2018). Trade Secrets Law and Corporate Disclosure: Causal Evidence on the Proprietary Cost Hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research, 56(1), 265-308. Mace, M., 1986. Directors: Myth and Reality. Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA. Na, K. (2020). CEOs’ outside opportunities and relative performance evaluation: evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Financial Economics, 137(3), 679-700. Srinivasan, S. (2005). Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: Evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(2), 291-334. Wooldridge, J. M. (2021). Two-way fixed effects, the two-way mundlak regression, and difference-in-differences estimators. Available at SSRN 3906345. Wu, Y. L. (2004). The impact of public opinion on board structure changes, director career progression, and CEO turnover: evidence from CalPERS' corporate governance program. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(1), 199-227. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211. Yermack, D. (2004). Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors. Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2281-2308. | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/96516 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文研究美國州法院駁回不可避免揭露原則（Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, IDD）與CEO擔任外部董事的因果關係，以檢視外部就業機會是否作為CEO提升聲譽的動機。儘管基線迴歸未能支持此關係，但當CEO較年輕或任期較短時，州法院駁回IDD對其外部董事席次有顯著的正面影響。這種效應在CEO為較小或較年輕的公司工作時也會成立，但需要較長的時間才會顯現。沒有證據表示公司或產業的成長機會影響CEO在IDD被駁回後的外部董事席次。總體而言，實證證據支持就業機會假設，顯示渴望向上流動與提升聲譽的CEO在IDD被駁回後，會增加更多外部董事席次。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the causal relationship between the U.S. state court’s rejection of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) and CEOs’ outside directorships to examine whether job opportunities affect CEOs’ incentives to elevate their reputation. Though the baseline regression fails to support this relation, the positive effect of IDD rejection on CEOs’ outside directorships is significant when they are younger or shorter-tenure. This effect also holds but takes longer to appear when CEOs work for smaller or younger firms. No evidence suggests that growth opportunities in firms or industries impact CEOs’ outside board seats after the IDD rejection. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the job opportunity hypothesis, showing that CEOs eager for upward mobility and reputation enhancement increase their outside directorships more following the IDD rejection. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2025-02-19T16:19:21Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2025-02-19T16:19:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i
摘要 ii Abstract iii 1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 5 2.1. Inevitable disclosure doctrine and outside employment opportunities 5 2.2. CEOs’ outside directorships and their reputation 8 2.3. Hypotheses development 10 3. Research Design 16 3.1. Regression models 16 3.2. Data and sample selection 20 3.3. Descriptive statistics 21 4. Empirical Results 28 4.1. Baseline regression 28 4.2. CEOs with younger age or shorter tenure 30 4.3. CEOs in smaller or younger firms 33 4.4. CEOs in firms or industries with more growth opportunities 38 4.5. The timing of changes in CEOs’ outside directorships 39 4.6. The impact of IDD adoption on CEOs’ outside directorships 44 5. Conclusion 47 References 50 Appendix 53 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.subject | CEO聲譽 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 外部董事席次 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 勞動市場流動性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 就業機會 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 不可避免揭露原則（IDD） | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | CEO reputation | en |
| dc.subject | Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) | en |
| dc.subject | Outside directorship | en |
| dc.subject | Labor market mobility | en |
| dc.subject | Job opportunity | en |
| dc.title | CEO的工作機會是否影響其外部董事職位？ 以自然實驗為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Do CEOs’ job opportunities affect their outside directorships? Evidence from a natural experiment | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 113-1 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳韋達;林軒馳 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Wei-Da Chen;Hsuan-Chih Lin | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 不可避免揭露原則（IDD）,外部董事席次,勞動市場流動性,就業機會,CEO聲譽, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD),Outside directorship,Labor market mobility,Job opportunity,CEO reputation, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 56 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202500250 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2025-01-25 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學系 | - |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | 2025-02-20 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-113-1.pdf | 922.32 kB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。