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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/9539完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 劉順仁(Shuen-Zen Liu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ching-Nern Yang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 楊欽能 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-20T20:27:36Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2008-08-14 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-20T20:27:36Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2008-08-14 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2008-08-11 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 中文部分:
1. Robert S. Pindyck、Daniel L. Rubinfeld合著,個體經濟學(Microeconomics 6th Edition),劉純之、游慧光、林恭正譯(台北市:台灣培生教育出版股份有限公司,2005年12月),頁472-504。 2. 林東清、劉勇志,「資訊系統整體績效的提升與高階主管的角色定位—我國的實證研究」,資訊管理,第一卷第一期,民國82年,頁88-107。 3. 曾羚,「連續性英式拍賣成交價格是否會下滑」(碩士論文,國立臺灣大學經濟學研究所,民國96年),頁32-33。 4. 黃玉婷,「台灣企業資訊部門策略角色對組織績效之影響」(碩士論文,國立成功大學企業管理研究所,民國90年6月),頁79-83。 5. 黃國楨,「從組織觀點簡析資訊管理所需的專業教育與人力資源規劃」,電腦學刊,第二卷第一期,民國79年,頁30-41。 英文部分: 1. Carol S. Saunders and Jack W. Jones, “Measuring Performance of the Information Systems Function,” Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 8, No. 4, (Spring 1992), 63 – 82. 2. Charles Noussair, “Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands,” Economic Theory, Vol. 5, No. 2, (June 1995), 337-351. 3. Dan Berhardt and David Scoones, “A Note on Sequential Auctions,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, (June 1994), 653-657. 4. Jeffrey G. Covin, “Entrepreneurial versus Conservative Firms: A Comparison of Strategies and Performance,” Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 28, No. 5, (September 1991), 439-462. 5. Phillip Ein-Dor and Eli Segev, “Organizational Context and MIS Structure: Some Empirical Evidence,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3, (September 1982), 55-68. 6. Scott Hamilton and Norman L. Chervany, “Evaluating Information System Effectiveness - Part I: Comparing Evaluation Approaches,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, (September 1981), 55-69. 7. Thomas D. Jeitschko, “Equilibrium Price Paths in Sequential Auctions with Stochastic Supply,” Economics Letters, Vol. 64, Issue 1, (July 1999), 67-72. 8. Tibor Neugebauer and Reinhard Selten, “Individual Behavior of First-price Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Computerized Experimental Markets”, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 54, Issue 1, (January 2006), 183-204. 網站部分: 1. Alvin E. Roth and Axel Ockenfels, “Last-Minute bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet,” NBER Working Paper No. 7729, June 2000, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7729> (1 July 2008). 2. Eric S. Maskin, “Mechanism Design Theory: How to Implement Social Goals,” Nobel Lecture, 8 December 2007, <http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/maskin-lecture.html> (15 June 2008). 3. MBA lib, “拍賣理論,” <http://209.85.171.104/translate_c?hl=zh-TW&sl=zh-CN&u=http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/%25E6%258B%258D%25E5%258D%2596%25E7%2590%2586%25E8%25AE%25BA&prev=/search%3Fq%3D%25E6%258B%258D%25E8%25B3%25A3%25E7%2590%2586%25E8%25AB%2596%26hl%3Dzh-TW%26rls%3Dcom.microsoft:zh-tw:IE-SearchBox%26rlz%3D1I7SUNA&usg=ALkJrhjNjD-s4WlYu8T6DW2WSL50JBqusg> (18 July 2008). 4. Wikipedia, “information asymmetry,” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_asymmetry> (20 June 2008). 5. Wikipedia, “winner’s curse,” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winner%27s_curse> (20 June 2008). 6. Wikipedia, “囚徒困境,” <http://zh.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=%E5%9B%9A%E5%BE%92%E5%9B%B0%E5%A2%83&variant=zh-tw> (20 June 2008). | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/9539 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 在企業內設立軟體開發維護部門是當今現代化企業組織的普遍現象,其目的在於能以相較於外包或外購取得同級產品或服務的較低成本,得到較快的服務反應時間或服務品質,以增加企業的外部競爭力,使企業獲得投資的超額報酬。但為了得到軟體開發資源的使用權,經常在軟體部與需求部門間、及諸需求部門之間,發生競爭衝突;雖然一般多以申請服務的優先序與權威仲裁的方式配合內部支援計價機制來處理,不過對於軟體開發這種企業內的有限且稀有的資源的運用,卻仍未能達到使其效益極大化的目標。倘以投資效益來評估軟體部門的整體績效與存在價值,在實務上將面臨兩大挑戰:(一)投資的回收效益難以合理地數量化;(二)軟體開發部門大多以案件完成率或完成數與客戶滿意度來衡量績效,而不是採案件完成後對原需求單位產生的實質效益來衡量。
除了資源分配的困難外,另一個困擾供、需雙方的重大關鍵就是資訊不對稱,它使供、需雙方不能建立信任關係,也造成雙方無法達成各自期望的績效。因為供給方不知需求方的真正需求內容與預期達成目標,所以無從據以分配合理的必需資源給需求方,也造成在資源使用調度排程上的困難;而需求方則因不清楚軟體技術內容,難以具體說明工作細節、開出明確的技術規格,所以不能提供予對方明確的需求估計。 本研究應用2007年的諾貝爾經濟學獎得主之一Eric S. Maskin的機制設計理論,結合賽局理論與拍賣理論,設計一個解決企業內部軟體開發資源在使用上之競爭問題的方案。從本研究中,吾人得到四點結論:(1)解決企業內軟體開發資源的使用競爭問題的機制是存在的;(2)密封式動態加價競標拍賣機制是解決此問題的有效方法;(3)競標拍賣機制使資源的公評價值得以彰顯;(4)此種解決機制可應用於處理其他類似的問題。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The set up of an in-house application development & maintenance service division is being commonly used in most recent modern enterprises. Time & cost efficient are essential, comparing to out-sourcing or purchasing 3rd party services. It is expected to increase the competitiveness and have a much higher ROI. However, in order to gain more resources in application development service, conflict of interest is always existing between the service provider and the requester; although normally it will be defined as a first come first serve basis or a top down decision to allocate the manpower, no matter what it is, the performance of the application development service unit is not optimal. You will face two challenges if you measure the application development division performance by using ROI method.
(1) The return of investment can not be reasonably quantified, (2) The application division, instead of evaluating the actual benefit that will bring to the requesters, uses the completion rate of projects or customer satisfaction survey to define their key performance factors. Besides the difficulties of resource allocation, information asymmetry is another main threat to the both sides. Lack of trust will also damage both parties. Since the service requesters are not expected to be as professional as the service provider in application development, the requesters can not clearly draw the pictures of their requirements. Given the circumstances of not knowing the actual needs and expectations, the service provider can not reasonably allocate the necessary and sufficient corresponding resources to meet the requirements, and a conflict of agenda will be caused. This paper is basically based on Mr. Eric S. Maskin’s (one of the 2007 Noble Price Winner in Economics) mechanism design theory, and also included game theory and auction theory to present a solution that can overcome the current issues when having resources allocation. As a result, I have come up with four conclusions: (1)The mechanism of solving resource allocation in application development division does exist, (2)Sealed ascending bid is an effective mechanism to solve this problem, (3)Resources can be fairly evaluated through bidding mechanism, (4)This mechanism can be applied to other similar issues. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-20T20:27:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-97-P95744019-1.pdf: 500529 bytes, checksum: d39bee704ccd76b6f7ab0a12a1df3393 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 誌謝.......................................................i
中文摘要..................................................ii THESIS ABSTRACT..........................................iii 目錄.......................................................v 圖目錄...................................................vii 表目錄..................................................viii 第一章 緒論................................................1 第一節 研究動機與目的....................................1 一. 研究動機...........................................1 二. 研究目的...........................................1 第二節 研究方法與流程....................................2 一. 研究方法...........................................2 二. 研究流程...........................................2 第三節 論文架............................................3 第二章 文獻探討............................................4 第一節 機制設計理論......................................4 一. 定理一:倘社會目標可實現,則目標必具單調性.........4 二. 定理二:設若社會至少有三個人,倘社會目標滿足單調性而且沒有否決權,則機制是可運作的.............................8 第三章 企業內應用軟體開發服務資源之競爭與衝突..............9 第一節 企業內應用軟體開發服務資源配置概況................9 第二節 軟體開發服務資源之使用分配問題...................11 一. 常見現象..........................................12 二. 問題分析..........................................14 第四章 解決方案研究.......................................17 第一節 設定目標與定義問題...............................17 一. 目標..............................................17 二. 問題..............................................17 第二節 設計解決方案.....................................19 一. 軟體工程師工時之競標拍賣..........................19 二. 拍賣機制..........................................19 三. 預期效益..........................................21 第三節 理論驗證.........................................28 一. 機制設計理論......................................28 二. 賽局理論..........................................34 第五章 結論與建議.........................................35 第一節 結論.............................................35 第二節 建議.............................................37 一. 對後續研究者的建議................................37 二. 對實務界的建議....................................37 三. 研究限制..........................................41 參考文獻..................................................42 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 企業內部軟體開發資源使用競爭問題之解決機制設計 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | A Solution Mechanism Design for the Competition of In-house Application Development Services within a Corporation | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 96-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳玲玲(Ling-ling Wu),朱炫璉(Hsuan-Lien Chu) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 拍賣理論,資訊技術服務管理,資訊資源管理,資源分配管理,軟體開發服務管理,賽局理論,機制設計, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Application Development Services Management,Auction Theory,Game Theory,Information Technology Resources Management,Information Technology Services Management,Mechanism Design,Resources Allocation Management, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 44 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2008-08-11 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計與管理決策組 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 會計與管理決策組 | |
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