論我國強制公開收購制度

Abstract

強制公開收購制度係針對控制權交易為規範的主要制度之一，其目的主要在確保所有股東在控制權交易發生時，能夠獲得平等參與交易的機會。而本文中所探討的控制權交易之範圍，聚焦於收購人與控制股東進行控制性股份收購之類型，蓋在此種情形中，控制股東與收購人間，往往會私下達成協議，少數股東難以知悉，遑論參與分配控制權交易所生的溢價。 比較法討論中，自適用的效果區分，可將控制權交易之管理制度分為全部收購規則、部分收購規則與市場規則等類型。我國現行制度實際上更為貼近部分收購規則的設計，而本文針對比較法上各個類型制度進行介紹及比較，試圖釐清究竟何種制度為更適合我國的制度。 若自法律經濟分析之效率觀點出發，全部收購規則及部分收購規則皆得阻礙所有的無效率控制權交易，但部分收購規則對於收購人的成本負擔較低，因此應較全部收購制度更具有代表性。再者，部分收購制度中，因其比例收購之特色，會導致控制股東往往在控制權交易後仍須留於原本的公司中，故應會對收購人之經營能力有更進一步之調查，制度本身具有過濾收購人的優劣之功能。而若再輔以股權結構及國家法制背景之分析，更可以得出針對股權集中的我國，部分收購規則較市場規則更合適的結論。 然而我國現行制度雖屬分析中，控制權交易類型裡較佳的部分收購規則，但仍存有許多問題，本文整理我國學者之討論，針對現行強制公開收購的適用要件、價格規定的欠缺、股權整合機制之欠缺及例外規定合理性等問題，參考比較法之規範，進行修法之建議。

In Taiwan, mandatory bid rule is one of the major rules regulating the “control transaction”, aiming at providing equal opportunities for all shareholders to participate ratably in the control transaction. In a system with concentrated ownership like Taiwan, to mitigate the conflict of interests between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders is vitally important. The controlling shareholders would reach the control transaction deal secretly, and thus the minority shareholder would be in no way to share the premiums. Therefore, the scope of the control transaction discussed in this paper focusing on the situations when the acquirer purchases shares that reaches control threshold from the controlling shareholders. In comparative studies, the control transaction regimes can be divided in to “General Offer Rule”, “Partial Offer Rule” and “Market Rule”. The mandatory bid rule in Taiwan features closer to the “Partial Offer Rule”. In this paper, an attempt is made to compare the merits and demerits among the regimes, determining the optimal regime for Taiwan. From the efficient point of view, inefficient transfers do not take place in both “General Offer Rule” and “Partial Offer Rule”. However, taking the cost of funds into account, acquirer bears lesser cost under “Partial Offer Rule”, meaning the latter would stop lesser efficient transfer from taking place. Moreover, taking ownership structure and national legal background into account, it can be concluded that, for a country with a more concentrated ownership structure and less developed shareholder derivative suit system, “Partial Offer Rule” is more appropriate than “Market Rule”. However, although the current regime in Taiwan falls within the category of preferable control transfer regime in the analysis results, there are still many issues yet to be solved. This paper summarizes discussions among scholars in Taiwan, focusing on the issues such as the applicability threshold for mandatory bid, deficiencies in pricing regulations, sell-out and squeeze-out regulations, and the reasonableness of exemption rules. This Paper refers to the comparative regulations and discussions to provide recommendations for the legislative amendments.