危機事故下的詢答分析:以普悠瑪號事故與太魯閣事故為例

Abstract

近年來我國遭逢許多危機與災難，例如新冠疫情、風災、重大交通事故等，皆促使政府必須及時應對，以消弭危機所帶來的社會與政治衝擊。其中台鐵局接連發生重大交通事故，不僅使得社會大眾對台鐵局的信任度下降，更令國人對台鐵改革政策的執行績效產生懷疑。為此本研究選擇台鐵在2018年10月及2021年4月，所發生的普悠瑪號翻覆事故與太魯閣號出軌事故，行政官員接受立法課責的質詢稿進行內容分析，以探討立法課責的效能，兩起事故中，行政院與台鐵局官員需要負起一定責任，其中政務官需要承擔政治責任，而事務官則須承擔行政責任。然而行政官員在面對立法課責時，會運用責難規避(blame avoidance)策略，來減少在質詢過程中的形象損害，以確保聲譽，將間接削弱課責的效能，因此探討行政官員的答詢內容有其重要性。不同政黨立委在質詢政務官與事務官時，會採用何種質詢策略?又行政官員如何運用責難規避策略回應不同政黨立法委員的質詢問題?結合過去有關口頭質詢與責難規避的研究，可以更深入的了解立委的質詢與行政官員答詢，兩者之間的互動關係，同時以正式的課責途徑檢視行政官員在危機事件中的回應行為。 為此本研究結合Maricut-Akbik (2021)的質詢監督分類，將立委的口頭質詢內容分為要求資訊、要求說明與解釋政策行為、要求改變政策行動、與威脅譴責制裁官員。並基於行政官員捍衛聲譽以確保政治資本的假設前提，結合Hood(2009)的責難規避策略分類，形成「詢答分析」架構，在此基礎上進行編碼與分析。本研究結果發現，不同政黨立委在質詢時，發言數量上具有差異性。且偏好使用「要求說明」與「要求資訊」的質詢策略。整體而言「政務官」與「事務官」的答詢策略，以承擔責任為主，唯有當事務官接受執政黨立委質詢時，才會偏好以責難規避策略答詢。

In recent years, our country has faced numerous crises and disasters, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, typhoons, and major transportation accidents, all of which have necessitated a prompt government response to mitigate the social and political impacts of these crises. The Taiwan Railways Administration (TRA) has experienced a series of major transportation accidents, leading to a decrease in public trust and raising doubts about the effectiveness of government policies for TRA reform. In this study, we examine two specific incidents involving TRA: the Puyuma train overturning accident in October 2018 and the Taroko Express train derailment in April 2021. We conduct content analysis of the questions raised by legislators during legislative sessions where government officials were held accountable. Our aim is to explore the effectiveness of legislative accountability in these two accidents. In these incidents, both administrative and TRA officials bear a degree of responsibility, with political officials taking political responsibility, and administrative officials bearing administrative responsibility. However, when facing legislative accountability, government officials often employ blame avoidance strategies to minimize damage to their public image during questioning, ensuring the preservation of their reputation. This can indirectly weaken the effectiveness of accountability. Therefore, examining the responses of government officials is essential. This study also investigates the questioning strategies used by legislators from different political parties when interrogating both political and administrative officials. By combining existing research on oral questioning and blame avoidance, we gain a deeper understanding of the interaction between legislators' questioning and the responses of government officials, within the context of formal accountability. To achieve this, we adopt Maricut-Akbik's (2021) categorization of interrogation oversight, which classifies legislators' oral questions into four categories: requests for information, requests for explanations and policy behavior, requests for policy changes, and threats of condemnation and sanctioning of officials. Based on the premise of government officials safeguarding their reputation to secure political capital, we incorporate Hood's (2009) categorization of blame avoidance strategies to create a "question-response analysis" framework, which forms the basis for coding and analysis. The results of this study indicate that legislators from different political parties differ in the number of questions they ask during legislative sessions and have preferences for using the "requests for explanations" and "requests for information" questioning strategies. Overall, both political and administrative officials primarily adopt a responsibility-bearing approach in their responses. However, administrative officials tend to prefer blame avoidance strategies in their responses when questioned by legislators from the ruling party.