中國反壟斷併購審查：經濟民族主義的觀點

Abstract

本研究的目的，是在美、中政經角力的視野下，觀察中國對跨國併購反壟斷審查權的運用。為此，本文嘗試以經濟民族主義理論，解釋中國如何以反壟斷併購審查的經濟法工具，回應美中貿易戰的外部衝擊。透過案例研究及文獻分析法，本文彙整中國反壟斷機關歷年來「干預併購審查」的模式，並聚焦於貿易戰爆發後的執法趨勢變化。立基於整體趨勢和重要案例探討，我們發現：（1）中國反壟斷機關干預的併購案，長期以來集中於技術密集與新興戰略產業；（2）美中貿易戰期間，中國反壟斷機關對外國半導體併購案的審查趨嚴，且其干預措施具有保護中國半導體產業的效果。 本研究論證，中國反壟斷機關干預併購案的動機，可能包含對本國產業、企業及物資供應安全的保護。美中貿易戰期間，西方經貿限制對中國半導體產業帶來的生存壓力，進一步驅使中國採取經濟民族主義式的反壟斷執法，藉由干預大型的外國半導體併購計劃，來確保本國半導體產業的供應安全與發展空間。本研究主要的理論貢獻是拓展經濟民族主義的解釋範圍，延伸至外資審查與跨國併購的領域。此外，我們也揚棄傳統以法理分析為主的研究途徑，藉由中國案例的實證基礎，剖析國家如何利用反壟斷調查審查機制，達成政治和戰略目標。

The aim of this study is to explore how China exercises its authority in anti-monopoly merger review amidst the geopolitical competition with the United States. Employing the theory of economic nationalism, I attempt to explain how China responds to the U.S.-China trade war through its merger control review. The research conducts case studies and document analysis to outline the patterns of China's merger review, emphasizing shifts in enforcement following the outbreak of the trade war. My thesis suggests that: (1) Chinese antitrust regulators have long focused their interventions in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) cases on technology-intensive and strategic emerging industries. (2) During the U.S.-China trade war, China’s antitrust authorities have intensified their scrutiny of M&A plans proposed by foreign semiconductor companies. Furthermore, the merger remedies they adopt can shield China's domestic semiconductor industry from foreign restrictions. The research demonstrates that China's antitrust authorities may intervene in M&A cases to safeguard the security of local industries, enterprises and material supplies. During the U.S.-China trade war, Western trade and investment restrictions have significantly increased the survival pressure on China's semiconductor industry. The stringent external environment further compels China to adopt economic-nationalist antitrust enforcement measures. Therefore, China's antitrust regulators tend to intervene in foreign semiconductor M&A plans, aiming to ensure the security of the supply chain as well as the ongoing development of domestic semiconductor industry. The theoretical contribution of this study lies in extending the scope of economic nationalism to the realms of foreign investment screening and cross-border M&As. Departing from the traditional legal analysis approach, I use empirical evidence from Chinese cases to examine how nations leverage antitrust review mechanisms to achieve political and strategic objectives.