公平交易法適用於勞動市場之研究

Abstract

在全球及台灣都面臨著經濟成長趨緩、勞工薪資停滯、就業市場萎縮及貧富差距擴大等問題。近年來越來越多的研究及關注指出，這些問題係出於勞動市場買賣雙方力量失衡。但此種現象並非一夕之間發生，而係由來已久，為何近年來全球才開始意識並重視到此項議題、若為勞動市場的問題，比較適當的管制手段應該是勞動法，抑或為競爭法，抑或兩者併行？若為競爭法，會有什麼適用上的困境、這些難題是否能解決等，產生了一系列的問題。 本文首先自勞動市場的概念切入，分析勞動市場買賣雙方，亦即勞雇雙方，力量失衡可能衍生的弊端將導致市場價格受雇主所掌握，也造就了薪資固定等情況。接著，本文透過歐美學理以及實務上所點出的現象中分析這股勞動市場上買方力量增強的原因，除因市場上資訊不對稱結構外，勞動市場上也開始出現許多偏利於雇主的協議，包含互不挖角協議（No-poaching agreement）、競業禁止協議（Non-compete agreement）等，這些都使得雇主力量增強並最終導致買方獨占（Monopsony）的現象發生。但由於買方獨占為市場結構失能的議題，勞動法規不論從立法目的、對市場參與者之定義、或是其規範內容來看，都非對此問題的最佳解藥。由於競爭法誕生之初，就被賦予了保持市場競爭，並促進經濟安定繁榮之功效，不論自美日或我國的競爭法制定歷史、立法目的來看，競爭法都是相較於勞動法規更為適當的管制手段。 在適用上，由於勞動法律關係中「從屬性」的概念，使得勞動市場上對於「勞務」或是「勞工」的定義，都對於其是否可成為我國公平交易法上「商品與服務」、「事業」帶來了阻礙。惟本文認為競爭法應介入的市場毋寧為人力資源市場，由於目前勞動市場反競爭行為及買方獨占現象對於人力資源市場影響較為深遠，且傳統上對以「事業」作為公平交易法啟動門檻之觀點，亦不再是適用上的問題。亦即將整體勞動市場分為上游的「人力資源市場」，此時的市場問題應由競爭法規範；下游的「勞動市場」因市場買賣雙方已進入勞動關係，此際之問題便由勞動法規處理。 在美日兩國的實務上，都已開始針對互不挖角協議或禁止招攬條款等雇主反競爭行為，有了相當的論述與應對，且也漸漸的出現了相關的訴訟案例可供我國參考，我國公平交易法並非對這些雇主共謀行為完全無法因應，惟其適用之方法以及構成要件的適用，都有待公平交易委員會頒布相關指引或是累積法院實務，最終，加強對勞動市場中反競爭行為的法律規範，以保障勞工權益和市場公平。本研究期冀能為臺灣的勞動市場提供新的法律視角，並促進相關政策和法律的改進，以應對勞動市場中的反競爭行為。

Both globally and in Taiwan, there are issues of slowing economic growth, stagnating wages, a shrinking employment market, and widening income inequality. Increasing research and attention in recent years have pointed out that these problems stem from an imbalance of power between buyers and sellers in the labor market. However, this situation did not happen overnight but has been ongoing for a long time. Why is this issue only recently begun to be recognized and addressed? If it is a labor market problem, whether labor law or competition law will be the more appropriate regulatory measure, or we should choose a combination of both? If we apply competition law, what challenges might arise, and can these difficulties be resolved? These questions give rise to a series of inquiries. This thesis first delves into the concept of the labor market, analyzing the possible drawbacks of the power imbalance between buyers and sellers, namely between employers and employees, which can lead to market prices being controlled by employers and result in wage-fixing situation. Next, through theoretical and practical analyses from Europe and the United States, the study examines the reasons behind the increasing buyer power in the labor market. Besides the asymmetric information structure in the market, there are also many agreements favorable to employers, such as no-poaching agreements and non-compete agreements, which strengthen employer power and ultimately lead to "Monopsony". However, since monopsony is an issue of market failure, labor laws and regulations are not the best solution considering their legislative purposes, definitions of market participants, or regulatory content. However, since its inception, competition law has been tasked with maintaining market competition and promoting economic stability and prosperity. Whether from the legislative history and purposes of competition law in the United States, Japan, or Taiwan, competition law is a more appropriate regulatory measure compared to labor laws and regulations. In application, the concept of "Subordination" between employers and employees brings obstacles to defining "Labor Services" or "Labor" as "Goods and Services" or "Enterprises" under Taiwan's Fair Trade Act. However, this thesis argues that competition law should intervene in the human resources market. Currently, antitrust practices and monopsony in the labor market have a profound impact on the human resources market, and the traditional view of using "Enterprise" as the threshold for applying the Fair Trade Act is no longer an obstacle. That is, the entire labor market can be divided into the upstream "Human Resources Market," where market problems should be regulated by competition law, and the downstream "Labor Market," where issues arising after entering labor relations should be handled by labor laws and regulations. In the practical experience of the United States and Japan, there has been considerable discussion and response to employers' anti-competitive behaviors such as no-poaching agreements or non-solicitation clauses, with relevant litigation cases gradually emerging for Taiwan's reference. Taiwan's Fair Trade Act is not entirely unable to respond to these employer collusion behaviors. However, the application methods and the conditions for its application require the Fair Trade Commission to issue relevant guidelines or accumulate court practices. Ultimately, strengthening legal regulations against anti-competitive practices in the labor market is necessary to protect workers' rights and market fairness. This research aims to provide a new legal perspective for Taiwan's labor market and promote the improvement of relevant policies and laws to address anti-competitive behaviors in the labor market.